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T h i s  B o o k  marks a moment in disability studies that is unique, as far 
as I can tell. This is the first time a volume on disability examines only one 
work, in this case, Jane Eyre. Many other books and special issues have 
looked at a variety of artists, filmmakers, novelists, poets, and so on, often 
under a uniting theme. But the idea of choosing only one literary work as an 
object of focus from a disability perspective means something quite signifi-
cant—it means we believe that disability studies has become so capacious, so 
much of a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary discourse, that it does not 
have to multiply its objects to bring along enough variety to sustain a single 
volume. Indeed, this is a coming of age moment for the study of disability.
 To the average reader, the role of disability does not seem particularly 
obvious in Brontë’s novel. Yes, Rochester goes blind and is maimed, but 
that comes at the end of the novel. The bulk of the story is about a young 
woman’s coming of age and her impassioned and frustrated love affair with 
her employer. Bertha is seen as a crazed monster, rarely as a woman with 
affective and cognitive disabilities. It would seem to most people that one 
could safely get through the issue of disability in Jane Eyre in a few short 
pages and then you would have done with it. As Dr. Johnson once famously 
remarked about a dog walking on its hind legs, “It is not done well; but you 
are surprised to find it done at all.” So too scholars might not care about 
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the quality of a disability analysis; rather they might be surprised that it was 
done at all.
 So this experiment conducted by David Bolt, Julia Rodas, and Eliza-
beth Donaldson, with the aid of all the authors in this volume, to see if 
Jane Eyre can sustain this multiple set of readings comes as a surprise but 
not in the way others might have predicted. In fact, the surprise one regis-
ters after reading all the chapters comes from wondering how it has been 
possible to read Jane Eyre without a serious consideration of disability. As 
the authors point out, while the feminist, colonialist, Freudian, and other 
dominant readings are more than valid, the point is that they all are largely 
ignorant of the basic facts about disability. For the most part even the best 
of these readings simply metaphorize disability. Given the former absence 
of disability studies in the humanities, there was no real way to talk about 
disability as disability. We saw this same problem in the case of race in lit-
erature, when early analyses of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, for example, 
focused on “man’s existential quest for meaning” or the “soul’s attempt to 
find enlightenment”—all the while completely ignoring the issue of race. As 
Freud once said in regard to his ideas of the phallic symbol, “Sometimes a 
cigar is just a cigar.” Likewise, sometimes disability is just disability.
 What does it mean to metaphorize disability? The process of metapho-
rization is a substitutive one in which you say something is something else. 
A woman is a rose; a scythe is death. Whether you substitute entire objects 
for others or you use parts for the whole, the effect is to distract, to disen-
gage from the initial object. When we say a woman is a rose, we are look-
ing away from the woman toward the rose. We are saying that roses smell 
sweet, look beautiful, and are fecund. Then we turn back to the woman and 
say “You, too, are all those things.”
 The problem with metaphor and disability is that disability already 
involves looking away. As the normate regards the person with a physical 
disability, the normate both wants to stare and to look away—both actions 
have the same ends, which are to objectivize and stigmatize by an inter-
related process of fascination and rejection (the latter in either or both the 
forms of disgust and dismissal). So disability has a special relationship to 
the process of metaphorization that other identities might share or might 
not. In any case, the idea that in Jane Eyre blindness is a metaphor for 
castration, for example, might work very well in a Freudian or a feminist 
analysis, but nevertheless such an approach fails to look directly at blind-
ness, as does David Bolt’s chapter, as a thing in itself, as an experience and 
an embodiment that does not have to steal its terms and borrow its exis-
tence through the process of metaphorization. Likewise, Bertha’s madness 
is rarely addressed directly as it is in Chris Gabbard’s chapter in this collec-
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tion, and the implications of metaphorizing madness have not been clearly 
identified as they are in Elizabeth Donaldson’s contribution. Instead of the 
more informed and nuanced readings in this volume, Bertha’s madness is 
generally seen in the line of postcolonial and feminist readings that might 
include other works like The Yellow Wallpaper and Wide Sargasso Sea. The 
chapters in this volume show us that before we can leap to the metaphor, we 
need to know the object. Before we can interpret the semiotics of disability, 
we need to understand the subjectivity of being disabled.
 I want to make clear that I am not denigrating these identity-based read-
ings, but I think they need to succeed, not precede, disability studies read-
ings. Theoretically those identity-based readings have put the cart before the 
horse, which means the horse has to do a lot more pushing and the way is 
not very clear. If we can have a firm understanding and foundation in seeing 
disabilities as they really are in themselves, as Matthew Arnold may have 
put it somewhat sightedly, then we might logically move to a more meta-
phorical and metacritical reading. But historically disability studies has been 
invisible in its nascence until fairly recently, so we cannot expect feminists or 
postcolonialists to have access to the increasingly larger and deeper pool of 
research in disability studies. The reason for this virtual ignoring of the dis-
ability studies archive is that disability is, as I have said elsewhere, the most 
discriminated category of oppression, at least from the point of view of aca-
demic recognition, if not in society in general.
 I also do not want to imply that we can actually see disability as it is. 
Obviously we exist now in a postmodern era of analysis, and the idea that 
something simply is no longer works. What I am saying, however, is that we 
need to begin with disability in all its complexity as a socially constructed 
entity that exists, too, in an embodied form. Disability is not in fact an 
object but a way of knowing, a way of being known, and a modality for 
corporeality. We can put that consideration first before we then use it in a 
meta-analysis of race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and so on.
 Perhaps the largest lesson of this volume is that the very best feminist 
or postcolonial criticism is only as good as its knowledge base. And, for 
example, the classic feminist works on Jane Eyre have had a pitifully small 
base on which to make large claims. As a result, the very best feminist works 
on Jane Eyre have had to take a common sense, which is to say ableist, per-
spective on disability. Thus, it seems logical, if you are not blind, to think 
of blindness as a form of castration. (If you are blind, you might laugh at 
this statement, even as you engage in completely uncastrated sex.) It is like-
wise logical, if you are not a single amputee, to see an amputated arm as an 
object of horror and of course—inevitably—as a symbol of castration. (If 
you are a person who is missing an arm, you might laugh at this assumption 
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as you attach your prosthesis so you can be the best of cyborgian lovers.) I 
have made this point in a somewhat lighthearted manner, but the reality is 
that these statements only reveal how any reading of Jane Eyre that fell back 
on the received “wisdom” of an ableist culture would be sadly impoverished 
and diminished. Even ballpark assessments of, say, biblical references to dis-
ability can be quite wrong, as Essaka Joshua points out in her chapter in 
this work. Likewise, from-the-hip assessments of the role of illness can be 
equally incorrect, as Susannah Mintz helpfully notes. Received wisdom is, 
in the end, a congealed form of the same ideology that plunged people with 
disabilities into unemployment, discrimination, segregation, stigma, and 
even annihilation and death. I do not want to exaggerate or be overly histri-
onic, but just as statements about the laziness of blacks, the avarice of Jews, 
the insensitivity of Asians, or the blood-thirstiness of Arabs or Native Amer-
icans fall back on stereotypes and local wisdom, so too do classic works 
such as The Mad Woman in the Attic objectivize and stereotype people with 
disabilities.
 One of our aims in reading a novel is to identify with and understand the 
characters in the work. Despite all our intellectualizing, a novel will never 
work if we do not make some kind of connection with the main character. 
How readers have over time come to understand Jane, Rochester, and Bertha 
tells us a lot about how much ideology and the ideological underpinnings of 
medical knowledge and psychological knowledge play a part in those acts of 
understanding and identification. As this volume shows us, the place of dis-
ability, illness, madness, and behavior will condition a response in the very-
directly-addressed “Reader” of Jane Eyre. So even a conventional analysis 
of this novel will have to grapple with character types available to the cul-
ture at a given time. As Julia Rodas points out, the autistic-acting nature of 
the character of Jane would send different signals of embodiment and psy-
chological existence to various groups of readers. And as Martha Stoddard 
Holmes indicates, these signals will reverberate through any filmic variation 
of the text. Margaret Rose Torrell too gives us an opportunity to understand 
in depth how embodiment will be part of this reception process. In short, 
the biocultural nature of being is surely vastly significant in any understand-
ing of Brontë’s text. Without that perspective, this text and what one can 
claim to understand about it is so much diminished.
 We can say, with the publication of this book, that no one can claim 
to write knowledgably on Jane Eyre without taking into consideration the 
issue of disability. And if one does, then one may well be continuing the 
legacy of ableism that, Reader, we can now see has haunted this work from 
its inception.
a  B o o k  o F  T h i s  s o R T  is as much the outgrowth of community as 
it is the product of individual effort. Without the larger discourses of dis-
ability studies, literary studies, and Victorian studies, such a book would 
simply have been unimaginable. In recognition of this fact, we, the editors, 
acknowledge an extraordinary debt to the communities that have nourished, 
supported, and inspired our contributions to this project: all our colleagues 
on the editorial board of the Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Stud-
ies; the International Network of Literary & Cultural Disability Scholars 
(especially Tom Coogan and Irene Rose); the thoughtful and opinionated 
scholars who comprise the membership of the DS-Hum listserv (especially 
tireless moderator, Mike Gill); the organizers and attendees of the Victo-
rian Seminar at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York 
(CUNY); Joseph Straus of the CUNY Graduate Center and William Eben-
stein of CUNY’s School of Professional Studies (SPS), who recently orga-
nized and hosted an open disability studies lecture series; three important 
groups promoting disability studies thinking at Columbia University (the 
members of the Future of Disability Studies working group at the Center 
for the Critical Analysis of Social Difference, the participants in the Seminar 
on Disability Studies associated with Teachers College, and the organizers 
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a s  o n e  o F  T h e  most widely read and widely written about novels in 
the English language, Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre (1847) holds an undis-
puted place in the Western canon and has been subject to critical and theo-
retical examinations from innumerable ideological, cultural, and literary 
perspectives. Despite extensive exegesis, however, the pervasive role of dis-
ability in the novel has yet to be fully recognized and articulated. While the 
reintroduction of Edward Fairfax Rochester at the close of the novel as a 
blind amputee compels one inescapable confrontation with significant phys-
ical and sensory impairment, readers too often experience this as the only 
encounter with disability. In fact, the presence of disability is by no means 
limited to this single representation. Bertha Mason Rochester, the infamous 
“madwoman” of the Thornfield attic, can also clearly be understood as a 
disabled character, one whose vocal, social, cognitive, or psychiatric impair-
ment is exacerbated by mistreatment and neglect. In addition to the impair-
ments of these two major characters, the novel also presents us with a range 
of other disabled subjects, including a collection of cousins who have singu-
lar psychic and social identities: the obsessive-compulsive Eliza Reed who 
shuns social intercourse and has each moment of her day scheduled “with 
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rigid regularity” (207; ch. 21);1 the bilious John Reed, without apparent 
familial affection, a possible gambling addict who eventually commits sui-
cide; the ascetic St. John who denies his fleshly appetites to the extent that 
he deliberately and contentedly invites his own death. Bertha’s family, an 
implicit spectral presence, is replete with disability, her brother Richard 
with “his feeble mind,” another brother “a complete dumb idiot,” and her 
mother “shut up in a lunatic asylum” (269; ch. 27). The life and philosophy 
of Jane’s closest childhood friend, Helen Burns, is thoroughly informed by 
her chronic degenerative illness. Even Jane herself is characterized in large 
part by her fundamental social anomaly, by a sense of distance and differ-
ence that shapes both her identity and her personal narrative.
 Despite the abundance of disability, however, this aspect of the novel 
has remained strangely disguised in the interpretive writing that surrounds 
it; the extraordinary presence of disability is typically figured in alternative 
terms, as a tool for articulating spiritual values, as an expression of sexist 
oppression or imperialist complicity, or as a symbol of divine punishment. 
In this interpretive process, embodied experiences of impairment and dis-
ability are erased. Conventional interpretive practices, constructing disabil-
ity as literary device rather than presence, have thus made it difficult for 
many readers to engage with, or even to recognize, the profusion of impair-
ment and disability in the novel.
 Manifestations of disability in Jane Eyre have traditionally been under-
stood in almost purely symbolic terms. The blinding and maiming of 
Rochester, the amputation of his hand, and the “madness” of Bertha have 
generally been read as deliberately dramatic emblems of other problems 
within the novel, especially Rochester’s hubris and Jane’s powerlessness. 
Rather than occupying its own complex identity position, disability appears, 
for many readers, to exist as a kind of overlay, a caution against losing 
control or against defying social convention. Among the interpretive acts 
that read disability in these stereotypical terms, perhaps none has gained 
greater currency than Richard Chase’s analysis of Rochester’s blindness as a 
symbolic castration, an interpretive gesture so widely disseminated and con-
sumed that it has come to represent the foundational meaning of blindness 
in Jane Eyre, despite the apparent contradiction of Rochester’s happy and 
fruitful marriage. This influential interpretation asserts a common literary 
and cultural convention, the “blindman”—a figure that serves as a conve-
niently reductive substitute for the real complexities of a visually impaired, 
 1. The version of the primary text referred to in this introduction is Charlotte Brontë, 
Jane Eyre, ed. Richard J. Dunn, 2nd ed. (New York and London: Norton, 1987).
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male identity. This blindman figure presents a feminized rendition of Roch-
ester, depleted and diminished, the loss of his left hand even suggesting phal-
lic amputation.
 The “madness” of Bertha, likewise, has most frequently been seen as 
standing in for some other veiled or unspeakable condition. Bertha is 
regarded, alternately, as an evocation of Jane’s tightly constrained interiority 
or as the “maddened double” of Brontë herself (Gilbert and Gubar, xi). Adri-
enne Rich sees the “madwoman” as a caution to the “powerless woman in 
the England of the 1840s,” Jane’s “opposite, her image horribly distorted 
in a warped mirror” (“Jane Eyre,” 469). Gayatri Spivak reads Bertha as a 
different sort of reflection: she is the colonial “Other,” a “figure produced 
by the axiomatics of imperialism” (“Three Women’s Texts,” 247). Her mad-
ness, for Spivak, represents the human/animal frontier that is central to the 
imperialist project of humanizing the Third World Other. Even fictional 
interpretations of the novel, like Jean Rhys’s groundbreaking Wide Sargasso 
Sea, seem to see Bertha’s disability as representing something else; in this 
instance, her “madness” is reconstructed as the strangulating mask of sexist 
and imperialist power imposed by an insecure and jealous husband, rather 
than as an intrinsic quality of Bertha’s embodied experience.
 While acknowledging the massive debt owed to the community of schol-
ars with whom we have shared Jane Eyre, this volume sets out not only to 
expand upon but also to depart from these long-standing interpretations, 
offering more nuanced readings of disability presence and asking vital ques-
tions about traditions of embodiment, representation, social intercourse, 
and identity. Customarily, impairment in Jane Eyre has been read unprob-
lematically as loss, an undesired deviance from a condition of regularity 
vital to stable closure of the marriage plot. But the work of disability schol-
ars informs and complicates our understanding of impairment and disability 
in Brontë’s text. For example, Lennard J. Davis has argued that the idea of 
disability emerges out of a Victorian context, citing the increasing use of sta-
tistics during this period, dating the first appearance of the word “normal” 
to 1840, and pointing to the “coming into consciousness” of the idea of the 
“norm” in the early years of the Victorian era (Enforcing Normalcy, 24). 
Jane Eyre’s representations of physiognomy and disability, likewise, par-
ticipate in an emerging modern medical discourse, a discourse that leads, as 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson notes, to eugenics and the “ascending scien-
tific discourse of pathology” at the end of the nineteenth century (Extraordi-
nary Bodies, 74). Published in 1847, Jane Eyre predates many of the major 
discoveries in Victorian medicine, such as pasteurization and the germ the-
ory of disease, yet the novel is contemporary with the early use of anesthesia 
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(other than alcohol and opiates) during surgery. Also contemporary with the 
publication of the novel is the opening of the Earlswood Asylum in 1847, 
which, in the wake of the Lunatics Act of 1845, signaled the beginning of 
a significant increase in the institutionalization of people with mental dis-
abilities in large residential hospitals (Wright). Jane Eyre is, therefore, his-
torically positioned at a time of radical transformation in the way Victorian 
bodies and minds were conceptualized, contained, and manipulated.
 The legacy of this transformation has been crucial to disability activism 
and theory, and to disability studies more generally, for in many ways we 
exist in the context of an increasing medicalization of bodies and minds. 
Critiques of the “medical model” of disability have been foundational in 
disability rights activism. As Paul Longmore states, this model posits dis-
ability as “a defect located in individuals” and “thereby individualizes and 
privatizes what is in fundamental ways a social and political problem” 
(Why I Burned My Book, 4). In contrast, Longmore and others argue that 
disability should be theoretically repositioned as a primarily social, political, 
legal, and cultural phenomenon. In keeping with the practice of disability 
studies scholarship, this book builds on an ongoing critique of the medical 
model and reveals the social and historical context of disability as it is rep-
resented in Jane Eyre, including an investigation of contemporary medical 
knowledge and practice. As a canonical text in English literature and cul-
ture, published on the cusp of the development of conceptions of normalcy 
and of modern medicine as we know it, Jane Eyre is ripe for such critical 
engagement. Drawing on the work of disability theorists, as well as scholar-
ship in women’s studies, deconstruction, autism studies, masculinity studies, 
caregiving, theology, psychoanalysis, and film studies, respectively, the con-
tributors to this volume suggest that disability may have both a more perva-
sive and a more subtle and textured place in Brontë’s novel than has hitherto 
been acknowledged, guiding us to an enriched understanding both of Jane 
Eyre and of the meanings and functions of disability.
 In the opening chapter, “The Corpus of the Madwoman: Toward a 
Feminist Disability Studies Theory of Embodiment and Mental Illness,” 
Elizabeth J. Donaldson builds on the tradition of previous feminist interpre-
tations of the madwoman, proposing a disability studies reading attuned to 
the connections between physiognomy and madness in Jane Eyre. Donald-
son argues that Bertha and Rochester reflect iconic contemporary images 
of raving and melancholy madness, a dyad famously depicted by Cauis 
Gabriel Cibber’s sculptures at the gates of Bethlem “Bedlam” Hospital. 
A close reading of Jane Eyre, furthermore, reveals how the novel’s logic 
of physiognomy and phrenology establishes a clear link between physical 
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impairment and mental illness: Bertha’s madness is both chronic and con-
genital, grounded in a family history of mental illness, while Rochester’s is 
acute and accidental, caused in part by physical trauma. Positioned in the 
context of Gilbert and Gubar’s quintessential reading of Bertha as Jane’s 
“maddened double” (xi), Donaldson departs from the established madness-
as-rebellion narrative and rejects the legacy of antipsychiatric readings of 
the text in order to open a new theoretical space for the analysis of embodi-
ment and mental illness. Using feminist science studies and theories of the 
body along with insights gained from disability scholarship, she calls for 
alternate feminist readings of madness that take into account the lived, cor-
poreal experience of mental illness and impairments.
 In keeping with the feminist interpretations that have become an essen-
tial part of Jane Eyre’s theoretical and critical history, the second chapter is 
informed by a blend of recent and classic works of feminism. Indeed, as is 
suggested in the title, “The Blindman in the Classic: Feminisms, Ocularcen-
trism, and Jane Eyre,” David Bolt frequently points to Gilbert and Gubar’s 
influential study. In his deconstructive reading, however, some feminisms 
become troubled by the exposure of the normative nature of literary sighted-
ness. After all, the term ocularcentrism denotes a perspective and, by exten-
sion, a subject position that is dominated by vision. The contention is that, 
grounded in ocularcentric epistemology and thus instrumental in shoring up 
what Garland-Thomson calls the “normate’s boundries,” the trope of the 
blindman is both ableist and patriarchal (Extraordinary Bodies, 8). That 
is to say, Bolt teases out the inherent bias in Brontë’s depiction of the blind 
Rochester, arguing that such a representation is incompatible with estab-
lished feminist commendations of the novel. This problem is illustrated in 
a comparison between Jane Eyre and a selection of overtly ocularcentric 
constructs perpetuated by Rudyard Kipling, Sigmund Freud, and John Mil-
ton. Bolt’s central concern is not that a female character’s empowerment is 
emphasized by a male counterpart’s disempowerment but that male disem-
powerment is here engendered by a patriarchal mythos of blindness.
 The third chapter turns away from Bertha and Rochester, the charac-
ters who more evidently embody disability in Jane Eyre, to suggest that the 
novel’s heroine may herself be understood in terms of disability identity. 
“‘On the Spectrum’: Rereading Contact and Affect in Jane Eyre” engages 
the early writing of autism pioneers Leo Kanner and Hans Asperger and 
considers Jane’s unusual affect and sociality within the context of medical, 
theoretical, and autobiographical writing on autism, ultimately suggesting 
that Jane occupies a place on the autistic spectrum. Julia Miele Rodas argues 
that readers tend to contextualize Jane’s emotional experience, the interior-
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ity of her passionate emotional life, her reduced affect, and the concealing 
of her deeply rooted feelings in terms of cultural history, understanding her 
extreme self-control and apparent poise as fitting with historically appro-
priate social conventions. Rodas points out, however, that because readers 
experience this self-control from the inside, Jane’s passions are highly visible 
and her most obvious autistic characteristics—her silence, flattened affect 
and remoteness—have rarely been noticed or questioned beyond a feminist 
context. This chapter claims that Jane’s aloofness and social idiosyncrasy 
do not represent a tacit acceptance—as some have argued—of the exploi-
tation and oppression of subject peoples but point rather to the political 
significance of solitude. Thus, Jane achieves new political stature, becoming 
a model for effective resistance to social control, her “private fecundity seed-
ing possibilities for oppressed and marginalized peoples, especially autistic 
persons,” who reject the punishing demands of “compulsory sociality.”
 Margaret Rose Torrell’s “‘From India-Rubber Back to Flesh’: A Reevalu-
ation of Male Embodiment in Jane Eyre” explores how Brontë’s display of 
male bodies performs interventions into cultural attitudes about gender and 
ability and gestures toward a nonhegemonic model of masculinity, which is 
complemented (rather than conflicted) by physical disability. The chapter 
examines how embodied status has been used as a dividing line between 
genders in Euro-American culture, creating a double binary of gender and 
embodiment, which links masculinity to disembodiment and femininity 
to embodiment and its counterpart, disability. But while the novel may be 
said to uphold ableist conceptions in its reconfigurations of gender hierar-
chies, Torrell argues that there are also moments in which both the gender 
and ability binaries become unmoored. One such moment is located in the 
final portrayal of Rochester. According to Torrell, Brontë’s representation of 
Rochester’s embodied masculinity, coupled with Jane’s embodied femininity, 
facilitates a reevaluation of both gender and ability hierarchies. For Torrell, 
then, Rochester achieves a fairly progressive integration of disability and 
masculinity that anticipates the type of nonoppressive, embodied masculin-
ity discussed by contemporary disability scholars and theorists of masculin-
ity: “just as the India-rubber stretches into flesh, so too does the model of 
masculinity stretch to encompass new, more inclusive possibilities for male 
embodiment.”
 D. Christopher Gabbard’s “From Custodial Care to Caring Labor: The 
Discourse of Who Cares in Jane Eyre” situates the novel vis-à-vis 1840s 
public policy reforms aimed at improving the treatment of mentally ill and 
disabled people. Gabbard observes that in narrating her story during the 
decade’s latter half, Jane reenacts in miniature the spirit of the national 
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reforms. The chapter presents two cycles of caregiving and disability—
Rochester and Bertha in the 1820s and 1830s followed by Jane and Roch-
ester in the 1830s and 1840s—with the two cycles manifesting a paradigm 
shift in philosophies of caregiving. Gabbard argues that Jane’s discovery of 
the difference between Rochester’s “custodial care” and the Rivers’ “caring 
labor” is brought about by her contact with Bertha and the protagonist’s 
subsequent wandering on the heath and convalescence at Moor House. By 
recourse to Ato Quayson’s “implied interlocutor,” Gabbard refreshes our 
understanding of Jane Eyre as bildungsroman, inferring that Jane develops 
morally through contact with Bertha, growing in her understanding and 
ethical consideration of divergent abilities. The reform Jane implements in 
the treatment of disability is seen in the way she interacts with Rochester at 
the end, bringing to the fore one of the novel’s major themes: the respon-
sibility of the individual charged with caring for another who is unable to 
live independently. Gabbard argues that the novel privileges the caregiving 
approaches exemplified by Maria Temple and the Rivers family and implic-
itly censures those of Rochester, Mrs. Reed, and Mr. Brocklehurst.
 Essaka Joshua’s “‘I Began to See’: Biblical Models of Disability in Jane 
Eyre” brings a theological perspective to the project. As Joshua notes, Brontë 
was “an adept commentator, absorber and interpreter of biblical material, 
and it is no surprise, given the extent of biblical allusion in Jane Eyre, that 
her biblical intertexts engage with disability.” This chapter establishes an 
important context for reading biblical references within the novel, point-
ing out that Judeo-Christian scripture itself deploys several models of dis-
ability, some negative (e.g., the associations with sin and punishment) and 
some positive (e.g., the associations with discipleship and spiritual worth). 
Joshua argues that the novel centers discussion of biblical disability on the 
spiritual role of sight and blindness and on the physical body’s relationship 
to the spiritual body, and that the allusions to biblical disability in Jane 
Eyre emphasize positive, spiritual gains. In fact, it appears that through her 
choice of biblical texts, “Brontë dissociates stigma and disability,” reinforc-
ing the idea “that disability is a symbol of being saved or chosen, and that it 
is a route to salvation.” Reading the novel with attention to its use of bibli-
cal references to disability, Joshua provides a more progressive understand-
ing of the novel’s account of disability than is often suggested. The chapter 
concludes that, if we read in the light of Brontë’s consistently redemptionist 
agenda, Rochester’s disability may be understood not as a punishment but 
rather as an indication of his spiritual well-being.
 Susannah Mintz’s “Illness, Disability, Recognition in Jane Eyre” pro-
poses that the novel reveals the cost of denying or suppressing difference 
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and longs for an alternative form of engagement with embodiment. Making 
use of the psychoanalytic theory of recognition, this chapter contends that 
Brontë records the possibility of a form of interaction that acknowledges 
and accepts the frailties of the body. Recognition insists that true acknowl-
edgement of another’s subjectivity is possible—indeed, that it is the basis 
of political and cultural understanding. Brontë’s novel, fascinated as it is 
by bodies, bodily shape, facial features, extremities of sickness and injury, 
renders these as axes of heightened intersubjective possibility where sub-
jects are tested for their capacity to tolerate and respect. Representations 
of disease, disability, or atypical bodies complicate the idea that these are 
inevitably problematical conditions rather than incidental to problems of 
social arrangement. In its emphasis on intersubjective regard as a means 
of disrupting hierarchical binaries of dis/ability, the novel reminds read-
ers of the need for less restrictive or determinative ways of thinking about 
bodies, selves, illness, and relationships. Mintz juxtaposes the text’s unsur-
prising participation in the structures of normalcy against its depiction of 
what might obtain between people in a world where “irregularity”—a word 
that recurs frequently in reference to the shape and symmetry of people’s 
bodies—does not need to be repaired. Jane Eyre openly displays troubled 
bodies, not to make them the fascinating or pitiable spectacles of the read-
erly stare but rather to return, time and again, to the scene of potential 
recognition.
 In our closing chapter, Martha Stoddard Holmes brings film studies and 
disability studies together to examine how the novel’s descriptions of dis-
ability have been portrayed in five key film adaptations ranging from 1944 
to 2006. Even though for some readers Rochester’s injured body facilitates 
Jane’s desire for him, his disabled body simultaneously presents a series of 
representational challenges for twentieth- and twenty-first century screen 
versions of the novel. This chapter, “Visions of Rochester: Screening Desire 
and Disability in Jane Eyre,” shows that while Brontë is direct and concrete 
in her descriptions of Rochester’s injuries—he has lost an eye and a hand—
and their appearance, film versions vary considerably in organizing special 
effects makeup, costume, and mise-en-scène to depict these impairments. 
While most versions render Rochester’s blindness visible through makeup 
and props, many counter the film adaptation’s need for compression by sup-
plementing the dialogue in which Jane and Rochester work through the 
meaning of his disability—including its supposed implications for sexual-
ity and marriage. Several add dialogue that frames blindness with angry 
assumptions of pity, culminating in a rebuff of Jane that does not align with 
the text of the novel. Further, only one version renders visible Rochester’s 
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amputation. Taken in the aggregate, Holmes observes, while film versions of 
Jane Eyre do articulate desire in the context of blindness, anger and pity are 
presented as obligatory gatekeepers to the happy ending.
 These chapters are connected not simply by their engagement with Jane 
Eyre and disability in general but also by their engagement with other more 
specific themes and critical traditions. The chapters speak to, with, and 
sometimes against each other. While both Donaldson and Gabbard begin 
with a reconsideration of Bertha’s mental illness, each has a different criti-
cal focus: Donaldson, the embodiment of mental illness; Gabbard, the act 
of caregiving. Bolt brings the process of deconstruction to the figure of the 
blindman and its ocularcentric premise, both in the novel itself and in the 
feminist literary criticism that follows. Though working within a similar 
framework, Torrell deconstructs binaries of male disembodiment and female 
embodiment. Joshua seeks to recuperate blindness in Jane Eyre in the criti-
cal context of biblical studies, which contrasts somewhat with Holmes’s 
work on the proliferation of modern film versions. Finally, Rodas positions 
Jane on the autism spectrum, giving her intense interior life and solitude a 
positive valence, yet Mintz stresses the close connection between Jane and 
Rochester and the “heightened intersubjective” relationship that their mar-
riage reveals.
 Collectively, these chapters argue that disability is crucial to a critically 
engaged reading of Jane Eyre. The madwoman and the blindman of our 
title call attention to the central critique of this book, that the massive tradi-
tion of scholarship around Brontë’s famous novel has largely been content 
to read the disability of Rochester and Bertha (and other representations of 
disability in Jane Eyre) as static symbol rather than as complex embodiment 
with meaning, context, and potential beyond that ascribed to the blindman 
or madwoman tropes. The Madwoman and the Blindman, then, marks just 
one moment in an ongoing conversation about Jane Eyre, about the value of 
disability, and about the importance of disability theory.

o v e R  T h i R T y  y e a R s  a g o ,  Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar pub-
lished The Madwoman in the Attic, a now classic text of early feminist 
literary criticism. Basing their title on the character of Bertha Mason, a 
madwoman secretly imprisoned in her husband’s attic, Gilbert and Gubar 
argued that the “maddened doubles” in texts by women writers of the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries “function as social surrogates,” projecting 
women writers’ anxiety of authorship in a male-dominated literary tradi-
tion (xi). Much like the determined women who fueled feminism in the 
1960s and 70s, these madwomen rebel against the strictures of patriarchal 
authority. Since then, the figure of the madwoman as feminist rebel has 
had a sustained cultural currency. As Elaine Showalter notes, “To contem-
porary feminist critics, Bertha Mason has become a paradigmatic figure” 
(68). Furthermore, as Showalter also notes, feminist critics have a sympathy 
for Bertha Mason that, ironically, Charlotte Brontë does not seem to share 
(68–69).
 Many factors, not the least of which is the proliferation of feminist criti-
cism and reading practices, have contributed to Bertha Mason’s paradig-
matic status and to contemporary readers’ newfound sympathy. Perhaps 
most notably, Jean Rhys’s Wide Sargasso Sea (1966), a prequel to Jane 
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Eyre, has influenced a generation of readers’ responses to Brontë’s character. 
Rhys’s novel tells the story of Bertha “Antoinette” Mason’s life in Jamaica 
before she marries Rochester and moves to England.1 Rhys gives voice to 
the previously silent madwoman and depicts what some might consider the 
causes of her madness—a difficult childhood, a dangerous social climate, 
and her husband’s ultimate betrayal. In her depiction of the events that pre-
cede Antoinette’s imprisonment in the attic, Rhys departs in important ways 
from Jane Eyre’s configuration of madness, which I discuss in greater detail 
below. By stressing the causal factors that contribute to Antoinette’s emo-
tional state, Rhys also makes it easier for readers to understand and to iden-
tify with the originally enigmatic and inarticulate character.
 Another factor significantly affecting contemporary readers’ sympathy 
for Bertha Mason is the changing cultural thinking about psychiatry, men-
tal illness, and the asylum from the late 1960s to the present. Psychiatry, 
feminist critics pointed out, unfairly pathologizes women.2 Mental illness, 
according to the antipsychiatry movement, is a myth.3 The asylum, Fou-
cault explained, is primarily a form of institutional control (Madness and 
Civilization).4 The reception of Rhys’s reevaluation of Bertha Antoinette 
Mason is in part a product of this particular historical moment in Eng-
land and in the United States. In this context, Bertha Mason, and the figure 
of the madwoman in general, became a compelling metaphor for women’s 
rebellion.
 Yet this metaphor for rebellion has problematic implications. Although 
Gilbert and Gubar warn readers against romanticizing madness, the figure 
of Bertha Mason as a rebellious woman subverting the patriarchal order by 
burning down her husband’s estate has a certain irresistible appeal. Gilbert 
and Gubar’s text and Rhys’s novel are, of course, not the only texts that 
 1. In Jane Eyre, the madwoman’s maiden name is Bertha Antoinette Mason. In Rhys’s 
novel, the parallel character’s maiden name is Antoinette Mason, née Cosway; the name 
Bertha is an invention of her husband Edward Rochester, and this renaming emphasizes 
the formative role he has in forging her mad identity in Rhys’s text. I use Bertha to refer to 
Brontë’s character, and Antoinette to distinguish Rhys’s character, although, for those who 
have read both texts, a hybrid of the two—Bertha Antoinette Cosway Mason Rochester—
might best describe the composite character who emerges.
 2. Key texts from this period of second-wave feminism include Showalter’s The Female 
Malady, which details the gendered nature of ideas about insanity, and Chesler’s Women 
and Madness and Ehrenreich and English’s The Sexual Politics of Sickness, which describe 
similar phenomena. For data on the predominance of women patients in the mental health 
care system from this period, see Guttentag, Salasin, and Belle; Howell and Bayes.
 3. For very explicit statements of this position, see Szaz, who was in turn influenced by 
the work of Laing.
 4. For American versions of this form of institutional critique, see Goffman, Rothman, 
and Grob.
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figure madness as rebellion. In Women and Madness, Phyllis Chesler views 
women’s madness as a journey of mythic proportions: “women have already 
been bitterly and totally repressed sexually; many may be reacting to or try-
ing to escape from just such repression, and the powerlessness it signifies, 
by ‘going mad’” (37). In the face of such repression, “going mad” might 
be considered the only sane response to an insane world (see, for example, 
Deleuze and Guattari). The ability to “go mad” also functions as a class 
marker of a higher sensibility: this sort of psychological depth has “the glow 
of transgressive glamour” (Pfister, 176). For example, in Mockingbird Years, 
Emily Fox Gordon describes her stay at a mental hospital as “the fulfillment 
of an adolescent fantasy”:
The status of mental patient would invest me with significance. [ . . . ] We 
had seen the movie David and Lisa [1962], a tearjerker about a love affair 
between two adolescent mental patients, and we were smitten with the 
romance of madness. I think we believed that if we cultivated dissocia-
tion we would become as beautiful as Lisa: our complexions would turn 
luminous, our faces grow expressive hollows, our hair lie flat and glossy. 
We spent our days edging cautiously around the grounds, taking drags on 
shared cigarettes and muttering “a touch can kill,” hoping to be noticed by 
the patients, drawn into their glamorous orbit by the magic of proximity. (5)
Oprah Winfrey’s remake of David and Lisa, more than thirty years after the 
original, illustrates the enduring romantic appeal of madness (Winfrey and 
Kramer).5 And even more recently, in a film version of Susanna Kaysen’s 
memoir, Girl, Interrupted, Angelina Jolie’s portrayal of a mental patient 
reinforces this linkage of mental illness and transgressive glamour for a new 
generation of young women. Similarly, in Gothika, a film that shares the 
sensibilities of Wide Sargasso Sea’s version of the post-Brontë madwoman 
tale, Halle Berry plays Dr. Miranda Grey, a former psychiatrist turned men-
tal patient who is incarcerated after murdering her husband, a psychiatrist 
who conceals his madwomen victims in a barn basement rather than an 
 5. The previous film David and Lisa (Perry and Heller 1962) is based on the study by 
Rubin (1961). See Kesey’s novel One Flew over The Cuckoo’s Nest (1962) and Forman and 
Douglas’s subsequent film (1975) for the masculinized counterpart of the glamorization of 
madness, which ironically also trivializes and denigrates the experience of people with mental 
illness. In Cuckoo’s Nest, the patients fall into two categories: those in therapy appear to suf-
fer from socially produced ailments and are distinguished from the chronic (real?) patients, 
who seem to fall outside the realm of discourse, sympathy, and redemption. This is a point 
that Mitchell and Snyder also discuss (Narrative Prosthesis, 173–74), and that I explore in 
greater detail in another essay, “The Psychiatric Gaze.”
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attic. In keeping with the contemporary madwoman tradition in fiction, Dr. 
Grey’s madness is not actually mental illness: her body is possessed by the 
angry spirit of a woman her husband had abused.
 However it is romanticized, madness itself offers women little possibility 
for true resistance or productive rebellion. As Marta Caminero-Santangelo 
argues in her aptly titled, The Madwoman Can’t Speak: Or, Why Insanity Is 
Not Subversive, Bertha Mason’s madness only “offers the illusion of power” 
(3). Using both fictional madwomen and women’s biographical accounts of 
asylum experiences, Caminero-Santangelo reveals the limited political effi-
cacy of the mad subject. Similarly, Shoshana Felman writes:
Depressed and terrified women are not about to seize the means of pro-
duction and reproduction: quite the opposite of rebellion, madness is the 
impasse confronting those whom cultural conditioning has deprived of 
the very means of protest or self-affirmation. Far from being a form of 
contestation, “mental illness” is a request for help, a manifestation both of 
cultural impotence and of political castration. (8)
Furthermore, and this is a crucial point for my argument here, using mad-
ness to represent women’s rebellion has undesirable effects due primarily to 
the inevitable, as the previous quotation illustrates, slippage between “mad-
ness” and “mental illness.” While Gilbert and Gubar make it clear that their 
discussion concerns madness as a metaphor, not mental illness in the clinical 
sense, this distinction proves impossible to maintain. Fictional representa-
tions of madness have a way of influencing clinical discourses of mental 
illness and vice versa. As Showalter has demonstrated, the figure of Ber-
tha Mason circulated in precisely this way during Brontë’s time: “Bertha’s 
violence, dangerousness and rage, her regression to an inhuman condition 
and her sequestration became such a powerful model for Victorian readers, 
including psychiatrists, that it influenced even medical accounts of female 
insanity” (68).
 Why is the association between women’s rebellion/madness and men-
tal illness undesirable? In some ways it is not. Beginning in part with this 
insight, feminist critiques of psychiatry and psychology have provided us 
with necessary and important analyses of the gendered politics of psychiatric 
diagnoses: it is certainly true that women have been disproportionately and 
in some cases even falsely diagnosed as mentally ill. And it is certainly true 
that psychiatry and psychiatric hospitals were in dire need of outside critics 
in the early days before deinstitutionalization and the patient rights move-
ment transformed the mental health care system. However, at this particular 
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historical moment, one in which disability studies is coming of age, I believe 
that the madness/rebellion configuration subtly reinforces what has become 
an almost monolithic way of reading mental illness within feminist literary 
criticism and perhaps in the larger culture of women’s studies scholarship.6 
This is undesirable, I would argue, because this configuration of madness, if 
it remains widely accepted and uncontested, may limit our inquiry into mad-
ness/mental illness.
 Indeed, one could argue, when madness is used as a metaphor for femi-
nist rebellion, mental illness itself is erased. In Illness as Metaphor, Susan 
Sontag describes “the punitive or sentimental fantasies concocted” about 
tuberculosis and cancer and attempts to counteract stereotyped conceptions 
of these diseases (3). In comparison, the madness-as-feminist-rebellion meta-
phor might at first seem like a positive strategy for combating the stigma tra-
ditionally associated with mental illness. However, this metaphor indirectly 
diminishes the lived experience of many people disabled by mental illness, 
just as the metaphoric use of terms like lame, blind, and deaf can misrepre-
sent, in ways that have ultimately harmful political effects, the experience 
of living with those physical conditions. As someone who often acts as an 
advocate for family members disabled by severe mental illness, I approach 
this subject with a certain sense of political urgency. In my experience, theo-
ries that pay attention exclusively to the social causes and construction of 
mad identity while overlooking the material conditions of the body, and 
the body as a material condition, have a limited political scope.7 A feminist 
disability studies theory of mental illness that includes the body, one which 
theorizes bodies as a “material-semiotic generative nodes” and mental ill-
nesses as physical impairments, would be a timely and productive way of 
developing the discussion of madness/mental illness within women’s studies 
scholarship (Haraway, “The Biopolitics,” 208).8 Perhaps the most appropri-
 6. The impressive body of work by feminist historian Nancy Tomes and recent books 
by Jonathan Metzl are notable exceptions here. Tomes was an early critic of female malady 
interpretations of insanity and of the madness-as-feminist-rebellion configuration. Metzl of-
fers nuanced examinations of gender, race, and the historical and cultural contexts of mental 
illness while still affirming the material reality of mental illness as disease.
 7. My mother has schizophrenia. Her emotional distress, paranoid delusions, and hal-
lucinations were formative parts of my childhood, and these untreated symptoms continue 
to shape our lives. A younger brother of mine also has schizophrenia. After several arrests, 
periods of homelessness, and forced hospitalizations, he is currently a client of a forensic as-
sertive community treatment team, which provides him with outpatient medical care and the 
much-needed help of overworked and underpaid social workers. My thinking about mental 
illness reflects this ongoing personal history.
 8. In the time since this essay was originally researched and published (2001), other 
scholars have made similar remarks. On the subject of mental illness and disability studies 
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ate and useful way to begin thinking through a theory of embodiment and 
mental illness is with the paradigmatic figure of women’s madness, Jane 
Eyre’s Bertha Mason.
rereadIng The MadwoMan in The aTTic
A feminist disability studies reading that stresses the connections between 
madness and physiognomy, between the mind and body, provides us with 
an alternate way of conceptualizing madness in Jane Eyre. In this reading, 
Bertha Mason’s madness is a sociomedical condition, a secret family his-
tory of mental illness. This family history precedes and supersedes Bertha 
Mason’s marriage. Jane Eyre’s plot rests on a structure not exactly of mad 
doubles but of juxtapositions between normative and non-normative bodies, 
between the accidental and the congenital, between masculine rationality 
and feminine embodiment, and between melancholy and raving madness. 
Reading the body is a central practice in Jane Eyre: madness gets its mean-
ing from the novel’s underlying logic of physiognomy.
 While the novel to a certain extent deconstructs ideals of beauty and the 
perfect body, it simultaneously is heavily invested in the notion of physi-
ognomy, of reading moral character through facial features.9 Jane Eyre’s 
rival for Rochester’s affection, the “beautiful Miss Ingram,” for example, 
is described as “moulded like a Diana. [ . . . ] The noble bust, the sloping 
shoulders, the graceful neck, the dark eyes and black ringlets were all there” 
(161; ch. 17).10 Rochester describes his supposed rival for Jane’s affection, 
St. John, as “a graceful Apollo [ . . . ] tall, fair, blue-eyed, and with a Grecian 
profile” (422; ch. 37). Yet these classically beautiful bodies enclose flawed 
theories, Mollow writes, “analyses that privilege disability over impairment deflect attention 
from the political nature of impairment itself” (288). She also notes that framing disability 
primarily in terms of social oppression may “sacrifice [ . . . ] a way of thinking in political 
terms about the suffering some impairments cause” (287). Nicki also stresses a movement 
away from an exclusively social model of psychiatric disability: “In order for mental illnesses 
to be conceived as real illnesses and those afflicted to be treated appropriately, mental illnesses 
must not be seen purely in terms of their cultural and social components” (83). She notes 
that “a social constructionist approach to mental illness [ . . . ] may be used to undermine 
mental illness as a legitimate illness and disability,” which may in turn harm women disabled 
by psychiatric illnesses (84).
 9. Davis’s Bending over Backwards observes that Jane’s unconventional plainness 
marks her as an abnormal heroine for a novel (96). Kaplan also notes how “Jane’s constel-
lation of defects [ . . . ] works as a defensive counterdiscourse” (“Afterword,” 309).
 10. The version of the primary text referred to in this chapter is Charlotte Brontë, Jane 
Eyre (New York: Bantam, 1981).
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characters who are not successful in their matches. St. John rejects the per-
fect beauty of Rosamond and is in turn rejected by “plain” Jane. Blanche 
Ingram’s face and her facial expressions contradict her perfect form: “but 
her face? Her face was like her mother’s; a youthful unfurrowed likeness: 
the same low brow, the same high features, the same pride. [ . . . ] [H]er 
laugh was satirical, and so was the habitual expression of her arched and 
haughty lip” (161; ch. 17). Beauty may be skin deep, but expression and 
gesture are visually evident on and through the surface of the body and, 
if read correctly, are accurate manifestations of inner moral character and 
identity.
 The narrator herself cannot escape becoming the object of the structur-
ing narrative of physiognomy. As Miss Ingram’s mother remarks: “I am a 
judge of physiognomy, and in hers [Jane’s] I see all the faults of her class” 
(166; ch. 17). Rochester, a much more sensitive reader than the Ingrams, 
also reads Jane’s body, more precisely her head and face. Borrowing from 
the terms of phrenology, the study of character based on the shape of the 
head, Rochester at one point describes Jane as having “a good deal of the 
organ of Adhesiveness” (236; ch. 23: see figure 1).
 According to phrenology, inner organs of the brain are associated with 
specific personality traits and cognitive skills. The over- or underdevelop-
ment of these inner organs can be read through the external shape of the 
skull and its protrusions and recesses (Davies, 4). Adhesiveness, sometimes 
depicted as two sisters embracing (see figure 2), signifies social bonds and 
friendship.11
 The offhand reference to “the organ of Adhesiveness” is never explained 
in Jane Eyre, which seems to suggest the audience’s familiarity with this 
term. In keeping with this emphasis on the continuity between the external 
head and the internal mind, Rochester, while posing as a gypsy fortune teller, 
quickly throws aside the pretense of reading Jane’s palm in favor of reading 
her countenance: “what is in a palm? Destiny is not written there. [ . . . ] 
[I]t is in the face: on the forehead, about the eyes, and in the eyes themselves, 
in the lines of the mouth” (185–86; ch. 19).12 Jane, previously skeptical of 
the gypsy’s powers, then states, “Ah! now you are coming to reality [ . . . ] 
 11. Whitman was particularly proud of the development of his organ of adhesiveness. 
See Whitman’s phrenological chart in the second edition of Leaves of Grass, which was pub-
lished by the American phrenologists Fowler and Wells (reprinted in Madeleine Stern, 76–77). 
The image of the two sisters embracing recalls Brontë’s relationship to her sisters as well as 
the many references in Jane Eyre to the likeness between Jane and Rochester, “familiar to me 
as my own face in a glass” (190; ch. 19).
 12. Although palmistry as a science is discounted in this scene, the gesture of hands is 
quite significant in Jane Eyre, a point that I discuss in greater detail later.
FiguRe 1.  Numbered and listed phrenological organs. From Samuel R. Wells’s New Physiog-
nomy (1871). Courtesy of the Library Company of Philadelphia.
FiguRe 2.  Illustrated phrenological organs. From Samuel R. Wells’s New Physiognomy 
(1871). Courtesy of the Library Company of Philadelphia.
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I shall begin to put some faith in you presently” (186; ch. 19). Both Jane and 
Jane Eyre the novel partake in a deep abiding faith in the discerning powers 
of physiognomy.
 Physiognomy was also used to discern madness and idiocy, two men-
tal states that were commonly discussed in tandem. John Caspar Lavatar’s 
Essays on Physiognomy (1789) introduced to many English readers a con-
nection between facial expressions and insanity. By the time Brontë was 
writing Jane Eyre, Alexander Morison’s depictions of madness in texts like 
The Physiognomy of Mental Disease (1840) were familiar and “greatly 
influential” (Gilman, 100).13 When Jane first sees Richard Mason, the mad-
woman’s brother, she notes:
[H]e was a fine-looking man, at first sight especially. On closer examina-
tion, you detected something in his face that displeased; or rather, that 
failed to please. His features were regular, but too relaxed: his eye was large 
and well cut, but the life looking out of it was a tame, vacant life—at least 
so I thought. (178; ch. 18)
On second sight, Jane, who fittingly has a distinctive talent for sketching 
revealing portraits, remarks, “I liked his physiognomy even less than before 
[ . . . ]. For a handsome and not unamiable-looking man, he repelled me 
exceedingly” (178–79; ch. 18). Immediately juxtaposed with Jane’s exami-
nation, the Ingrams’ perceptions of Richard’s features differ significantly: “a 
beautiful man,” “a pretty little mouth,” “what a sweet-tempered forehead,” 
“such a placid eye and smile!” (179; ch. 18). The Ingrams, of course, are not 
good judges of character. Jane’s more accurate evaluation of Richard’s phys-
iognomy is verified later when we learn about Richard’s congenital legacy. 
Richard is Bertha’s brother, a Mason, and as such is more than likely des-
tined to hereditary madness or idiocy according to Rochester: “he has some 
grains of affection in his feeble mind [ . . . but he] will probably be in the 
same state [as his siblings] one day” (291; ch. 27).
 The novel’s assumptions about biological destiny are also explicitly rein-
forced in the discussions about Rochester’s ward Adèle, “the illegitimate 
offspring of a French opera-girl [Céline]” (135; ch. 15). Once Rochester 
discovers that his mistress Céline is having an affair, Adèle’s paternity is 
cast forever in doubt: “the Varens, six months before, had given me this 
fillette Adèle, who she affirmed, was my daughter; and perhaps she may 
 13. Gilman has compiled an extensive collection of the icons of madness, including La-
vatar’s and Morison’s illustrations. My discussion here owes much to Gilman’s work. Also 
see Hartley for a history of physiognomical thinking in the nineteenth century.
T h e  c o R p u s  o F  T h e  M a d w o M a n  21
C
h
a
p
ter 1
be, though I see no proofs of such grim paternity written in her counte-
nance: Pilot [my dog] is more like me than she” (135; ch. 15). Though Jane 
searches Adèle’s face for a resemblance to Mr. Rochester, she “found none; 
no trait, no turn of expression announced relationship” (136; ch. 15). In the 
absence of a confirmed, legitimated paternity, Adèle is defined by her matri-
lineal origins—and she is indelibly, innately French. Jane sees in Adèle “a 
superficiality of character, inherited probably from her mother, hardly con-
genial to an English mind” (136; ch. 15); “there was something ludicrous 
as well as painful in the little Parisienne’s earnest and innate devotion to 
dress” (160; ch. 17). Rochester explains, “I am not her father; but hearing 
that she was quite destitute, I e’en took the poor thing out of the slime and 
mud of Paris, and transplanted it here, to grow up clean in the wholesome 
soil of an English country garden” (135; ch. 15). Adèle’s French nature is 
checked by her English nurture: “As she grew up, a sound English education 
corrected in a great measure her French defects” (431; ch. 38). For Adèle, 
female is to male as nature is to nation. And the nation is always England.14 
Embodiment and the imperatives of the physical are a matrilineal legacy. 
Enculturation and Englishness become patrilineal prerogatives. That Adèle 
is somehow tainted by her mother is in keeping with the novel’s anxious 
relationship to female and to disabled bodies.
 The madness of Bertha Mason, “the true daughter of an infamous 
mother,” is similarly congenital (291; ch. 27). Grounded in her body, her 
madness is contextualized as a matrilineal legacy of national, ethnic identity 
and physical disorder: “Bertha Mason is mad; and she came of a mad fam-
ily; idiots and maniacs through three generations! Her mother, the Creole, 
was both a madwoman and a drunkard!—as I found out after I had wed 
the daughter: for they were silent on family secrets before” (277; ch. 26). 
Yet at the same time, the gestation of her madness is specifically linked to 
her drinking and to her sexual appetites—failures of the will, not the body, 
in Rochester’s opinion. Therefore, despite Bertha Mason’s fated madness, 
Rochester still holds her morally accountable for her illness. For example, 
at one point Jane upbraids Rochester for speaking of his wife with con-
tempt, “Sir [ . . . ] you are inexorable for that unfortunate lady: you speak of 
her with hate—with vindictive antipathy. It is cruel—she cannot help being 
 14. Female bodies are often identified in tellingly reductive ways in Jane Eyre. Blanche 
Ingram, whose body is said to resemble Bertha Mason’s, is “dark as a Spaniard” (162), and 
Bertha Mason’s mother is simply “the Creole” (277). After Bertha Mason’s madness mani-
fests itself, Rochester embarks on a geographic search “for the antipodes of the Creole” and 
chooses an international menu of mistresses—an Italian, a German, and finally the French-
woman who is Adèle’s mother (296). See also Spivak (“Three Women’s Texts”).
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mad” (286; ch. 27). However, according to Rochester, Bertha Mason can 
help being mad, although to a limited extent: “her excesses had prematurely 
developed the germs of insanity” (292; ch. 27). Rochester also, for what it 
is worth, distinguishes the source of his hatred: he claims to hate her not for 
being mad but for having those excesses.
 Bertha Mason would be recognizable to Victorian readers as an exem-
plar of “raving madness,” depicted by Cauis Gabriel Cibber’s well-known 
sculpted figure over the gates of Bethlem “Bedlam” Hospital (Gilman, 
17–19; see figure 3, p. 24, right). Cibber’s figure is restrained by chains, 
a common image in connection with raving madness or mania. Rochester 
himself mimes key features of this image in a game of charades earlier in the 
novel: “Amidst this sordid scene, sat a man with his clenched hands resting 
on his knees, and his eyes bent on the ground. [ . . . ] As he moved, a chain 
clanked; to his wrists were attached fetters. ‘Bridewell!’ exclaimed Colonel 
Dent, and the charade was solved” (172–73; ch. 18). Bridewell refers simul-
taneously to the infamous prison and to the secretly imprisoned bride Ber-
tha, as well as to Rochester who is bound to her by marriage. Paraphernalia 
of the prison, the fetters and chains were all-too-common paraphernalia of 
the asylum, despite the attempts of reformers. For example, Edward Wake-
field’s influential 1815 broadside publicized the case of William Norris, who 
had been fastened to a short, foot-long chain by the neck and warehoused in 
Bethlem Hospital for over ten years (Gilman, 153–55). However, by the time 
Jane Eyre was published in 1847, only a handful of English asylums had dis-
continued the practice of mechanically restraining patients (Shortt, 128).15 
In the novel, restraint and isolation are presented as necessary conditions 
of raving madness. Once Bertha is declared mad, she, “of course,” must be 
sequestered: “since the medical men had pronounced her mad, she had, of 
course, been shut up” (292; ch. 27). When Rochester publicly reveals Ber-
tha’s existence, he restrains her while Jane and others watch: “he mastered 
her arms; Grace Poole gave him a cord, and he pinioned them behind her: 
with more rope, which was at hand, he bound her to a chair” (279; ch. 26). 
Even if Jane Eyre should happen to go mad, she will not escape the require-
ments of restraint, as Rochester explains:
Your mind is my treasure, and if it were broken, it would be my treasure 
still: if you raved, my arms should confine you, and not a strait waistcoat—
your grasp, even in fury would have a charm for me: if you flew at me as 
 15. In addition to Shortt, other helpful histories of asylum life and mental illness in 
nineteenth century England and America include Scull, Tomes (The Art of Asylum Keeping), 
Dwyer, and Wright.
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wildly as that woman did this morning, I should receive you in an embrace, 
at least as fond as it would be restrictive. (286; ch. 27)
Whether confined by a straitjacket, also known as an “English camisole,” or 
by Rochester’s fond embrace, the mad and manic body appears to warrant 
physical restraint (Gilman, 153).
 Above the gates of Bedlam, Cibber’s sculpture of raving madness faced 
its counterpart, melancholy madness (see figure 3, p. 24, left). Similarly, once 
Bertha dies in the fire that she begins, Rochester becomes her would-be mir-
ror image, the second half of Cibber’s mad dyad. After the fire, Rochester is 
“blind, and a cripple”: he is missing one eye, has limited sight in the remain-
ing eye, and has had one hand amputated (410; ch. 36). Though Rochester’s 
blindness and missing hand might have seemingly little to do with Bertha’s 
madness, these physical alterations mark him as an icon of melancholy mad-
ness.16 In Cibber’s sculpture, the clenched hands and chained wrists of the 
raving madness figure are juxtaposed with the melancholic’s hidden hands, 
which almost seem to disappear at the wrist. In Seeing the Insane, Sander 
Gilman identifies hidden or obscured hands as a conventional element in the 
iconography of melancholia. Symbolizing “the melancholic’s ineffectuality,” 
the hidden hands are also a common gesture of grieving (Gilman, 14). When 
Rochester shows Jane his amputation, his missing hand alludes to this tradi-
tion of images: “‘On this arm I have neither hand nor nails,’ he said, draw-
ing the mutilated limb from his breast, and showing it to me” (417; ch. 37). 
Not only is the hand missing, permanently obscured, but the blinded Roch-
ester also draws his hand from his breast. The gesture of hiding this absence 
further marks him as melancholic. Jane recognizes this quickly, “I will be 
[ . . . ] eyes and hands to you. Cease to look so melancholy” (416; ch. 37).
 At her death, Bertha’s disabling mental illness is transferred to the body 
of her husband as physical impairment and blindness, which, in turn, are 
deployed by Brontë to depict melancholy madness. Paradoxically, Roch-
ester’s blindness helps to make madness visible. Rochester, because of his 
blindness, invokes a notion of the inescapable predominance of interior 
 16. Admittedly, when Jane learns that Rochester is blind, she thinks to herself, “I had 
dreaded worse. I had dreaded he was mad” (410; ch. 36). While this statement makes a clear 
distinction between blindness and madness, I would argue that the madness that Brontë is 
distinguishing from blindness here is raving madness, not melancholy. Jane’s fear or dread 
of raving madness is evident from her previous reactions to Bertha and to Rochester’s earlier 
threat to “try violence,” which she prevents in part by repositioning his hand: “I took hold 
of his clenched hand, loosened the contorted fingers” (287–86; ch. 27). In Jane Eyre, though 
Bertha’s raving madness is certainly “worse” than Rochester’s blind melancholy, they share 
a symbiotic relationship.
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vision, an interiority that threatens to separate the self from the exterior 
world, just as a severe mental illness might. After his impairment, Rochester 
retreats to the desolate Ferndean manor-house, and his self-imposed exile 
there parallels the seclusion of Bertha Mason:
[O]ne saw that all to him was void darkness. He stretched his right hand 
(the left arm, the mutilated one, he kept hidden in his bosom): he seemed to 
wish by touch to gain an idea of what lay around him: he met but vacancy 
still [ . . . ]. He relinquished the endeavor, folded his arms, and stood quiet 
and mute in the rain. (413; ch. 37)
Like an inmate in an asylum yard, Rochester’s folded arms, his mute ges-
tures, and his inability to seek cover from the rain illustrate the self-neglect 
and social isolation associated with melancholy madness.
 In a text so occupied with looking and with the way faces look, Roch-
ester’s blindness and his “cicatrized visage” threaten to place him outside 
of the novel’s prevailing visual economy (417; ch. 37). Yet the vision of 
Jane keeps him firmly placed within this purview. After the fire, Rochester 
becomes a safely specular object, and the invisible Jane can now gaze at 
Rochester whenever she wishes: “in his countenance I saw a change [ . . . ] 
that looked desperate and brooding” (412; ch. 37). Jane’s narrative encour-
ages readers not to stare but to gaze with pity upon Rochester’s newly dis-
abled body: “It is a pity to see it; and a pity to see your eyes—and the scar of 
fire on your forehead: and the worst of it is, one is in danger of loving you 
too well for all this; and making too much of you” (417; ch. 37).17
 Despite the continuity between Bertha’s raving madness and Roches-
ter’s melancholy, Rochester’s impairments differ in significant ways. While 
Bertha’s madness is congenital and chronic, Rochester’s is coincidental and 
curable. In addition to the associations with melancholy, Jane also compares 
Rochester’s impairments to Nebuchadnezzar’s temporary madness:
It is time some one undertook to rehumanize you [ . . . ] for I see that you 
are being metamorphosed into a lion, or something of that sort. You have 
a faux air of Nebuchadnezzar in the fields about you, that is certain: your 
hair reminds me of eagle’s feathers; whether your nails are grown like bird’s 
claws or not, I have not yet noticed. (417)
 17. See Garland-Thomson for the distinction between the gaze and the stare—“the gaze 
intensified” that frames the body as “an icon of deviance” (Extraordinary Bodies, 26). See 
also Shapiro’s No Pity for a critique of the politics of pity regarding the disabled body.
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After Nebuchadnezzar has a prophetic dream of a blasted tree and the dis-
solution of his kingdom, he undergoes a brief period of madness that trans-
forms him into an animal-like, subhuman figure: “he was driven from men, 
and did eat grass as oxen, and his [ . . . ] hairs were grown like eagles’ 
feathers, and his nails like bird claws” (Daniel 4:33).18 Later, Nebuchadnez-
zar’s reason returns to him. Similarly, Rochester’s first marriage proposal 
to Jane is followed by a lightning blast that destroys a tree, foreshadow-
ing Rochester’s future punishment and paralleling Nebuchadnezzar’s dream. 
Just as Nebuchadnezzar returns to reason, Rochester wakes from the dream 
of blindness and of disability. The closed eyes of the sleeping dreamer seem 
temporarily blinded. Imprisoning and isolating the dreamer, the dream 
state represents the threat of inescapable interiority, or madness. Rochester 
wakes—regains his sight—in time to see his newborn son and more impor-
tantly, his resemblance in his son’s eyes: “When his first-born was put into 
his arms, he could see that the boy had inherited his own eyes, as they once 
were—large, brilliant, and black” (432; ch. 38). Rochester can therefore 
verify his son’s paternity by sight, in direct contrast to the inscrutable pater-
nity of Adèle. His son’s eyes reinforce the logic of physiognomy and disabil-
ity in Jane Eyre: a legitimate patrilineal succession corrects the female-based 
legacy of disability. Rochester’s restored vision and the exchanged gaze 
between Rochester and his son confirm the primacy of hereditary traits and 
are presented as Rochester’s triumph over madness, disability, and the dis-
abling female body. “Normalcy,” Lennard Davis notes, “has to protect itself 
by looking into the maw of disability and then recovering from that glance” 
(“Constructing Normalcy,” 26).19
toward a FemInIst dIsabIlIty studIes theory oF 
embodIment and mental Illness
Jane Eyre’s Bertha Rochester is mental illness incarnate; however, the very 
embodied nature of Bertha’s madness and the novel’s insistent physiognomy 
 18. Although both Rochester’s and Bertha’s madness are presented as animal-like states, 
Rochester’s madness is nevertheless nobler. Bertha crouches on all fours like a “clothed 
hyena” (279; ch. 26). Rochester resembles “some wronged and fettered wild beast or bird, 
dangerous to approach in his sullen woe. The caged eagle, whose gold-ringed eyes cruelty 
has extinguished, might look as looked that sightless Samson” (412; ch. 37).
 19. See also Mitchell and Snyder on narrative prosthesis: a narrative’s “need to restore 
a disabled body to some semblance of an originary wholeness” (Narrative Prosthesis, 6). 
The birth of Rochester’s son at the conclusion of Jane Eyre and this resemblance in and of 
Rochester’s eyes is in keeping with Mitchell and Snyder’s notion of prosthetic intervention 
(Narrative Prosthesis).
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often fail to register in a critical climate occupied with the notions of men-
tal illness as primarily socially-produced and of madness as feminist rebel-
lion. A disability studies reading, in contrast, demands closer attention to 
physical bodies and to the theories of embodiment that structure the novel. 
Moreover, the field of disability studies may provide the framework for 
new and alternate ways of theorizing about mental illness from a feminist 
perspective.
 Victorian notions of physiognomy and madness might seem far removed 
from the neuroscience and psychopharmacology that compose scientific 
thinking about mental illness today. Yet all share a basic understanding 
of the brain as a territory to be mapped. Phrenologists drew comparisons 
between the occurrence of mental disease and the development of organs 
of the brain. Today magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans depict the 
enlarged brain ventricles of people diagnosed with schizophrenia, positron 
emission tomography (PET) scans show increased glucose metabolism in 
people diagnosed with obsessive compulsive disorder, and on the cellular 
level neuropharmacology targets dopamine receptors between nerve cells to 
alleviate the symptoms of severe mental illness. Although there is a certain 
continuity between the medical imaging processes of phrenology and mod-
ern neuroscience, there are also crucial differences, and the types of pharma-
ceutical interventions that psychiatry practices today are a marked departure 
from the moral treatment advocated in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, 
I do want to suggest that the enduring importance of medical imaging and 
madness might be productively linked to what Donna Haraway would call 
the “tropic” nature of corporealization: “bodies are perfectly ‘real,’ and 
nothing about corporealization is ‘merely’ fiction. But corporealization is 
tropic and historically specific at every layer of its tissues” (Modest Witness, 
142).20 Though Bertha Rochester is merely fiction, the system of phrenology 
and physiognomy in which Jane Eyre participates is part of the corporeal-
ization of mad bodies in the nineteenth century. One of the goals of a femi-
nist disability studies theory of mental illness should be to examine these 
scientific tropes of the mad body. Furthermore, as Haraway suggests, it is 
possible to accept the “tropic and historically specific” nature of corporeal-
ization (and of medical language) while simultaneously thinking of bodies 
(and of mental illness) as “real.” Haraway’s corporealization conceives of 
bodies as “material-semiotic” nodes, and while Haraway warns against mis-
taking the tropic for the nontropic (which she refers to as “corporeal fetish-
 20. Similarly Wilson and Lewiecki-Wilson have also previously noted the potential con-
tributions that corporeal feminism might make to rhetorical studies of disability (“Disability, 
Rhetoric, and the Body,” 3).
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ism”), it is equally important, I would argue, not to forget that the material, 
the nontropic, the thing-in-itself, does still exist in this model (Modest Wit-
ness, 141–48). Critical approaches which view mental illness as symbolic or 
as primarily socially constructed often seem to deny the material conditions 
of the body. Corporealization recognizes a more complex, tangled relation-
ship between the somatic and the semiotic.
 Beginning to think through mental illness using this notion of corpo-
realization will necessitate a pivotal shift from the model of madness-as-
rebellion currently circulating within some women’s studies scholarship, and 
it will require a more detailed analysis of some of the central terms and con-
cepts of disability studies. More specifically, a theory of the corporealization 
of mental illness demands a closer examination of the relationship between 
“impairment” and “disability.” The distinction between impairment and 
disability, the material body and the socially constructed body, has been a 
crucial one within disability studies. As Davis explains: “An impairment 
involves a loss [ . . . ] of sight, hearing, mobility, mental ability, and so on. 
But an impairment only becomes a disability when the ambient society cre-
ates environments with barriers—affective, sensory, cognitive, or architec-
tural” (“Constructing Normalcy,” 506–7). What Davis describes here may 
be termed the impairment-disability system. Like Gayle Rubin’s configura-
tion of the sex-gender system—the process by which biological sex is trans-
formed into cultural gender—the impairment-disability system is the process 
by which biological impairment is transformed into cultural disability. This 
configuration of the impairment-disability system has been particularly use-
ful for people in the disability rights movement, who combat stigma and 
who protect the civil rights of people with disabilities: by shifting attention 
away from the biological (impairment) to the social (disability), one can 
effectively identify and address discrimination.
 However, while the politically strategic distinction between impairment 
and disability has been particularly useful, it also has its limits. On one 
level the impairment-disability system enacts a separation between an acci-
dental, physical body (impairment) and a transcendent, social identity (dis-
ability). The subsequent focus on the social realm privileges a transcendent 
civil identity and obscures or represses physical impairment. If impairment 
occurs in the body and disability occurs in society, then this posits an ideal, 
disembodied social subject who seems to remain intact, unaltered, even 
“normal,” despite impairment. The language of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act evokes this ideal: the subject (American) is the stable core that 
exists independently from the accidental body (with Disability). However, 
the impairments of severe mental illness challenge the normalizing logic of 
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this model. Using a wheelchair does not disrupt the notion of “American” 
quite so much as being delusional does. For example, although the physical 
barriers that exist for wheelchair users are very real and pervasive, they are 
quite different in nature from mental competency requirements that restrict 
the abstract right to vote or to refuse medication. The barriers confronting 
people with severe mental illnesses and cognitive disabilities are more com-
plicated because they involve the concept of the self that is the very foun-
dation of our political system. As Susan Squier writes, “Not only does the 
discourse of the democratic citizen privilege the intact and autonomous self, 
but the discourse of medicine figures mental illness as an irreparable, sym-
bolically freighted breach in self-determination” (40).
 Theorizing about mental illness from a feminist disability studies per-
spective, I argue, demands a different focus on impairment. This reposi-
tioning, because it requires a shift toward medical models of illness, is not 
without its risks. As Simi Linton correctly points out, medical definitions of 
disability in the past have functioned to keep disability “within the purview 
of the medical establishment, to keep it a personal matter and ‘treat’ the 
condition and the person with the condition rather than ‘treating’ the social 
processes and policies that constrict disabled people’s lives” (11). Borrowing 
a term from Eve Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the Closet, Rosemarie Gar-
land-Thomson also points out that medical definitions of impairments have 
fostered a “minoritizing” view of disability as private tragedy rather than 
positioning disability as a universal problem affecting everyone (“Feminist 
Theory,” 282).
 Adopting a medical model also poses other risks. Thinking about physi-
cal impairment, in particular congenital physical impairment, is often char-
acterized by concomitant reductive assumptions about biological bodies. 
This is the case, for example, with Bertha Mason’s madness in Jane Eyre 
and with the definitive powers attributed to pathological genes today. In 
order to steer clear of the pitfalls of essentialism and biological determin-
ism when conceptualizing mental illness as physical impairment, it is useful 
to begin with the understanding that bodies are not simply born, but made. 
As Haraway explains, “bodies as subjects of knowledge are material-semi-
otic generative nodes. Their boundaries materialize in social interactions; 
‘objects’ like bodies do not preexist as such” (“The Biopolitics,” 208). Femi-
nist science studies and feminist examinations of the body can offer us the 
conceptual modes and the critical language to begin a rigorous denaturaliza-
tion of impairment within disability studies. In Bodies That Matter, Judith 
Butler revised how we think of the sex-gender system—arguing in part that 
“sex” is not the static, natural category out of which the social construction 
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of gender emerges. Similarly, reexamining the impairment-disability system, 
and moreover repositioning mental illness as a physical impairment, seems 
appropriate and particularly necessary when we speak of severe and chronic 
mental illnesses within the disability studies rubric.
 It is possible, in other words, to begin with the premise that mental ill-
ness is a neurobiological disorder and still remain committed to a feminist 
and a disability studies agenda, and it is important that feminists and dis-
ability theorists begin to think about mental illness in these terms.21 The 
elision of the physical component of Bertha Rochester’s madness in contem-
porary criticism is not coincidental but is symptomatic of a larger, cultural 
anxiety surrounding mental illness. This anxiety, I suspect, emerges from the 
impossible task of reconciling medical discourses of mental illness, which 
describe the symbolic failure of the self-determined individual, and the com-
peting discourses of democratic citizenship, which imagine will and self as 
inviolable—a tension that lies at the heart of both liberal individualism and 
the impairment-disability system. “Democracy,” Davis writes, “needs the 
illusion of equality, and equality needs the fiction of the equal or average 
citizen” (Bending over Backwards, 110). In Frontiers of Justice, Martha 
Nussbaum begins her examination of John Rawls’s social contract theory, 
which is based on the assumption that citizens are “free, equal, and inde-
pendent,” with a similar insight: “We cannot extend the core idea of invio-
lability and the related idea of reciprocity to people with severe physical 
and mental impairments without calling these features into question, thus 
severing ties with the classical social contract tradition” (119). Of course, 
if one insists that mental illness is a myth, that mental illness does not exist 
as a material, physical impairment, then one avoids such thorny problems. 
In this sense, antipsychiatry and conceptions of madness as feminist rebel-
lion are essentially conservative: they do not require a radical rethinking of 
our central political principles. Tempting though it may be to fall back on 
 21. For many reasons, this is a difficult but necessary statement to make. In a poignant 
essay about a close friend who has schizophrenia, Prendergast characterizes this dilemma 
well when she writes, “For an academic like myself with generally poststructuralist leanings, 
to think of schizophrenia as a ‘disease’ makes me sound at best conservative and at worst 
theoretically unsound. I am therefore left wandering far from my usual terrain to find lan-
guage with which I can address the dilemmas and gaps in understanding that mental illness 
presents” (190). As Prendergast’s essay ultimately illustrates, to conceive of schizophrenia as 
a “disease,” or of severe mental illness as a physically based impairment, does not necessarily 
result in a conservative, biologically reductive theory of mental illness. On the contrary, to 
be unable to theorize mental illness as a disease unduly limits our strategies of political and 
philosophical engagement. Just as Butler has complicated the notion of sex in the sex-gender 
system, so too can we conceive of a more complex, nuanced, and politically effective notion 
of mental illness within the impairment-disability system.
T h e  c o R p u s  o F  T h e  M a d w o M a n  31
C
h
a
p
ter 1
concepts that imagine mental illness as purely socially produced, the true 
radical challenge that Bertha Rochester represents is far more complex. Ide-
ally, this is a challenge that a next wave of madwoman theory, one based 
on the insights of both feminism and disability studies theory, will begin to 
address.
T h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  B a s e s  of Jane Eyre and Rudyard Kipling’s The 
Light That Failed (1891) are, according to a number of classic expositions, 
diametrically opposed. Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar commend Jane 
Eyre, for instance, as a work of “rebellious feminism” (338), while George 
Holbrook Jackson asserts that the “keynote” of The Light That Failed is 
“the love of the masculine life” (234). Indeed, far from being commended 
as a belief in the equality of the sexes, Kipling’s “pugnacious philosophy,” 
with its “insistence upon clean health and a courageous and dangerous life,” 
is said to make “men more like men and women more like women” (Hol-
brook Jackson, 234). In this chapter I probe the received ideological con-
trast between the two classic novels, emphasizing an alliance that becomes 
manifest in the characterization of the blindman. The contention is that 
many feminist commendations of Jane Eyre are underpinned by patriarchal 
attitudes toward visual impairment that are also found in The Light That 
Failed. What is more, though explicit in Jane Eyre and implicit in The Light 
That Failed, both are grounded in the same epistemology as John Milton’s 
Samson Agonistes (1671). This intertextuality is notable because, notwith-
standing the fact that Milton wrote his greatest works subsequent to the 
onset of his own visual impairment, Samson Agonistes is ocularcentric in the 
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extreme; it is indicative of a dominant visual discourse, claiming that light, 
the “prime work” of God, “so necessary is to life” that the existence of 
those without access constitutes a “living death” (lines 70–100).1
 The functionality of these depictions may be explained in accordance 
with the Derridean perspective on disability suggested by Mairian Corker 
and Tom Shakespeare, that although normativism and disability are antag-
onistic in relation to each other, the definition of the former is dependent on 
that of the latter: “a person without an impairment can define him/herself 
as “normal” only in opposition to that which s/he is not—a person with 
an impairment” (Disability/Postmodernity: Embodying Disability Theory, 
7). In these terms, alterity is fundamental to the construction of the Self 
because, as Jacques Derrida puts it in Of Grammatology, without the non-
presence of the other that is inscribed in the meaning of the present, familiar-
ity would not appear. Thus, following Corker’s and Shakespeare’s reading of 
disability as a construct that is not excluded from normativism but integral 
to its very assertion, I argue that the blindman in the classic is fundamental 
to the characterization of his sighted counterparts. After all, notwithstand-
ing Rey Chow’s assertion that “In terms of plot structure, the fire removes 
the impediment, the mad woman” (145), the simultaneity of Bertha’s suicide 
and Rochester’s blindness is read by Julia Miele Rodas as a migration of 
one identity into another (“Brontë’s Jane Eyre”). The suggestion is that the 
blindman becomes for Jane what the madwoman has been for Rochester, a 
disabled Other in relation to which the normative Self can emerge.
 Binary oppositions are famously criticized in Derrida’s Of Grammatol-
ogy because of the way in which one term is privileged over the other, the 
second term being typically thought of as derivative, inferior, and even para-
sitic, meaning that the first term, the one more associated with the phallus 
and the logos, is rendered original and superior. As well as to binary opposi-
tions such as man and woman, male and female, speech and writing, iden-
tity and difference, fullness and emptiness, mastery and submission, life and 
death, the criticism is applicable to normativism and disability—and, more 
specifically, for the purpose of this chapter, to the sighted and the blind. On 
the basis of the assertion that deconstruction is an openness toward the 
other (Derrida, “Deconstruction and the Other,” 124), I venture a deconstruc-
tive reading insofar as I invert these and a number of related binary opposi-
tions, focusing on secondary constructs in order to reveal their functionality 
in relation to primary counterparts. Rather than being ignored, incidental 
 1. Milton (1608–74) lost his sight at the age of forty-four (c. 1652). He published 
Paradise Lost in 1667 and Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes in 1671.
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features such as those that describe Brontë’s Rochester (423–24; ch. 36)2 and 
Kipling’s Dick Heldar (155; ch. 16) as “stone blind” are exposed as a basis 
for a link between sight and vitality. I should stress that my criticism here is 
of the ocularcentric subject position and not necessarily of people who have 
unimpaired vision, for the sighted are a construct just like the blind.
 Mapping the quasi lifespan of the blindman, the first section of the chap-
ter focuses on alterity, the second on castration, and the third on melan-
cholia, revealing ocularcentric assumptions about beauty, sexuality, and 
happiness, respectively. In the first stage of this tragic development, the 
blindman is differentiated and diminished in grotesque portrayals of haptic 
perception, the implication being that beauty is naturally—if not solely—
perceived by visual means. This virtual castration becomes more Freudian 
in the second stage, for the blindman’s disempowerment creates a spectacle 
that not only empowers but also arouses the unseen spectator. The reso-
nance with Freudian theory deepens still further in the third stage, as the 
loss of the capacity for love develops into the various mental features of 
mourning and indeed melancholia. It is as though the blindman comes to 
internalize various ocularcentric beliefs, the result being an existential emp-
tiness in relation to which the lives of the sighted characters appear full. 
Put briefly, interpreting stone blindness as a preliminary of sighted vitality, I 
subvert the hierarchies of attractiveness over unattractiveness, sexuality over 
asexuality, spectator over spectacle, happiness over misery, light over dark-
ness, and life over death.
 First, though, I must acknowledge that several binary oppositions are 
subverted within Jane Eyre, as plainness triumphs over beauty, poverty over 
wealth, submission over mastery, and, insofar as the female protagonist nar-
rates her own story rather than being secondary in relation to a male nar-
rator, woman over man. Accordingly, the text has come to be “considered 
one of the first major examples of a woman overcoming patriarchal and 
class domination in modern times” (Chow, 144). Nevertheless, criticized by 
Toril Moi for leaving patriarchal aesthetics intact, Gilbert and Gubar’s clas-
sic feminist commendation of the novel is problematized by Dale Spender’s 
point about epistemology:
[F]eminist knowledge is based on the premise that the experience of all 
human beings is valid and must not be excluded from our understandings, 
whereas patriarchal knowledge is based on the premise that the experience 
 2. The version of the primary text referred to in this chapter is Charlotte Brontë, Jane 
Eyre (London: Penguin Popular Classics, 1994).
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of only half the human population needs to be taken into account and the 
resulting version can be imposed on the other half. (5)
The problem on which I focus is that Brontë’s portrayals of alterity, castra-
tion, and melancholia are patriarchal insofar as they are based on ocularcen-
tric epistemology and thus unappreciative of the experience of people who 
have visual impairments. Male and female roles may well be inverted in the 
novel, but the underpinning hierarchies of normativism over disability and 
“the sighted” over “the blind” remain intact. The sustainment of this state 
of affairs in some feminist expositions is indicative of the fact that writings 
of the most eminent scholars may prove deficient in relation to disability, 
that as Rosemarie Garland-Thomson puts it, feminists, like everyone else, 
including disabled people, have been acculturated to stigmatize those of us 
whose bodies are deemed aberrant (“Feminist Theory,” 286). That is not to 
say that I impose ideology on the text, a criticism aimed at some feminist 
and postcolonial readings (Beaty, 184). Instead, informed by the assertion 
that Gilbert and Gubar’s reading of Jane Eyre “would be more formida-
ble if it did not implicitly (and unnecessarily) claim that it is a reading of 
Brontë’s ‘intention’” (Beaty, 150), the focus is on intertextuality and charac-
ter functionality.
beauty and the hand oF the beholder
Though the maxim that beauty is in the eye of the beholder pertains primar-
ily to the debate about what constitutes attractiveness, it also reduces the 
likelihood of cultural associations with those of us who have visual impair-
ments. Vision is supposed to be a necessary condition of beauty in The Light 
That Failed when the sightless protagonist Dick Heldar responds to Bessie’s 
advice about his appearance by saying, “Good gracious, child, do you imag-
ine that I think of what becomes me these days?” (173–78; ch. 14). In writ-
ings from as far back as Plato the “straight profile of the Greek statue was 
usually assumed to be the ideal human face. One of its many assets was that 
it did not resemble the faces of rabbits, goats, apes, frogs, or any other igno-
ble animals” (Etcoff, 42). If beauty means not looking like a beast, Kipling’s 
protagonist is extricated when he is said to have “hit his shins against the 
stove, and this suggested to him that it would be better to crawl on all-fours, 
one hand in front of him” (139; ch. 11). He is described by Torpenhow 
as being “like a dog” (139; ch. 11), by Bessie as a “beast” (130; ch. 10, 
and 133; ch. 11), and by the narrator as a “stub-bearded, bowed creature” 
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(173; ch. 14). Brontë’s notion of visual impairment is similarly animalistic, 
because alluding to the way in which Samson is likened to an eagle (SA, 
line 1695), Jane thinks of Rochester as a “caged eagle, whose gold-ringed 
eyes cruelty has extinguished’; she is reminded of “some wronged and fet-
tered wild beast or bird, dangerous to approach in his sullen woe” (426; ch. 
37). The animalism is sublimated in a general appearance of unkemptness 
when, with allusion to the way in which the “redundant locks” of Samson 
are depicted “clustring down” (SA, lines 568–69), the “thick and long uncut 
locks” of Rochester suggest that he is “being metamorphosed into a lion, or 
something of that sort” and his hair is likened to “eagles’ feathers” (431; ch. 
37). Identified elsewhere as a problem with Brontë’s portrayal of ethnicity 
(e.g., Spivak, “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism”), the 
blurring of the boundary between the human and the animal invokes the 
notion of a lower evolutionary status; it implies a sense of animalistic alter-
ity around the blindman and thereby defines the legitimate subject position 
in relation to the sense of sight.
 The five senses are sometimes categorized in relation to a binary oppo-
sition between distance and contact. The distance senses of sight and hear-
ing have objects that are spatially separate from the perceiver, while the 
contact senses of smell, taste, and touch have objects that impinge on the 
body before perception. The significant point that Jonathan Rée raises 
about the Aristotelian division is that, “epistemologically and ethically more 
respectable,” the distance senses are “nobler, purer, more detached, and per-
haps—by some standards—more masculine than the contact senses” (34). 
In accordance with this line of thinking, vision might be conceived as a 
necessary condition of not only the possession but also the perception of 
beauty. The logical outcome is embodied in the sightless-unsightly pair, a 
trope that, while not exemplified, is implicit in both The Light That Failed 
and Jane Eyre: much as Dick’s loss of vision is followed by his union with 
Bessie Broke, the “wrong woman” (184; ch. 14), who is described as “sin-
gularly dull” (130; ch. 10) and a “little fiend” (136; ch. 11), and who is asso-
ciated with “hussies, trollops; and the like” (176; ch. 14), Rochester’s loss 
of vision is followed by his union with the original plain Jane. The tenor of 
such a union is that one partner’s lack in conventional outward beauty is 
not an issue when the other lacks the sense by which it is perceived. In Jane 
Eyre, according to Gilbert and Gubar, the scenario offers an “optimistic 
portrait of an egalitarian relationship” because, “now that they are equals, 
they can (though one is blind) see and speak even beyond the medium of the 
flesh” (368–69). Kate Flint departs only slightly from the classic feminist 
reading by claiming that visual impairment is portrayed as a “form of pun-
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ishment” that ultimately proves to be a means of illuminating the “inward 
eye” (The Victorians and the Visual Imagination, 80), but the problem is in 
the very premise that conventional outward beauty cannot be appreciated 
by those of us who have visual impairments. After all, putting aside the fact 
that most people who have visual impairments are able to perceive visually, 
that according to Allan Dodds, only five or ten percent of the legally blind 
are “unable to make out anything more than changes in light levels” (1), 
the notion that outward beauty cannot be appreciated via haptic means is 
patently erroneous. This idea of beauty is highly contentious, but people are 
frequently considered attractive due to the “curve of their lips or the slim-
ness of their waists” (Etcoff, 71), qualities that, like the Grecian neck and 
bust of Brontë’s Blanche Ingram, may be perceived by touch as well as sight. 
This form of beauty is no less in the hand than in the eye of the beholder.
 While those of us who have visual impairments may simply perceive 
beauty by haptic rather than visual means, a sense of alterity is evoked by 
the motif of the groping blindman, which refers to acts of searching, walk-
ing, and lecherousness. This motif is applied in The Light That Failed to 
portray the way in which Dick locates a lost item as well as the way in which 
he walks. He is said not only to have “groped among his canvases” (161; ch. 
13) but also to have “groped back to his chair” (159; ch. 13) and to “grope 
along the corridors” (167; ch. 14). Insofar as walking is displaced in favor 
of groping, Kipling and Brontë unify in their application of the motif: akin 
to Kipling’s protagonist, Brontë’s Rochester is said to have “groped his way 
back to the house” (427; ch. 37). It is a sense of lecherousness, however, that 
underpins the moment when Rochester is said to have “groped” until Jane 
“arrested his wandering hand” (428; ch. 37). This intransitive use of the 
verb groped indicates that Rochester is searching “blindly,” but connota-
tions of the more colloquial meaning are sustained by the reference to his 
wandering hand. Thus, although ignored as a means of perceiving beauty, 
the sense of touch is exaggerated to the point of grotesqueness as a signifier 
of alterity.
 The lecherous aspect of the groping blindman is of concern because, 
more than evoking a sense of unattractiveness, it perpetuates the idea of 
a blind Other who is out to impregnate the sighted Self. Illustrating Terry 
Eagleton’s assertion that for Brontë “almost all human relationships are 
power-struggles” (Myths of Power, 30), the grope becomes a lecherous grip 
and results in a personification of contagiousness when Jane refers to Roch-
ester by saying, “The muscular hand broke from my custody; my arm was 
seized, my shoulder, neck, waist—I was entwined and gathered to him” 
(428; ch. 37). The implicit warning against the dishonorable intentions 
38 B o l T
C
h
a
p
ter 2
of the Other illustrates three elements of personified contagiousness: first, 
irregularity is evoked by the way in which Rochester’s hand is objectified 
almost to the point of disembodiment, as if somehow able to reach fur-
ther than those of a sighted man; second, strength is denoted by the adjec-
tive muscular; and third, aggression is conveyed by the fact that Jane is the 
object of Rochester’s desire and therefore rendered sexually vulnerable in his 
grasp, as well as by the verb seized. This personification of contagiousness 
corresponds with a passage in The Light That Failed:
[Dick] was beginning to learn, not for the first time in his experience, that 
kissing is a cumulative poison. The more you get of it, the more you want. 
Bessie gave the kiss promptly, whispering, as she did so, “I was so angry I 
rubbed out that picture with the turpentine. You aren’t angry, are you?”
 “What? Say that again.” The man’s hand had closed on her wrist.
 “I rubbed it out with turps and the knife,” faltered Bessie. “I thought 
you’d only have to do it over again. You did do it over again, didn’t you? 
Oh, let go of my wrist; you’re hurting me. [ . . . ] I only meant to do it in 
fun. You aren’t going to hit me?”
 “Hit you! No! Let’s think.”
 He did not relax his hold upon her wrist but stood staring at the car-
pet. (182; ch. 14)
 First, irregularity is implicit when Dick is referred to as the man with a 
hold that he chooses not to relax but that closes on Bessie’s wrist automati-
cally, the man who cannot see and yet stands staring at the carpet. Second, 
Dick’s physical strength is apparent in Bessie’s assertion that he is hurting 
her. Third, reminiscent of not only Jane Eyre but also the way in which 
Samson feels a “sudden rage to tear” Dalila “joint by joint” (SA, line 953), 
Kipling invokes the threat of sexual assault by linking the cumulative poison 
of desire with anger, force, and violence. Dick’s exclamation indicates that 
striking Bessie is not his intention, but the sexual aspect of rape being sec-
ondary to the violent, the point to note is that she is not released from his 
grip while the alternatives are considered. Put briefly, when portrayed as a 
characteristic of the blindman, touch becomes a grope and ultimately a lech-
erous grip.
 The important detail to note about grotesque depictions of haptic per-
ception is that they are not sexual but hypersexual, which is why Samson, 
the forebear of both Rochester and Dick, is described by Derrida as “a bit 
like all the blind, like all one-eyed men or cyclopes,” as a “sort of phal-
loid image, an unveiled sex from head to toe, vaguely obscene and disturb-
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ing” (Memoirs of the Blind, 106). The hypersexuality is predicated on the 
notion that the “hand of the blind ventures forth alone or disconnected,” 
that “it feels its way, it gropes,” “as if a lidless eye had opened at the tip of 
the fingers, as if one eye too many had just grown right next to the nail, a 
single eye, the eye of a cyclops” (Memoirs of the Blind, 3). Because the hand 
of the blindman is animalistic, verging on the monstrous, and therefore 
classically adverse to beauty, it signifies alterity in relation to which vision 
appears antithetical and thus normative as a means of perceiving beauty. 
Hence, according to Freudian theory, the blinding of Oedipus is equivalent 
to castration, constituting the loss of the sense in which beauty resides and 
through which desire is excited. Grounded in such ocularcentric epistemol-
ogy, as is demonstrable when Derrida adds that Samson is a “figure of cas-
tration, a castration-figure” (Memoirs of the Blind, 106), the sexuality of the 
blindman appears distinct from that of his sighted counterparts. In effect, 
then, the grotesque depiction of haptic perception is a preliminary for the 
symbolic castrations by which the blindman is defined.
complex castratIon
Bearing in mind that in The Light That Failed, although “the blindness has 
made him rather muscular” (144; ch. 12), Dick pictures Maisie “being won 
by another man, stronger than himself” (140; ch. 11), it is notable that one 
of Charles Rycroft’s various definitions of the word castration pertains to 
“demoralization” in respect of the masculine role (15). The applicability 
of this definition to Jane Eyre is evident in Georgina Kleege’s description 
of Rochester as a “mighty man” who is “brought low’: “Once allpower-
ful, and rather arrogant about it, he is left feeble” (70). Donald Kirtley goes 
so far as to assert that the castration theme is pronounced, that “until his 
sight returns, Rochester’s masculine vigor is largely held in abeyance, after 
the fashion of the defeated Samson, with whom Jane identifies her sight-
less lover” (66). These references to being brought low and held in obei-
sance may be said to incriminate Rochester’s sighted counterparts, thereby 
revealing a conceptual link with Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon (Bozovic), 
the essence of the idea being that control can be affected by the very notion 
of an unseen seer.
 That the controlling figure of the Panopticon is not only housed but 
also represented by a phallic inspection tower invokes another aspect of 
second-wave feminism from which this chapter departs. I do not deny that 
the power relationship raises an instructive parallel with Laura Mulvey’s 
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concern in “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” about phallocentrism, 
that it is paradoxically dependent on the image of the castrated woman, 
for the political power of ocularcentrism depends on the symbolic castra-
tion of the blind. But the dynamic is more complex in Jane Eyre and The 
Light That Failed, where it is the blindman’s lack that produces vision as a 
symbolic presence. Indeed, because ocularcentrism is advantageous to the 
sighted female characters, yet dependent on the castration of the blindman 
for order and meaning, the very application of Mulvey’s feminist theory cre-
ates something of a paradox.
 The fact that Jane associates Rochester with Samson, a man whose 
downfall is brought about by a woman, foreshadows the most patriarchal 
of all psychoanalytic notions, for in “the first instance” the term castrating 
applies to “women who suffer from PENIS-ENVY and therefore dispar-
age or compete with men” (Rycroft, 15). Bearing in mind the claim that 
it is Jane’s aim “simply to strengthen herself, to make herself an equal of 
the world Rochester represents” (Gilbert and Gubar, 368), we might be 
tempted to respond to any suggestion of a castrating figure by pointing out 
that the diminishment of vision is linked with that of strength by male and 
female characters alike: the Innkeeper tells Jane that Rochester is “helpless, 
indeed—blind” (424; ch. 36); Jane says, “[T]he powerlessness of the strong 
man touched my heart to the quick” (434; ch. 37); and Rochester confronts 
Jane by saying, “You know I was proud of my strength: but what is it now, 
when I must give it over to foreign guidance, as a child does its weakness?” 
(441; ch. 37). The point to remember about these and other such asser-
tions of weakness, however, is that all appear within Jane’s narrative. This 
scenario resonates with The Light That Failed insofar as it is Maisie who 
finds Dick “down and done for—masterful no longer, but rather a little 
abject; neither an artist stronger than she, nor a man to be looked up to—
only some blind one that sat in a chair and seemed on the point of crying” 
(159; ch. 13). Kipling’s intransitive application of the verb crying connotes 
the same infantilization as the simile that Brontë draws between blindness 
and the “weakness” of a child (441; ch. 37). Likewise, a comparison with 
the emotion that touches Jane’s “heart to the quick” (434; ch. 37) can be 
found when, “filled with pity most startlingly distinct from love,” Kipling’s 
Maisie is “more sorry” for Dick than she has “ever been for any one in her 
life” (159; ch. 13). Thus, corresponding with the patriarchal notion of the 
castrating woman, in both novels it is the blindman’s prospective lover who 
conjures up his disempowerment.
 The notion of a link between vision and the masculine role raises issues 
of spectatorial identification, for Mulvey’s work on cinema has defined the 
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male protagonist as the bearer of the spectator’s gaze, meaning that he fre-
quently emerges as the representative of power in relation to woman as the 
spectacle. When applied to Brontë’s novel this dynamic becomes inverted 
because Jane, rather than Rochester, emerges as the representative of power, 
the sighted character with whom the sighted Implied Reader identifies. This 
power relationship is alluded to in Sally Shuttleworth’s study, as well as in 
Kleege’s assertion that for Jane, “Rochester’s blindness allows her to rise to 
power” (71), representing a deviation from Gilbert and Gubar’s claim that 
Jane’s power is drawn from within, “rather than from inequity, disguise, 
deception” (369). The departure from the classic feminist reading is sustain-
able because, implicit when Jane refers to Rochester by saying, “I stayed my 
step, almost my breath, and stood to watch him—to examine him, myself 
unseen, and alas! to him invisible” (426; ch. 37), it is through disguise 
and deception that the unseen spectator ensures not only inequity but also 
authority over the unseeing spectacle. The nature of this authority invokes 
a conceptual link with the Panopticon because, just as anyone who entered 
Bentham’s central inspection tower could automatically assume authority 
over the unseeing prisoners (Bozovic), Jane assumes authority over Roch-
ester and Kipling’s Bessie does likewise over Dick: “There were droppings 
of food all down the front of his coat; the mouth, under the ragged ill-
grown beard, drooped sullenly; the forehead was lined and contracted; and 
on the lean temples the hair was a dusty, indeterminate colour that might 
or might not have been called grey” (177; ch. 14). Dick’s lack of concern 
for his appearance is typical of the blindman and provides a spectacle for 
Bessie’s evaluating gaze. He is reduced to what Michel Foucault calls an 
“object of information” (Discipline and Punish, 200). Thus, although the 
scenario might be interpreted as subversive, a feminist reversal of the female 
character and the evaluating male gaze by which she is rendered passive, a 
concurrent implication is that people who do not have visual impairments 
are active and authoritative in relation to those of us who do have visual 
impairments.
 There are several theoretical usages of the word castration that per-
tain to sexual matters explicitly, for, as well as to the removal of testes, the 
concept refers to “loss of the capacity” for erotic pleasure, or loss of the 
penis, as in the threats used to deter boys from masturbating (Rycroft, 15). 
The naming of Dick Heldar (i.e., penis handler) invokes the cultural link 
between blindness and masturbation, but both Kipling and Brontë evoke 
diminishments in respect of the capacity for erotic pleasure in their construc-
tion of the blindman. When extending the analysis of Rochester’s castration 
into the area of erotic pleasure, then, one might consider Derrida’s assertion 
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that Samson loses “every phallic attribute or substitute, his hair and then his 
eyes” (Memoirs of the Blind, 104). This reference to Rochester’s forebear is 
illustrative of the way in which phallocentrism and ocularcentrism are not 
only comparable but also interchangeable. In the unconscious, Karl Abra-
ham claims, the “fixed stare” is “often equivalent to an erection” (352), a 
notion that informs and is informed by the idea that blindness is equivalent 
to castration. This dynamic is illustrated when Jane stays her step, almost 
her breath, and fixes Rochester in her stare:
He descended the one step, and advanced slowly and gropingly towards the 
grass plot. Where was his daring stride now? Then he paused, as if he knew 
not which way to turn. He lifted his hand and opened his eyelids; gazed 
blank, and with a straining effort, on the sky, and toward the amphitheatre 
of trees: one saw that all to him was void darkness. He stretched his right 
hand (the left arm, the mutilated one, he kept hidden in his bosom); he 
seemed to wish by touch to gain an idea of what lay around him: he met 
but vacancy still; for the trees were some yards off where he stood. He 
relinquished the endeavour, folded his arms, and stood quiet and mute in 
the rain, now falling fast on his uncovered head. (426; ch. 37)
Given that he has already “stretched forth his hand as if to feel whether 
it rained,” it might seem rather perplexing that Rochester should proceed 
with an “uncovered head,” that he is referred to as “a man without a hat,” 
but in psychoanalytic terms any such lack can be interpreted as a symbolic 
castration. It is therefore quite pertinent that Jane’s “sightless Samson” 
(426; ch. 37) is rendered quiet and mute, that he is said to have descended 
without daring, to have moved slowly and gropingly. This castration is inte-
gral to its symbolic opposite in Jane because, while interpreting Rochester’s 
behavior as helplessness, she refuses to assist him. Rather than relinquishing 
her fixed stare, her unconscious erection, she ponders and assumes spec-
tatorial authority, as is illustrated by her assertion that Rochester knew 
not which way to turn—that is, by her ocularcentric appropriation of his 
epistemology.
 The curiosity factor of the unseeing spectacle is evidently not always as 
overt as when Samson is forced to make “sport with blind activity” (SA, 
line 1328). The fact that Rochester is fixed in Jane’s gaze as he merely steps 
outside his home illustrates that the most routine behavior of the blind-
man is a source of pleasure for the unseen spectator. This pleasure is also 
illustrated in The Light That Failed by Maisie’s reluctance to betray her 
presence:
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Dick rose and began to feel his way across the room, touching each table 
and chair as he passed. Once he caught his foot on a rug, and swore, drop-
ping on his knees to feel what the obstruction might be. Maisie remem-
bered him walking in the Park as though all the earth belonged to him, 
tramping up and down her studio two months ago, and flying up the gang-
way of the Channel steamer. The beating of her heart was making her sick, 
and Dick was coming nearer, guided by the sound of her breathing. She put 
out a hand mechanically to ward him off or to draw him to herself, she did 
not know which. It touched his chest, and he stepped back as though he 
had been shot. (158; ch. 13)
While it is unlikely that someone who has a visual impairment would drop 
to her or his knees in order to identify a rug, especially in such a familiar 
setting, the point is that when Dick, the blindman, does so, Maisie is not 
only fascinated but also disgusted to the point of nausea, so overwhelmed 
that she can “hardly move her lips.” Indeed, having “pressed herself up 
into a corner of the room,” when she does “put out a hand,” she does so 
“mechanically” (157–58; ch. 13). More than illustrating what Foucault calls 
the power of Panopticism (Discipline and Punish, 200), this combination of 
silence and visibility may be explained in terms of jouissance, which Bruce 
Fink defines as a pleasure that is “excessive, leading to a sense of being over-
whelmed or disgusted, yet simultaneously providing a source of fascination” 
(xi). In these terms, Maisie’s gaze—that is, her unconscious erection—lasts 
until the climactic point at which Dick responds as though he has been shot.
 The interchangeability of phallocentric and ocularcentric perspectives 
illustrates Mary Devereaux’s point that “the male gaze is not always male, 
but it is always male dominated” (339). Insofar as Jane’s stare falls on 
Rochester and Maisie’s on Dick, the traditional roles of the male gaze are 
reversed by Brontë and Kipling alike. However, the resulting depiction is 
ocularcentric and thus essentially patriarchal, because the reversal is predi-
cated on the victim being unable to see. The subordinate role is feminine 
but allocated to Rochester and Dick owing to their symbolic castration; 
the dominant role is masculine but allocated to Jane and Maisie owing to 
their symbolic erections. Therefore, while the teleology of these inverted 
roles may be praised as a reaction to the objectification of women, we must 
recognize that a simultaneous point is being made about desire in men who 
have visual impairments. As if always scopophilic, love, the most profound 
of life experiences, becomes a superficial activity for which vision is requi-
site. Accordingly, Rochester tells Jane, “[I]f I were what I once was, I would 
try to make you care—but—a sightless block!” (430, ch. 37), much as Dick 
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thinks of Maisie and says, “I couldn’t be any use to her now” (140; ch. 11). 
The lamentation that underpins these claims is that Rochester and Dick are 
unable to deliver that in which Jane and Maisie are consequently unable to 
be caught: the male gaze. The patriarchal implication of this lament is that 
scopophilia is as necessary in male heterosexuality as is exhibitionism in the 
female counterpart—an example of ocularcentrism that renders male het-
erosexuality beyond the blindman.
 The diminished capacity for erotic pleasure is a preliminary for the con-
struct of dependency by which love is displaced in Jane Eyre. Rochester is 
“profoundly frustrated in his efforts to develop independence,” according to 
Kirtley, and “consequently becomes almost wholly dependent on Jane, who 
plays the part of the good nurse until his sight is restored” (65). However, 
it should not be forgotten that Jane “enjoys” her new power over Roches-
ter, as Kleege points out, because “his dependence on her makes him all the 
more attractive” (71), meaning that her actions are not selfless, the depen-
dency is not parasitic:
Mr Rochester continued blind the first two years of our union: perhaps it 
was that circumstance that drew us so very near—that knit us so very close: 
for I was then his vision, as I am still his right hand. Literally, I was (what 
he often called me) the apple of his eye. He saw nature—he saw books 
through me; and never did I weary of gazing for his behalf, and of putting 
into words, the effect of field, tree, town, river, cloud, sunbeam—of the 
landscape before us; of the weather round us—and impressing by sound 
on his ear what light could no longer stamp on his eye. Never did I weary 
of reading to him; never did I weary of conducting him where he wished to 
go: of doing for him what he wished to be done. And there was a pleasure 
in my services, most full, most exquisite, even though sad—because he 
claimed these services without painful shame or damping humiliation. He 
loved me so truly that he knew no reluctance in profiting by my attendance; 
he felt I loved him so fondly, that to yield that attendance was to indulge 
my sweetest wishes. (446; ch. 38)
Seemingly as a result of visual impairment, there are numerous services that 
Rochester requires of Jane, the execution of which she finds pleasurable in 
a “most full, most exquisite” way, thereby illustrating something of Albert 
Memmi’s assertion that “there is in almost every dependency, even if it is 
apparently parasitic, some sort of symbiotic relationship” (66). The trouble 
is that Jane’s conception of dependency does not accommodate Rochester’s 
subjectivity. Whereas the dialectic of dependency results from a relationship 
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in which the dependent is a provider and the provider a dependent, Jane 
does not recognize Rochester as a provider. The dependency is only recipro-
cal insofar as Jane receives pleasure and power in the act of giving. What lies 
beyond this dependency is a contentious point because, while stating with 
conviction that Rochester “loved” her “so truly,” Jane is somewhat tenta-
tive in saying, “[H]e felt I loved him so fondly.” Indeed, when articulating 
her own position in the relationship, Jane qualifies the verb loved with felt, 
displaces the adverb truly in favor of fondly and omits usage of the first per-
son pronoun altogether. That is to say, she diminishes the emotion on three 
counts. Moreover, as is implicit in her dismay at the absence of “painful 
shame,” “damping humiliation,” and “reluctance in profiting” by “atten-
dance,” Jane cannot respect the man whom she ascribes no self-respect.
 In The Light That Failed, Dick’s diminished capacity for love is similarly 
exposed by a construct of parasitic dependency. Having lost his relationship 
with Maisie when he lost his sight, Dick initiates a relationship with Bessie 
by saying, “I’m afraid I must ask you to help me home” (174; ch. 14), reflect-
ing later that she “can’t care, and it’s a toss-up whether she comes again or 
not, but if money can buy her to look after me she shall be bought” (179; ch. 
14). What is more, echoing the moment in Jane Eyre when the eponymous 
protagonist addresses Rochester by saying, “I will be your neighbour, your 
nurse, your housekeeper” (430; ch. 37), Dick says to Bessie, “You’d better 
come and housekeep for me then” (180 ch. 14). There is some evidence that 
Bessie regards Dick as both provider and dependent when Kipling’s narra-
tor says, “Early in the afternoon time she came, because there was no young 
man in her life just then, and she thought of material advantages which 
would allow her to be idle for the rest of her days” (180; ch. 14). But that is 
not to say that her dependency is unlike Jane’s, or that it is purely materialis-
tic, for Dick’s loss of sight instills in Bessie a “keen sense of new-found supe-
riority” (175; ch. 14), the “utter misery and self-abandonment of the man 
appealed to her, and at the bottom of her heart lay the wicked feeling that he 
was humbled and brought low who had once humbled her” (177; ch. 14). 
Thus, like Jane Eyre, The Light That Failed is indicative of the way in which 
the blindman’s dependency is integral to power and pleasure on which the 
sighted counterparts become dependent.
the melancholIa oF blIndness
The loss of the capacity for love, which is a precursor for the conception of 
parasitic dependency, is listed by Freud as a distinguishing mental feature of 
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melancholia (“Mourning and Melancholia,” 252). This detail is significant 
here because Brontë’s Rochester is repeatedly ascribed “melancholy” (430, 
433, 436; ch. 37), foreshadowing an assertion in The Light That Failed 
about the melancholy of blindness being a “weight of intolerable darkness” 
(140; ch. 11). In fact, not only the loss of the capacity for love but all the 
mental features of melancholia are relevant to the trope of the blindman. 
This list of mental features includes a profoundly painful dejection, an end 
of interest in the outside world, an inhibition of all activity, and what Freud 
calls a “lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utter-
ance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional 
expectation of punishment” (“Mourning and Melancholia,” 252). Roch-
ester’s loss of the capacity for love is illustrated when he supposes that for 
Jane he can “entertain none but fatherly feelings” (430; ch. 37); his lack of 
interest in the outside world, when Mary tells Jane, “I don’t think he will see 
you,” adding that he “refuses everybody” (427; ch. 37); his general lack of 
activity, when he becomes a “fixture” (423; ch. 36); and his lowering of self-
regarding feelings, when he says, “I was desolate and abandoned—my life 
dark, lonely, hopeless—my soul athirst and forbidden to drink—my heart 
famished and never to be fed” (429; ch. 37). Put briefly, the blindman suf-
fers a miserable existence, an absence of joy in relation to which the lives of 
his counterparts are likely to appear joyful.
 When considering the psychology of the blindman in more detail, atten-
tion might be paid to the way in which it corresponds with Freud’s theory 
that the work of melancholia involves the internalization of the lost object, 
the result being a continuously critical presence in the ego: “the shadow of 
the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a 
special agency, as though it were an object, the forsaken object” (“Mourn-
ing and Melancholia,” 249). In accordance with this theory, we might infer 
that the blindman refuses to accept his blindness and seeks to revive his 
sight by internalizing the notion that it is necessary. This conclusion may be 
drawn about The Light That Failed, when Dick is said to have learned not 
to stir until advised to do so:
[T]here was nothing whatever to do except to sit still and brood till the 
three daily meals came. Centuries separated breakfast from lunch, and 
lunch from dinner, and though a man prayed for hundreds of years that his 
mind might be taken from him, God would never hear. Rather the mind 
was quickened and the revolving thoughts ground against each other as 
millstones grind when there is no corn between; and yet the brain would 
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not wear out and give him rest. It continued to think, at length, with imag-
ery and all manner of reminiscences. It recalled Maisie and past success, 
reckless travels by land and sea, the glory of doing work and feeling that 
it was good, and suggested all that might have happened had the eyes only 
been faithful to their duty. (167; ch. 14)
The features of melancholia that are implicit in this extract include the loss 
of the capacity for love, the profoundly painful dejection, the end of interest 
in the outside world and the general inhibition of activity. Continuing with 
the application of Freudian theory, then, we might infer that Dick revives 
his sight by internalizing the notion that it is necessary for love, an interest 
in the outside world and activity in general. In these terms, the melancholia 
of the blindman may be said to result from the internalized object of sight 
being at odds with the ego’s sightless reality. The key point that is illustrated 
by this psychoanalytic reading is that the reality of sightlessness is not mel-
ancholic intrinsically, only becoming so when permeated by ocularcentric 
ideas, a scenario that is notable because the melancholia is integral to the 
notion that sight is a necessary condition of vitality.
 The lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utter-
ance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, culminating in a delusional expec-
tation of punishment, is the most significant feature of melancholia, being 
the only one that is not also present in the state of mourning. The attribute 
is portrayed in Jane Eyre when, for example, Rochester says, “I supplicated 
God, that, if it seemed good to Him, I might soon be taken from this life” 
(441; ch. 37). Indeed, in The Light That Failed, the fact that the lowering 
of Dick’s self-regarding feelings culminates in a delusional expectation of 
punishment is explicit in the assertion that there poured into his soul “tide 
on tide of overwhelming, purposeless fear—dread of starvation always, ter-
ror lest the unseen ceiling should crush down upon him, fear of fire in the 
chambers and a louse’s death in red flame, and agonies of fiercer horror that 
had nothing to do with any fear of death” (167; ch. 14). The fear becomes 
manifest when Dick is said to have “bowed his head, and clutching the 
arms of his chair fought with his sweating self” (167; ch. 14), parodying the 
moment when “straining all his nerves” Samson “bowd” and “shook” the 
“two massie Pillars” (SA, lines 1646–50). The inclusion of this key feature 
is notable because prior to Freud’s early twentieth-century blurring of the 
distinction between mourning and melancholia, the former was considered 
a normal effect of loss and the latter a pathological disposition. That is to 
say, Jane Eyre and The Light That Failed were first published at a time when 
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melancholia was widely defined in terms of alterity, indeed madness, a con-
textual factor that bolsters Rodas’s suggestion that the identity of the mad-
woman migrates into the blindman (“Brontë’s Jane Eyre”).
 The melancholia of the blindman is sustained by blindness-darkness 
synonymy, for whether the word darkness is used to denote a lack of light 
or sight, the connotation of misery remains the same. Rochester’s “all” is 
reduced to “void darkness” (426; ch. 37), for example, before he is said to 
ask, “Who can tell what a dark, dreary, hopeless life I have dragged on for 
months past? Doing nothing, expecting nothing; merging night in day; feel-
ing but the sensation of cold when I let the fire go out, of hunger when I 
forgot to eat; and then a ceaseless sorrow” (432; ch. 37). The motif can also 
be found in The Light That Failed because, having said that he is “blind” 
and “the darkness will never go away” (137; ch. 11), Dick asserts that it is 
“hard to live alone in the dark, confusing the day and night; dropping to 
sleep through sheer weariness at mid-day, and rising restless in the chill of 
the dawn” (167; ch. 14). The problem with blindness-darkness synonymy is 
that it is ocularcentric, it takes the visual perspective as a measure by which 
all others are judged, for it can only be from the subject position of people 
with vision that darkness looks like blindness. In other words, the synon-
ymy does not accommodate the fact that the existence of a person without 
vision is, by definition, no more dark than it is light, that when sight loss is 
total, the bearer ceases to see not only light but also darkness.
 Embedded with the melancholia of blindness is the Samsonian platitude 
that death is preferable to a life without sight. Accordingly, the eponymous 
protagonist of Jane Eyre is told that while Rochester is alive, “many think 
he had better be dead” (423; ch. 36), foreshadowing The Light That Failed, 
where it is asserted that blindness is “the living death” (126; ch. 10), a 
“death-sentence of disease” (129; ch. 10), that Dick is “dead in the death 
of the blind” (142; ch. 12) and that his life is “nothing better than death” 
(167; ch. 14). The allusion to Samson Agonistes is sustained by Brontë 
when Rochester says, “I supplicated God, that, if it seemed good to Him, 
I might soon be taken from this life” (441; ch. 37), much as by Kipling, 
when Dick is said to have “prayed to God that his mind might be taken 
from him, offering for proof that he was worthy of this favour the fact that 
he had not shot himself long ago” (170; ch. 14). Though corresponding in 
these evocations of suicide, Brontë differs from Kipling and Milton insofar 
as she does not depict the fatal act. It may seem as if Kipling is following 
suit when Dick persuades himself that suicide would be a “ludicrous insult 
to the gravity of the situation as well as a weak-kneed confession of fear” 
(170; ch. 14), which is why Kleege likens the character to Oedipus. How-
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ever, bearing in mind the classic formula advanced by Emile Durkheim, 
that “the term suicide is applied to any death which is the direct or indirect 
result of a positive or negative act accomplished by the victim” (42), the 
detail to note is that Dick makes his final journey expecting to be shot, that 
on reaching his destination he says, “Put me, I pray, in the forefront of the 
battle” (208; ch. 15). In other words, because deliberately standing in the 
line of fire is every bit as suicidal as pulling down the building in which one 
stands, Dick’s fate is linked with Samson in a way that Rochester’s is not.
 Although Brontë differs from Kipling and Milton insofar as she omits 
the suicidal act, the salient point is that the conclusion of Jane Eyre nonethe-
less endorses the ocularcentric belief that a person cannot live happily ever 
after without sight. For a “Christian God who is supposed to temper justice 
with mercy,” as Kleege puts it, permanent “blindness would be too harsh 
a punishment” (70). Furthermore, the conclusion illustrates that the blind-
man’s castration is integral to the sighted capacity for love and erotic plea-
sure, for Rochester recovers his sight sufficiently to produce a son: “[T]he 
sky is no longer a blank to him—the earth no longer a void. When his first-
born was put into his arms, he could see that the boy had inherited his own 
eyes, as they once were—large, brilliant, and black” (446; ch. 38). This 
transformation invokes a parallel with Spivak’s assertion that the emergence 
of Jane Eyre as the white individualist heroine requires the sacrifice of the 
Other in the form of “the mulatto woman” (In Other Worlds), for the emer-
gence of Rochester as Jane’s companion requires the sacrifice of the Other in 
the form of the blindman. Thus, by the end of the novel it becomes apparent 
that the misery of the blindman is integral to the happiness of not only the 
sighted woman but also the sighted man whom Rochester becomes.
conclusIon
In considering the multitude of diminishments with which Brontë associates 
visual impairment, I have isolated some of the many ways in which the char-
acterization of Edward Rochester corresponds with that of Dick Heldar, 
as well as some of the ways in which both characters are foreshadowed by 
Samson. The ocularcentric basis of this unity and its resonance with psycho-
analytic discourse have raised various feminist issues. Indeed, exemplifying 
Spender’s definition of patriarchal knowledge, the trope of the blindman 
is premised on the notion that the experience of only part of the human 
population needs to be taken into account and the outcome imposed on the 
whole. Like Kipling, Brontë portrays someone who has a visual impairment 
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but takes into account only the experience of people who do not have visual 
impairments. The result is a diminished character who augments the status 
of the sighted protagonist, a functionality that corresponds with feminism 
only insofar as the former is male and the latter female. That is to say, while 
inverting the patriarchal schema that Simone de Beauvoir has described as 
men taking the subject position and women being treated as an objectified 
Other, Brontë actively endorses the binary opposition of normativism and 
disability. This scenario has been found to be a concern for feminist as well 
as literary disability scholars because the subject position that Jane occupies 
is bolstered by the objectification of the disabled Other; it is indicative of 
disempowerment rather than empowerment.
 In accordance with the Derridean assertion that deconstruction is an 
openness toward the Other, which is the basis for Corker and Shakespeare’s 
reading of disability as an integral part of normativism, I have inverted 
numerous binary oppositions, analyzing the blindman’s diminishments and 
exposing links with the augmentations of his sighted counterparts. I have 
suggested that the grotesque portrayal of haptic perception underpins the 
implication that physical beauty is appreciated by purely visual means, that 
the symbolic castration invokes the figure of the castrating woman and her 
symbolic erection, that the unseeing spectacle elevates the controlling status 
of the unseen spectator, that the dependency of the blindman necessitates 
the dependability of his sighted counterparts, that his melancholia defines 
their happiness and, finally, that the emptiness of his living death is funda-
mental to the fullness of their lives. In brief, I have privileged the construct 
of disability over that of normativism and, more specifically, the blindman 
over his sighted counterparts, the result of which is a new perspective on 
Jane Eyre that will supplement the corpus of feminist readings. Moreover, 
while there can be no denying Chow’s assertion that the process of femi-
nization must be understood as “the emergence of a discursive network in 
which forces of class and race as well as gender become imbricated with one 
another” (144), I have demonstrated that disability must also be added to 
the list of significant forces. Indeed, heralded by Kirtley, Kleege, and Rodas, 
among others, the conclusive point is that the taxonomy of feminist, Marx-
ist, and postcolonial approaches to Jane Eyre can be supplemented by an 
approach that is appreciative of disability, from which we may infer that 
there must be an absence that, in a Derridean sense, requires supplement-
ing. After all, Brontë may be excused for the regressiveness of her approach 
to disability on the grounds of historicity, but the same cannot be said of 
literary scholars who have written since the disability movement gathered 
momentum in the late twentieth century.
i n  h e R  notorious piece appearing in The Quarterly Review of Decem-
ber 1848, Elizabeth Rigby comments on the “sheer rudeness and vulgarity” 
of the recently published Jane Eyre and cuts acutely at the narrator (440), 
observing:
We hear nothing but self-eulogiums on the perfect tact and wondrous 
penetration with which she is gifted, and yet almost every word she utters 
offends us, not only with the absence of these qualities, but with the posi-
tive contrasts of them, in either her pedantry, stupidity, or gross vulgarity. 
She is one of those ladies who put us in the unpleasant predicament of 
under-valuing their very virtues for dislike of the person in whom they are 
represented. One feels provoked as Jane Eyre stands before us—for in the 
wonderful reality of her thoughts and descriptions, she seems accountable 
for all done in her name—with principles you must approve in the main, 
and yet with language and manners that offend you in every particular. 
Even in that chef d’oeuvre of brilliant retrospective sketching, the descrip-
tion of her early life, it is the childhood and not the child that interests you. 
The little Jane, with her sharp eyes and dogmatic speeches, is a being you 
“on The SpeCTrum”
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neither could fondle nor love. [ . . . .] As the child, so also the woman—an 
uninteresting, sententious, pedantic thing [ . . . .]. 
It is a punishing review, but it brings home an essential point for all read-
ers, even those who feel profoundly attached to the text: there is some quirk 
in the narrative character that irks, that stands clear of our affection, that 
resists our sense of intimacy. No matter what we may see Jane Eyre as being 
“about,” no matter how we may approach the text, there is no getting away 
from the fact that the affect and social conduct of the narrator are highly 
unusual. From its first publication in 1847 and persistently throughout the 
century and a half that has followed, critics and theorists have commented 
on the idiosyncratic nature of Jane’s feelings and reactions, on her uncon-
ventional approach to relationships, and on the singularly remote, with-
drawn, or unattractive quality of her social intercourse. There may be many 
fruitful approaches to understanding Jane’s affect and demeanor, including 
widely disseminated postcolonialist and feminist readings that interpret the 
protagonist’s behaviors in terms of government and politics. This chapter 
suggests, however, that a new approach to Jane’s sociality enables a reading 
of the heroine as an individual on the autistic spectrum, and that such an 
interpretation, in turn, invites crucial new questions about the narrative of 
Jane Eyre and its apparent politics.
“a Queer, FrIghtened, shy lIttle thIng”: 
Jane eyre and antIpathIes
A sampling of the copious critical and theoretical literature surrounding 
Jane Eyre demonstrates a common theme running through even the most 
disparate approaches to the text. In addition to that which appeared in 
the Quarterly, another early negative review of the novel, an anonymous 
piece from The Christian Remembrancer, says of the narrator, “Never was 
there a better hater” (“Jane Eyre: An Autobiography,” 439). In his lauda-
tory 1847 review, George Henry Lewes cites the book’s “strange power of 
subjective representation” (437). Other critics have followed suit in recog-
nizing the idiosyncratic nature of the narrator, of the text, and frequently 
of the author as well. In 1916, Virginia Woolf’s interpretation of Jane Eyre 
cues the reader first to think of Charlotte Brontë, “unhappy and lonely, in 
her poverty and her exaltation.” Woolf compares Brontë’s writing unfavor-
ably with that of Austen and Tolstoy, characterizing it as “narrow,” “con-
stricted,” and comparatively unidimensional. The impressions of writers 
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like Brontë, she adds, are “self-centered and self-limited,” “close packed 
and strongly stamped between [ . . . .] narrow walls. Nothing issues from 
their mind which has not been marked with their own impress. They can 
learn little from other writers, and what they adopt they cannot assimilate.” 
Cora Kaplan sums up Woolf’s assessment of “Brontë’s heroine [as] located 
at the margins of bourgeois culture and normalcy, her social and psychic 
condition made to seem both voluntary and deeply eccentric” (Victoriana, 
18). In his 1950s reading of Jane Eyre as gothic, Robert Heilman abstracts 
the narrator’s character: “as a girl she is lonely, ‘passionate,’ ‘strange,’ 
‘like nobody there’” (460). He comments that she is “so portrayed as to 
evoke new feelings” and observes that Jane joins Rochester at Ferndean 
in a “closed-in life.”1 Terry Eagleton’s Myths of Power (1975) interprets 
Jane’s “self [as] a free, blank, ‘pre-social’ atom” (491). In the early 1970s, 
Adrienne Rich writes about Jane’s extreme disconnectedness, her lonely and 
orphaned state, as a fundamental metaphor for the condition of women 
in patriarchal society. Other feminist approaches, like Gilbert and Gubar’s 
Madwoman in the Attic (1979), ask the reader to understand Jane Eyre 
in terms of a “secret self.” From the mid-1980s, Gayatri Spivak’s ground-
breaking postcolonialist reading is deeply critical of the “isolationism” 
of the narrator and of the like response Spivak sees the text as inspiring 
in its readers. So, for instance, Spivak reads Jane as occupying a space of 
“self-marginalized uniqueness,” as preserving “her odd privilege,” likewise 
observing that the text draws the reader in to become Jane’s “accomplice” 
in this position (246). For Spivak, narrative details of the narrator’s interac-
tions with domestic space and her personal negotiation with the dominant 
sociality of the culture described are part of “the unexamined and covert 
axiomatics of imperialism in Jane Eyre” (“Three Women’s Texts,” 257). 
Following Spivak, Nancy Armstrong positions Jane Eyre within a tradition 
of domestic fiction that “detached the desiring self from place, time, and 
material cause,” thus creating in their “universal forms of subjectivity” a 
dangerously antisocial narrative mechanism (187). And Sally Shuttleworth 
also proposes that Jane Eyre “can be read as a quintessential expression of 
Victorian individualism” (182, qtd. in Kaplan, Victoriana, 30). But perhaps 
most striking, for the present purposes, are the observations of R. A. York, 
who speaks directly to the narrator’s characteristic “silence.” In his Strang-
ers and Secrets: Communication in the Nineteenth-Century Novel (1994), 
 1. The isolation of Ferndean has been a favored theme of many other scholars as well, 
including Shannon; Gilbert and Gubar; Roy; and Nestor. Yoshiaki Shirai reads Ferndean as a 
kind of “Wardian case” that “encloses Jane and Rochester” and preserves them from “noise” 
(129).
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York demonstrates that Jane is “fundamentally uncommunicative for much 
of the novel,” that “she retains a distaste for contact [ . . . .] throughout 
much of her life,” and that “her replies can be brief and uncooperative 
in the extreme” (62). Whatever other purpose or meaning such silence, 
secrecy, isolationism, rudeness, or resistance to contact may have, whether 
interpreted from the standpoint of Christian values, within a Freudian 
framework, from the context of Marxist or feminist politics, or of postcolo-
nialist theory, the fundamental idiosyncrasy of Jane’s affect, what one critic 
identifies as her “social freakery” (Chen, 374), remains a quality that con-
fronts the reader at every turn.
 From the very outset of Jane’s life with her uncle’s family, the Reeds, 
she is regarded as difficult and temperamental. Aunt Reed complains of 
Jane’s affect even from babyhood, saying of the infant Jane, “I hated it the 
first time I set my eyes on it—a sickly, whining, pining thing!” (232; ch. 
21).2 Her reaction to the baby is uncharitable, certainly, but it is nonethe-
less worthy of examination, for it is not merely jealousy for her own chil-
dren or class prejudice that dampen Aunt Reed’s affection for her infant 
niece; it is clearly something in the baby’s very being that irks her, some real 
but insubstantial irritation that lies behind her statement: “I would as soon 
have been charged with a pauper brat out of a workhouse” (232; ch. 21). 
Jane’s unhappy childhood is so familiar that it has become almost a cliché; 
her aunt despises her and her cousins exclude her. Ultimately, Mrs. Reed’s 
assessment, provided in the opening pages of the narrative, is almost diag-
nostic in its cruel precision: Jane is explicitly lacking “a sociable and child-
like disposition” (7; ch. 1). There is certainly no love lost between them. 
Writes Jane:
I was a discord in Gateshead Hall: I was like nobody there; I had nothing 
in harmony with Mrs. Reed or her children, or her chosen vassalage. If they 
did not love me, in fact, as little did I love them. They were not bound to 
regard with affection a thing that could not sympathise with one amongst 
them; a heterogeneous thing, opposed to them in temperament, in capacity, 
in propensities; a useless thing, incapable of serving their interest, or adding 
to their pleasure; a noxious thing, cherishing the germs of indignation at 
their treatment, of contempt of their judgment. (15–16; ch. 2)
Jane is lonely and ill-treated by both her own account and that of others, the 
 2. The version of the primary text referred to in this chapter is Charlotte Brontë, Jane 
Eyre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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servants whispering to one another of her wrongs but agreeing at the same 
time that something in the child’s demeanor resists affection or attachment. 
The housemaid, Abbot, comments that “if she were a nice pretty child, one 
might compassionate her forlornness; but one really cannot care for such a 
little toad as that” (26; ch. 3); so, too, Abbot remarks to her fellow servant 
that Jane is “an underhand little thing: I never saw a girl of her age with so 
much cover” (12; ch. 2). In an uncharacteristic moment of frankness, the 
young Jane once approaches the more favored of these two maids, her nurse 
Bessie, with an impulsive embrace and an open plea against being scolded. 
But Bessie’s reaction to this momentary impulse serves further to affirm the 
sense of Jane as withdrawn and forbidding: “‘You are a strange child, Miss 
Jane,’ she said, as she looked down at me: ‘a little roving, solitary thing 
[ . . . .]. You’re such a queer, frightened, shy little thing. You should be 
bolder. [ . . . . D]on’t be afraid of me. Don’t start when I chance to speak 
rather sharply: It’s so provoking’” (39; ch. 4).
 But it is not boldness, exactly, that Jane lacks. An unpopular orphaned 
child who will physically and verbally attack those who persecute her, despite 
their advantage in age, size, and power, cannot comfortably be understood 
as merely shy or shrinking. The assaults that Jane makes on her older cousin 
John, and more especially on his mother, are breathtaking, moments of tri-
umph for the beleaguered narrator and for those readers who identify with 
her browbeaten childhood. Jane’s famous speech to Mrs. Reed, rejecting her 
aunt and calling her to account for the terrible injustices the narrator had 
suffered, cannot easily be figured into the withdrawn character with which 
the reader is otherwise confronted. Aunt Reed remains baffled by Jane’s 
behavior almost a decade later and is troubled by the child’s outburst as an 
“uncanny” experience. Mrs. Reed revisits this encounter repeatedly, on her 
deathbed, still trying to configure Jane’s behavior into a meaningful con-
text. She refers to Jane’s “disposition” as “very bad,” “impossible to under-
stand,” and “incomprehensible” (239–40; ch. 21). Confronting the narrator 
in adulthood, Mrs. Reed laments:
I could not forget your conduct to me, Jane—the fury with which you once 
turned on me; the tone in which you declared you abhorred me the worst 
of anybody in the world; the unchildlike look and voice with which you 
affirmed that the very thought of me made you sick, and asserted that I had 
treated you with miserable cruelty. (239; ch. 21)
For Mrs. Reed, it is as though “an animal that I had struck or pushed had 
looked up at me with human eyes and cursed me in a man’s voice.” For the 
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socially conventional Aunt Reed, Jane is an enigma, “something mad,” a 
“fiend,” a being scarcely human, her affect and the extraordinary quality of 
her sociality locating her outside the explicable boundaries of human social 
contact:
I have had more trouble with that child than any one would believe. Such 
a burden to be left on my hands—and so much annoyance as she caused 
me, daily and hourly, with her incomprehensible disposition, and her 
sudden starts of temper, and her continual, unnatural watchings of one’s 
movements! I declare she talked to me once like something mad, or like a 
fiend—no child ever spoke or looked as she did; I was glad to get her away 
from the house. (231; ch. 21)
But if the narrator’s character is enigmatic for her aunt, Jane is equally at a 
loss to understand her own inability to please. She is conscious that others 
do not like her, but she also suffers miserably from the coldness and exclu-
sion she experiences. Though resentful of her treatment as a child, Jane is 
nevertheless bewildered, filled with painful wondering at the implicit rejec-
tion she experiences:
Why was I always suffering, always brow-beaten, always accused, for ever 
condemned? Why could I never please? Why was it useless to try to win 
any one’s favour? Eliza, who was headstrong and selfish, was respected. 
Georgiana, who had a spoiled temper, a very acrid spite, a captious and 
insolent carriage, was universally indulged. [ . . . .] John, no one thwarted, 
much less punished [ . . . .despite his violent and destructive behaviors]. 
I dared commit no fault; I strove to fulfill every duty; and I was termed 
naughty and tiresome, sullen and sneaking, from morning to noon, and 
from noon to night. (15; ch. 2)
Even in adulthood, nothing beholden to her aunt, Jane continues to seek the 
affection she feels she deserves, apologizing to the woman who had made 
her life a misery and arguing, “I should have been glad to love you if you 
would have let me” (240; ch. 21). Aligning with the textual observations of 
various critics, Jane’s experiences in childhood, confirmed from a variety of 
perspectives within the novel, clearly define a person with an unusual social-
ity and personal affect. The person thus described, while baffling to others 
and often personally bewildered by social conventions and the unspoken 
expectations of interpersonal contact, may be identified within literature of 
the twentieth- and twenty-first centuries as “autistic.”
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dIscoverIng autIsm: 
theorIes, deFInItIons, IdentItIes
Coined in the early 1940s, the term autism was developed independently 
by two doctors—Hans Asperger and Leo Kanner—working autonomously 
continents apart (the former in Austria and the latter in the United States). 
Early work with autistic children by famed child psychologist Bruno Bet-
telheim and popular representations of profoundly autistic people have 
resulted in a widespread but false understanding of autism often in extreme 
negative terms, as completely disabling and as a “tragedy” for those 
affected. Although popular ideas about autism are shifting, the commonest 
sense of the autistic individual remains that of a person who is nonverbal, 
of low intelligence, and frequently violent, characteristics which have been 
disseminated through a wide variety of sources. Advertising for personal 
injury lawyers claims massive settlements in autism cases, indirectly inform-
ing the public unconscious and adding to the sense that autism is a calam-
ity. Popular sources of electronic information—government websites, online 
encyclopedias, and commercial databases—describe children as “suffering 
from autism,” as silent and unresponsive, and popular print sources report 
an autism “epidemic.” In addition, grassroots health-care activists who see 
the recent “explosion” in diagnosed autism as resulting from environmen-
tal factors, especially the irresponsible overuse of childhood immuniza-
tions, urge political and social action but also typically portray autism in the 
bleakest light. Even positive representations of autism (usually as Asperger 
syndrome) are often poisoned by conventions that transform the autistic 
character into a sentimental icon or a stereotype of spectacular skill without 
full human identity in order to create what Stuart Murray calls an “effect of 
wonder at the level of human difference” (30).
 Medical or therapeutic professionals working with autistic clients are 
also sometimes responsible for making devastating global claims about 
autism, as lamentable for their bias as for their inaccuracy. One recent text 
designed to guide therapeutic work with autistic adults claims, “In autism 
the prerequisites for creativity are not present. The adult with autism can-
not extend the known, or bring together understandings to create new ones, 
because the known remains confined to the specific context in which it was 
learnt. [ . . . .] Autistic thinking is of a non-imaginative kind” (Jordan and 
Powell, 78–79). This understanding of autism in negative terms, as deficit, 
is most infamously propagated in Bettelheim’s classic book-length study on 
autism, The Empty Fortress (1967), a failed Freudian approach that sees 
autism as a prison and that ruthlessly blames parents (and mothers espe-
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cially) for what the writer understands as a form of childhood psychosis. 
Even sympathetic accounts of autism written by family members frequently 
reinforce the idea that the person “inside” the autism is living an experi-
ence of imprisonment. Writing in 1999, Wendy Robinson, for instance, 
explains of her relationship with her autistic son, “We never broke down the 
wall and retrieved the person that could live independently and be socially 
aware” (244). All together, popular notions of autism give the impression 
that the withdrawn, insular, autistic self is profoundly damaged, incapable 
of feeling, dangerous, and diminished in capacity for thought or creativity.
 This sense of autism not only diverges radically from the lived experi-
ence of many autistic people,3 but it is also clearly contrary to the writings 
of Kanner and Asperger that first defined and delineated autistic personality. 
Key to this misunderstanding is a failure to look closely at the very word 
first coined to describe the single defining feature of different autistic per-
sons. Though later writers frequently comment on the amazing coincidence 
of Asperger and Kanner coming up with the word autism independently, 
there is actually nothing strange about this, since autism literally means 
“selfness” and is the primary characteristic of the personality described. 
Thus, the principal feature of autism is an unusual degree of inwardness, 
aloneness, or independence, sometimes—but not always—to the exclu-
sion of others from direct verbal exchange or eye contact. The “cases” first 
described by Kanner in his seminal article, “Autistic Disturbances of Affec-
tive Contact” (1943), are far from fitting the popular stereotype of autism 
today. Kanner’s subjects span a broad range of intelligence, skill, and social 
awareness. In the brief theoretical section that follows his clinical analyses, 
Kanner suggests that:
 3. Negative stereotypes of autism are an ever-present challenge, even within literature 
that is otherwise sensitive and well-informed. As autism becomes an increasing social pres-
ence, however, there is greater recognition of the assets and contributions of people on the 
spectrum. A recent article in WIRED magazine notes the spike in autism diagnoses in Cali-
fornia’s Silicon Valley and attributes the surge to the concentration of techie “geeks” whose 
intermarriage and reproduction have genetically reinforced the incidence of autism. While 
considering the disadvantages that arise in such a situation, Silberman nevertheless recognizes 
that autism is linked to specialized forms of intelligence and productivity, quoting Temple 
Grandin’s observation, for instance, that NASA is likely “the largest sheltered workshop in 
the world,” commenting on the prevalence of autistic types in “the halls of academe,” and 
noting: “It’s a familiar joke in the industry that many of the hardcore programmers in IT 
strongholds like Intel, Adobe, and Silicon Graphics—coming to work early, leaving late, 
sucking down Big Gulps in their cubicles while they code for hours—are residing somewhere 
in Asperger’s domain.”
“o n  T h e  s p e c T R u M ”  59
C
h
a
p
ter 3
[The] fundamental disorder is the children’s inability to relate themselves 
in the ordinary way to people and situations from the beginning of life. 
Their parents refer to them as having always been “self-sufficient”; “like 
in a shell”; “happiest when left alone”; “acting as if people weren’t there”; 
“perfectly oblivious to everything about him”; “giving the impression of 
silent wisdom”; “failing to develop the usual amount of social awareness”; 
“acting almost as if hypnotized.” This is not, as in schizophrenic children 
or adults, a departure from an initially present relationship; it is not a 
“withdrawal” from formerly existing participation. There is from the start 
an extreme autistic aloneness that, whenever possible, disregards, ignores, 
shuts out anything that comes to the child from the outside. Direct physi-
cal contact or such motion or noise as threatens to disrupt the aloneness 
is either treated “as if it weren’t there” or, if this is no longer sufficient, 
resented painfully as distressing interference. (41)
Indeed, Kanner’s brilliance lies in his ability to recognize the single defining 
feature across a diverse range of other characteristics, lighting on the “autis-
tic” quality of the children studied, despite a wide range of verbal capabili-
ties and apparent intelligence. As autism expert Leon Eisenberg comments, 
“The genius of [Kanner’s] discovery was to detect the cardinal traits [ . . . .] 
in the midst of phenomenology as diverse as muteness in one child and 
verbal precocity in another” (qtd. in Rutter, 51). Kanner was highly con-
scious of the intelligence of many of the children he observed, and he noted 
particularly that all the subjects with whom he initially interacted came 
from unusually intelligent, highly educated, and/or exceptionally productive 
families, noting a relationship between the personality of the child and the 
exceptional nature of the family, and thus pointing not only to a potential 
genetic component to autism but also to a possible understanding of autism 
as linked to other idiosyncratic aspects of cognition or intelligence. In other 
words, despite his (sometimes cruelly) clinical approach to the autistic per-
sonality, Kanner’s groundbreaking article allows room for interpreting 
autism in positive terms.
 The increasing incidence of autism in recent decades, or at least the 
increasing rate of diagnosis, has worked to refresh and complicate the 
understanding and definition of autism for many people. Specifically, the 
introduction of Asperger syndrome to the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) and the subsequent proposed integra-
tion of Asperger syndrome into the diagnostic criteria for “Autistic Disorder 
(Autism Spectrum Disorder)” for the American Psychiatric Association’s 
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DSM-5, has broadened diagnostic criteria, encouraging an understanding of 
autism/Asperger as existing on a “spectrum,” defined primarily by patterns 
and behaviors having to do with conventional sociality.4 So, for instance, in 
determining the presence of autism/Asperger syndrome, the DSM asks that, 
among other items, diagnoses consider the following:
1.  failure to develop appropriate peer relationships
2.  lack of social or emotional reciprocity (e.g., not actively participating in 
simple social play or games, preferring solitary activities, or involving 
others in activities only as tools or “mechanical” aids)
3.  marked impairment in the ability to initiate or sustain a conversation 
with others
4.  use of idiosyncratic language
5.  lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social imitative play 
appropriate to developmental level
6.  abnormal functioning in social interaction
7.  lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or achieve-
ments with other people
While not an exhaustive compendium of the diagnostic criteria offered in 
the DSM,5 this list offers some sense of how subtle and ambiguous autistic 
behavior may be. Even if the individual assessed does not meet the standard 
for diagnosis, autism experts (including autistic people) speak of individu-
als as having autistic traits or characteristics. Autism is thus understood—
within the medical establishment and by a popular community experienced 
 4. The defining of autism has been a hotly contested issue both among clinicians and 
within families and autism communities. Though many feel that broader diagnostic criteria 
are warranted, there has been persistent disagreement as to whether “autism” and “Asperger 
syndrome” ought to be understood as discrete categories. Both Kanner and Asperger use 
the term autism to describe their observations, and, while Asperger’s work tends to look at 
individuals who are—in clinical parlance—considered to be “high functioning,” there is cer-
tainly room in Kanner’s initial study for the inclusion of the amply intelligent and the highly 
verbal, the key distinction made in the DSM-IV between autism and Asperger syndrome being 
one of verbal development and ability (a distinction that is elided in the proposed DSM-5). 
Kanner notes of those children who made up his initial eleven “cases”: “Even though most 
of these children were at one time or another looked upon as feebleminded, they are all 
unquestionably endowed with good cognitive potentialities” (47). For the purposes of this 
chapter, which grounds itself in the earliest theorizations of autism, no distinction between 
autism and Asperger is deemed necessary and none is made from this point forward.
 5. These diagnostic criteria are abstracted from the DSM-IV, the approved version of 
the manual at the time the present volume went to press; while incomplete, edited, or par-
tially paraphrased, the apparent intended sense has not been altered; substantial changes to 
diagnostic criteria will appear in the DSM-5, scheduled for release in May 2013.
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with autism—as existing along a spectrum, with some individuals having 
barely discernable social idiosyncrasies, some having active social and intel-
lectual lives that play out exclusively through nonimmediate contact (e.g., 
through writing or within electronic communities), and with others who 
demonstrate no apparent contact with or interest in the “outer” world. 
Autism, Asperger syndrome, and related sensory and affective “conditions” 
are thus often encapsulated by the global diagnostic term ASD, or autism 
spectrum disorder. Along this spectrum, the manifestation of affective idio-
syncrasy is as diverse as any other human quality. In other words, autistic 
people are not always visual, or always nonverbal, or always savants; the 
range of personalities and interests is as various as in any other demographic 
pool. And the degree of what is seen as “function” (i.e., the ability to interact 
seamlessly with ordinary people) in some autistic persons has led many to 
conjecture that there is a diagnostic crisis within the medical establishment. 
By embracing such a broad array of social and affective behaviors, some 
argue, it seems that diagnosis may become either impossible—or inevitable.
 For many, the debate over diagnosis—especially insofar as it concerns 
the criteria of the DSM—is paramount, since the diagnostic pronouncement 
is immediately concerned with the distribution of material resources. How-
ever, for a larger portion of the population and for the purposes of fiction, 
formal diagnosis is beside the point. If an individual, no matter how eccen-
tric, thrives without medical or therapeutic intervention, there is much to be 
said for resisting medicine, the disciplinary framework that exists, in many 
respects, for the tyrannical purposes of normalizing what is seen as irregu-
lar.6 (A growing “neurodiversity” movement resists the pervasive misreading 
of autism as “defect” and insists on the cultural and social value of people 
on the spectrum, without the dubious benefit of intervention.) Likewise, 
for a fictional character, formal diagnosis can bring no benefit. At the same 
time, while diagnosis may not always be advantageous, coming to an under-
standing of autistic personality and a recognition of autistic characteristics, 
both within ourselves and in the world around us, can contribute to a more 
complex sense of identity and an enriched political consciousness. Thus, the 
suggestion of this chapter—that Jane Eyre is an individual on the autism 
spectrum—is intended not as an end, not as an incarceration of the char-
acter within the rigid framework of diagnosis, not as a gesture that cuts 
off meaning and interpretive possibility, but instead as a device to reopen 
 6. The thinking for this chapter is indebted in general terms to the work of scholars in 
disability studies. This passage in particular is obviously influenced by the work of Michel 
Foucault, but the observation that “normalcy” may be a tyrannical social force echoes the 
work of Lennard Davis.
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discussion of the novel’s politics and to challenge what seem to be some of 
our larger presuppositions regarding the political and social meaning of the 
individual.
Jane eyre/autIsm autobIography
To some extent, the analysis of Jane’s childhood offered earlier begins to 
effect this shift, but a brief rereading of the narrator’s adult experiences 
within the context of recently published autism auto/biography creates a 
more textured sense of Jane’s autism. Literature by and about autistic per-
sons has proliferated in recent years, from the exploratory essays of neuro-
psychologist Oliver Sacks7 in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s to Temple Grandin’s 
groundbreaking autobiography, Emergence: Labeled Autistic (1986), to 
Donna Williams’s best-selling Nobody Nowhere (1992), to the more recent 
productions of writers like Mark Haddon, Dawn Prince-Hughes, Daniel 
Tammet, and Keiko Tobe. As this genre grows and offers increasing clar-
ity regarding the diversity of autistic personality and experience, readers 
can also begin to recognize certain shared themes and ideas within the lit-
erature. These frequently include: A feeling of misunderstanding and being 
misunderstood by others in everyday interactions; a powerful and elaborate 
sense of connection in some special arena or skill area (e.g., numbers, color, 
animals, drawing/painting, languages); the experience of being excluded, 
especially in childhood when rigid social structures prevail; and a sense of 
peace and satisfaction that comes with order and ordering, both in material 
and in logical terms.8 As one rereads Jane Eyre in the context of this emerg-
 7. While a controversial figure within disability studies—critiqued most notably by Tom 
Shakespeare and Thomas Couser—Oliver Sacks has made a brilliant, if flawed, contribution 
to the understanding of neurodiversity and very often writes of autism (and disability more 
generally) in terms of creativity, talent, and giftedness, counteracting the deficit model that 
is elsewhere so entrenched an aspect of medicalized disability. Moreover, Sacks has himself 
been regarded as an individual on the spectrum (Sacks, “Face-Blind,” 37), a powerful reason 
for including his perspective despite criticism of his work.
 8. The theme of peace and autistic ordering cannot be fully developed here; however, 
one might briefly consider the joy that Jane claims in the thorough cleaning of Moor House in 
anticipation of the Christmas holiday—“to clean down Moor House from chamber to cellar; 
[ . . . .] to rub it up with bees-wax, oil, and an indefinite number of cloths [ . . . .] ; [ . . . .] 
to arrange every chair, table, bed, carpet, with mathematical precision,” etc. (390; ch. 34)—a 
passage which may fruitfully be compared with one from Donna Williams’s Nobody No-
where, describing her work as a department store clerk: “It seemed almost unbelievable that 
I would be expected to do the thing I loved most: put things in order. There were numbers to 
be counted and ordered, there were colors and sizes and types of article to be grouped; every 
department was kept separate from every other department and called by a different name; 
it was a world of guarantees” (82–83).
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ing literature, maintaining a consciousness of these commonalities and the 
ways that autism is perceived and represented “from the inside,” Brontë’s 
novel and Jane’s story gain a familiar hue, and add increasingly to the sense 
that the “disconnected” governess may be understood as a person “on the 
spectrum” (161; ch. 16).
 Having already touched on Jane’s experience of exclusion in childhood, 
an account that dovetails suggestively with narratives offered in modern 
autism autobiography, it may be helpful to reconsider the general character 
of the adult Jane with a sense of autism in mind. With an interpretive ges-
ture alert to autistic possibilities, all kinds of minor details and episodes, all 
manner of quirky characteristics take on new significance: Jane’s “Quaker-
ish” appearance; her sense of aloneness at Lowood, even after many years 
of residence; the feeling of peace and wholeness she seems to derive from 
nature, from gardens, from plants instead of people; her silent impatience 
with a talkative roommate (“a teacher who occupied the same room with 
me kept me from the subject to which I longed to recur, by a prolonged effu-
sion of small talk. How I wished sleep would silence her” [85; ch. 10]). The 
episode of homelessness between her residences at Thornfield and Moor 
House, failing to take valuables with her, forgetting the morsel of luggage 
she does take along, forgetting her newly discovered connections, are all 
strongly reminiscent of homeless experiences depicted by Prince-Hughes and 
Donna Williams, who describe a sense of panic that induces them to leave 
places of comparative security. Think of Jane’s sincere but formal affec-
tion for Adèle, the consideration of the girl’s well-being as though from a 
distance. Jane’s early period of engagement with Rochester, she provoking 
him into sparring with her continually, actively, and consciously resistant 
to more tender forms of affection, hints at a fear of conventional contact, 
a reluctance to connect sexually that is also a recurrent theme explored in 
autism literature.9 Even Jane’s discreet relationship with Pilot, her acknowl-
edgment of Rochester’s dog as a seeming peer, as an individual worthy of 
respect, demonstrates an autistic sensibility, a connection to animals that 
echoes that of many autistic persons.
 It makes sense to explore further the appearance of Jane’s autism by 
looking more closely at the impression of missed connection that frequently 
arises between autistic and nonautistic people. Nonautistic people often 
attribute this sense of disconnect to a mistaken belief that individuals with 
autism have little or no feeling, but, indeed, the contrary is more likely true. 
Autistic persons typically experience intense sensations and emotions but 
 9. See, for example, Sacks’s “An Anthropologist on Mars,” Williams’s Somebody Some-
where, and Prince-Hughes.
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may habitually reduce the appearance of feeling or shield the self from a 
barrage of overwhelming external stimuli (including dialogue and other 
forms of communication) in order to preserve an integrated sense of iden-
tity. For “high functioning” autistic persons, this shielding may take the 
form of exceedingly effective social performance that can leave both self and 
other with a sensation of loss or failure. This experience is described over 
and over in autism auto/biography. Donna Williams, for instance, writes 
of employing fully formed but nonintegrated performance personalities to 
engage with the world on her behalf, often leaving her teachers, family, and 
employers baffled and enraged (Nobody Nowhere). Dawn Prince-Hughes, 
seeking to engage in a love relationship, speaks of conducting an intensive 
field study of human sexuality, developing “protocols” and applying “data” 
that lead her to some problematic conclusions, including the explicit idea 
“that my own sexual pleasure was irrelevant” (80–81). Needless to say, her 
spectacular sexual performances, while bringing much gratification to her 
lovers, do not result in mutual satisfaction.
 Within Jane Eyre, there is substantial evidence that Jane, too, partici-
pates in similar autistically informed social exchanges. In adulthood, as Jane 
exerts increasing control over her passionate emotional life, reducing her 
affect and concealing her deeply rooted feelings with ever greater success, 
experienced readers tend to contextualize this process in terms of cultural 
history, understanding the narrator’s extreme self-control, her apparent 
poise, as meshing with historically appropriate social conventions. Readers 
know, as Jane does, that a Victorian gentlewoman must not evidence feelings 
of passion, must not put herself forward, must not be seen to harbor ideas 
or opinions that are beyond her limited social scope. Because the reader sees 
Jane’s self-control from the inside, though, he or she is always aware of the 
roiling passions and rarely notices or questions the narrator’s most obvious 
autistic characteristic, the silence and flattened affect, the autistic remoteness 
that other characters evidently experience. This is quite apparent in the fes-
tive drawing room scenes in which Jane is clearly portrayed as dreading to 
appear before company: Rochester and Mrs. Fairfax both anticipate Jane’s 
objection to participating in social gatherings and the latter offers friendly 
advice on how best to avoid the crowd:
I’ll tell you how to manage so as to avoid the embarrassment of making a 
formal entrance, which is the most disagreeable part of the business. You 
must go into the drawing-room while it is empty, before the ladies leave the 
dinner-table; choose your seat in any quiet nook you like; you need not stay 
long after the gentlemen come in. (169; ch. 17)
“o n  T h e  s p e c T R u M ”  65
C
h
a
p
ter 3
In these scenes, the reader typically sees Jane as planting herself quite liter-
ally on the margins: “I sit in the shade—if any shade there be in this bril-
liantly-lit apartment; the window-curtain half hides me” (173; ch. 17). Even 
in the social exchanges that feel more natural to the reader, however, Jane’s 
affective idiosyncrasies are evident upon close reading. When she addresses 
Grace Poole, for instance, after the fire in Rochester’s room, hinting at what 
she thinks is a shared secret, Jane may look arch to the reader, but for out-
siders—all the other characters with whom the governess is interacting—her 
manner must seem haughty, even bizarre. Leah, a witness to the dialogue 
between Jane and Grace Poole, must find the governess’s behavior inexpli-
cable, as she whispers closely with a servant far beneath her, a person for 
whom she has always shown contempt. Even Grace’s reaction—Jane tells 
us that “there was something of consciousness” in the expression of the ser-
vant’s eyes—suggests the possibility that she finds Jane’s intimations a little 
weird (154; ch. 16).
 In fact, Mrs. Fairfax, the one person at Thornfield who is truly Jane’s 
social equal and with whom she would seem most naturally to fall into com-
panionship, obviously finds Jane strange and bewildering, despite the older 
woman’s warm feelings. The scene in which Jane first asks Mrs. Fairfax 
about Rochester’s character offers a telling sample of many of their other 
interactions. After prodding the housekeeper repeatedly for some concrete, 
meaningful, detailed sense of Mr. Rochester, Jane ultimately gives up unsat-
isfied, commenting to the reader:
There are people who seem to have no notion of sketching a character, 
or observing and describing salient points, either in persons or things: the 
good lady evidently belonged to this class; my queries puzzled, but did not 
draw her out. Mr. Rochester was Mr. Rochester in her eyes; a gentleman, 
a landed proprietor—nothing more: she inquired and searched no further, 
and evidently wondered at my wish to gain a more definite notion of his 
identity. (105; ch. 11; emphasis added)
Jane’s queries puzzle Mrs. Fairfax, but they do not elicit information, and 
because Jane does the telling, it is Mrs. Fairfax who here appears deficient, 
lacking in natural curiosity or powers of observation. Narrated from with-
out, however, it is easy to see how Jane’s distant sense of Mrs. Fairfax’s 
puzzlement and wonder might be translated into an understanding of the 
governess’s queries as peculiar or socially untoward.
 Even in her most passionate exchange with Rochester himself, the one 
person who “gets” her, who connects with the real, the unperformed Jane, 
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she demonstrates an unusually perceptive understanding of her apparent 
affect and an incisive sense of how others must read her. In the dialogue that 
leads up to this first engagement, Jane shouts angrily at Rochester, repeat-
edly affirming that she does have feelings and pointedly announcing that she 
is not “an automaton” (253; ch. 23). It is an assurance that seems fitting 
to the reader, who shares Jane’s rage and frustration over Rochester’s teas-
ing and erotic game playing, but it bespeaks as well a powerful underlying 
defensive posture, an insistence on her identity as a feeling human being 
despite persistent social misreading.
 Another scene that speaks compellingly of Jane’s autistic affect is that 
in which her marriage to Rochester is called off, she is exposed to Bertha 
Mason, and she is then left to manage her feelings in solitude. While the 
reader is offered an understanding of Jane as a person in shock, her absolute 
lack of affect and effective communication in this process are also strongly 
suggestive of an autistic personality. Upon the public announcement in the 
church that Rochester is already married and that his wife is living, Jane’s 
reaction is all internal: “My nerves vibrated to those low-spoken words as 
they had never vibrated to thunder—my blood felt their subtle violence as it 
had never felt frost or fire; but I was collected, and in no danger of swoon-
ing” (289; ch. 26). When presented with the violent spectacle of Rochester 
and Bertha, Jane continues silent and apparently calm, Rochester observ-
ing that she “stands [ . . . .] grave and quiet at the mouth of hell, looking 
collectedly at the gambols of a demon” (294; ch. 26). And when, at last, 
Jane emerges from the solitude of her chamber, to which she has imme-
diately after retreated, Rochester observes, “I have been waiting for you 
long, and listening: yet not one movement have I heard, nor one sob: five 
minutes more of that death-like hush, and I should have forced the lock 
like a burglar. So you shun me?—you shut yourself up and grieve alone! 
I would rather you had come and upbraided me with vehemence. You are 
passionate. I expected a scene of some kind. I was prepared for the hot rain 
of tears; only I wanted them to be shed on my breast: now a senseless floor 
has received them, or your drenched handkerchief. But I err: you have not 
wept at all! I see a white cheek and a faded eye, but no trace of tears.’” Even 
Jane’s forgiveness here is offered silently: “I forgave him all,” she writes, 
“yet not in words, not outwardly; only at my heart’s core” (298; ch. 27).
 Like contemporary autistic autobiographers and autism writers, Jane 
also demonstrates a strong sense of attachment to a specific arena existing 
apart from social convention and obligation. For some autistic persons, this 
realm is numerical, linguistic, or animal, with myriad overlappings of inter-
est or savant talent. While the sphere of human social interaction may seem 
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to the autistic person to operate by codes that are invisible and unfathom-
able, the area of special talent is typically experienced as enriched, having a 
depth or dimension beyond that experienced by neurotypical individuals.10 
So, Daniel Tammet writes of his synesthetic experience of the numerical 
world, where numbers have for him distinct personalities, including explicit 
identifying colors and size/shape characteristics. Oliver Sacks describes a 
conversation in prime numbers between savant twins, like two connoisseurs, 
each savoring the purely numerical exchange (“The Twins,” 201–4). Dawn 
Prince-Hughes is finally able to decode and replicate human social behaviors 
through an intense intuitive relationship with gorillas. For a great number 
of autistic persons, however, the area of enriched skill and interest is visual 
in nature. Countless autobiographical sources attest to this widespread 
visual orientation among autistic persons. Temple Grandin writes specifi-
cally about “thinking in pictures”; Stephen Wiltshire, an accomplished artist 
from childhood, has had significant public success, including the publica-
tion of book-length collections of his work; and another visually oriented 
autistic person, the incompletely identified “José” from Oliver Sacks’s “The 
Autist Artist,” is seen to harbor an astonishing visual intuition, his draw-
ings “richly expressive” and filled with roguish humor despite the fact that 
he is regarded by the attendants of his institutional home as an “idiot” and 
“hopelessly retarded” (214). For many autistic persons, the visual world 
simply feels more real, more concrete, more authentic than the seemingly 
random social interactions of a babbling humanity.
 Given this context, it is not difficult to see how Jane’s unmistakable visual 
orientation and artistic skill help to locate her on the spectrum. Indeed, 
Jane’s visuality has provided fertile ground for critical and theoretical explo-
ration. Among the many who have observed the narrator’s exceptional visu-
ality, Antonia Losano has described the crucial connection between Jane’s 
visual and narrative proclivities, and Carla Peterson sees Jane’s favoring 
of landscape over verbal caption as a feminist gesture. From the moment 
Jane introduces herself, leafing through Bewick’s History of British Birds 
“for the letter-press of which,” she declares, she “cared little” (8; ch. 1), 
the reader is confronted with the narrator’s devotion to the visual and her 
ability to concentrate herself entirely, to enter into an almost altered state 
when visually occupied. The report Jane makes to Rochester about working 
on the pieces he finds in her portfolio is telling: “To paint them,” she says, 
“was to enjoy one of the keenest pleasures I have ever known. [ . . . .] I sat 
 10. Describing this aspect of autism from the context of a medical model, Sacks writes, 
“‘Isolated islands of proficiency’ and ‘splinter skills’ are spoken of in the literature’” (“Autist 
Artist,” 219).
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at them from morning till noon, and from noon till night: the length of the 
midsummer days favoured my inclination to apply” (126; ch. 13). Again 
and again, artistic creation is seen as Jane’s solace, a firm place to stand in 
unstable or unfriendly territory. Revisiting the “hostile” home of her youth, 
the mature Jane is once again shunned by her cousins, but she finds “occu-
pation and amusement” in drawing, winning the unsought admiration of 
Georgiana and Eliza, who come to recognize Jane as a social equal because 
of her evident artistic gift (ch. 21). Generally dismissive of feminine beauty, 
Jane’s artist self connects eagerly with the “model” in qualitatively different 
terms from those of the social human subject. Otherwise uninterested in the 
charms and social graces of Rosamond, her cousin St. John’s love object, 
Jane nevertheless feels “a thrill of artist-delight at the idea of copying from 
so perfect and radiant a model. [ . . . .] I took a sheet of fine card-board, and 
drew a careful outline. I promised myself the pleasure of colouring it; and, 
as it was getting late then, I told her she must come and sit another day” 
(369; ch. 32). Like many other autistic personalities, Jane feels secure in her 
visual sense and her work as an artist, even when the demands of interper-
sonal contact challenge or threaten her individual autistic integrity.
the polItIcs oF prIvacy: 
preservIng autIstIc autonomy
It is around the idea of autistic integrity that it becomes possible to reread 
one of the great issues of Jane Eyre. While millions of readers have relished 
the text and countless critics have analyzed its merits, there remains a sense 
for many readers, amateur and professional, that the narrator’s general 
remoteness and her ultimate retreat to Ferndean, in particular, are subjects 
for justifiable critique. Many theorists—Gayatri Spivak and Nancy Arm-
strong most notably—have suggested that Jane’s “individualism” (or the 
individualism she is seen to represent) embodies a kind of antisocial self-
ishness, that her aloneness and the appeal of such aloneness for the reader 
represent a dangerous indulgence, a shuffling off of social and political 
responsibility that is damaging to others, possibly even murderous. Read 
as a manifestation of political isolationism, Jane becomes a culpable char-
acter, a passive agent of imperialism, a feminist reactionary who rejects the 
need for political solidarity. The difficulty with such an interpretation, even 
while it contributes to our understanding of the text and of our world, is 
that it fails to consider that the individual, even when she acts alone, is a 
political creature. Jane’s aloofness and social idiosyncrasy are not a bel-
“o n  T h e  s p e c T R u M ”  69
C
h
a
p
ter 3
ligerent confrontation of outsiders; the making of her home at Ferndean is 
not a wholesale rejection of humanity; and, most decidedly, her marriage to 
Rochester does not make her responsible for the imprisonment and death of 
the Creole Bertha Mason or of the imperialist outrages perpetrated by her 
husband’s family. The putting forward of such claims is to suggest a similar 
critique of tremendous political progressives like Jean-Jacques Rousseau or 
Henry David Thoreau, whose lives both point to the political importance of 
solitude.
 I would argue, in fact, that individuals in retreat or acting independently 
have been among the chief proponents of political and social change. When, 
in “Civil Disobedience,” Thoreau explains his refusal to pay taxes, his non-
involvement is described as a perfectly deliberate political act:
It is for no particular item in the tax bill that I refuse to pay it. I simply 
wish to refuse allegiance to the State, to withdraw and stand aloof from it 
effectually. I do not care to trace the course of my dollar, if I could, till it 
buys a man a musket to shoot one with—the dollar is innocent—but I am 
concerned to trace the effects of my allegiance. In fact, I quietly declare war 
with the State, after my fashion. (131; emphasis added)
Like Rousseau and like Thoreau, like Emerson and Wordsworth, Jane is a 
writer, influencing the greater world through her publication, but even with-
out this very concrete contribution, her privileging of her own autism, her 
recognition and accommodation of this foundational aspect of her identity, 
should be acknowledged as a legitimate political gesture. Collective politi-
cal action is a necessary and productive means of effecting social change, 
but the insistence that every individual act collectively is nothing short of 
totalitarian.
 In acting to preserve the autistic self, Jane’s behavior may be regarded as 
an active form of resistance to the autistic outcomes that predominate in her 
world. For Jane Eyre, in her aloneness, is not an only in the tale she narrates. 
Having explored the parameters of autistic personality, it becomes possible 
to mine the text further for additional examples of individuals on the spec-
trum. Unsurprisingly, Jane’s cousins also demonstrate autistic characteris-
tics: The single-minded St. John, a gifted linguist, makes a virtue of denying 
his love for Rosamond and courts his cousin Jane even though his affection 
for her appears purely theoretical or “ceremonial” (398; ch. 34); Jane’s rigid 
and narrow-minded cousin Eliza approaches life according to a deliberate 
“system,” whereby she divides each day into “sections” and assigns to each 
its “task” (236; ch. 21). Apart from these is Bertha Mason, imprisoned—
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speechless—in the windowless attic room at Thornfield, a tempting human 
“enigma”; clearly, the so-called madwoman demonstrates what Leo Kan-
ner identifies as “disturbances of affective contact.” And for each of these 
individuals, Jane points to a punishing conclusion: St. John closes the text 
with a passionate expression of longing for his own death (“even so come, 
Lord Jesus!” [452; ch. 38]); cousin Eliza, despite her “sense,” is “walled up 
alive in a French convent” (242; ch. 21); and Bertha, of course, is dead by 
her own hand. Without the strength and will to resist the world and to build 
a functional private space, the autistic individual is prone to imprisonment 
and extermination. Resistance to the encroaching world, and to tyranni-
cal expectations of compulsory sociality, is necessary to autistic survival 
and self-determination. From this perspective, Jane achieves tremendous 
political stature, becoming a model for effective resistance to social control, 
her private fecundity seeding possibilities for oppressed and marginalized 
peoples, especially autistic persons, outside the sphere of her immediate 
control.
a s  R o c h e s T e R  and Jane have one of their earlier fireside chats, he 
explains that he has become “hard and tough as an India-rubber ball” and 
asks whether she believes there is hope for his “re-transformation from 
India-rubber back to flesh” (125; ch. 14).1 She opts not to respond directly 
to him, wondering if he has ingested too much wine, but the text itself, peo-
pled with “hard” male constitutions-turned-flesh by narrative, participates 
in answering his question. This uncloaking of male bodies in Jane Eyre func-
tions rhetorically to question both gender and ability hierarchies, thereby 
performing an intervention into cultural attitudes about masculinity and 
disability that gestures toward a nonhegemonic model of masculinity, one 
which is complemented as opposed to conflicted by physical disability.
 That the novel, written and narrated by women, tells the story of wom-
en’s empowerment is nearly incontrovertible. However, that this empow-
erment occurs in concert with—not at the expense of—a progressive 
reconceptualization of masculinity and embodiment has not yet been fully 
recognized. As masculinity theorists have argued, masculinity and feminin-
 1. The version of the primary text referred to in this chapter is Charlotte Brontë, Jane 
Eyre (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2002).
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ity are social constructions and exist in a binary relationship to each other. 
Alterations in feminine identity impact the binary and cause a correspond-
ing shift in masculinity (Connell, 84). Thus, when the boundaries of wom-
an’s identity are redrawn in the novel, the borders of manhood, the other 
side of the binary, are also adjusted.
 Because embodied status is one of the main dividing lines of gender, 
attributing disability and embodiment to male characters is a means of 
accomplishing this alteration. Gender and embodied identity are tradition-
ally conceived along an axis where masculinity is associated with a denial 
of embodiment and femininity is connected to corporeality. Jane’s narrative 
both represents and destabilizes this conventional pairing, calling attention 
to it and freeing the axis of gender and ability so that a greater variety of 
gendered and embodied combinations form, among them a reaffirmation of 
identity as embodied, regardless of gender. As a result of this intervention in 
discourse, alternate models of masculinity are offered, some of which can 
more easily pair with physical disability and embodied status. This revision 
of masculinity, like the rewriting of femininity, performs valuable cultural 
work. While some ableist residue persists in Jane’s discourse, the various 
constructions of male embodiment in the novel make progress in offsetting 
gender binaries and reworking some of the pejorative terms of embodied 
and disabled identity.
 This exploration of the novel’s retransformation of men into flesh begins 
with a baseline study of the discourse of male disembodiment in theory and 
in the text. Jane’s narrative forms a counterdiscourse to these constructions, 
indeed transforming “hard, tough,” seemingly disembodied masculine exte-
riors into flesh by a rhetorical manipulation of the established terms of gen-
der and embodiment. The second section of the chapter examines one of the 
discursive maneuvers through which such a change might occur, considering 
the possibility that Jane repurposes a patriarchal, ableist discourse to assert 
a position of privilege for herself. The final section of the chapter identi-
fies another discursive maneuver that repositions the terms of gender and 
embodiment in a more emancipatory way: with a nod to the frayed and dif-
fusive nature of discourse that allows contradictory readings of the novel to 
exist side-by-side, I perform a new reading of Rochester’s embodied mascu-
line identity that emerges out of the discursive friction between the compet-
ing notions of gender and embodiment showcased in the text. His embodied 
masculinity relies on a correlating construction of embodied femininity; as I 
show, when embodiment is attributed to both sides of the gender binary, the 
result is that both gender and ability hierarchies are offset, and the power 
generated by them is attenuated. This prepares the way for an embodied 
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manhood that is a rather radical alternative to the conventional model of 
disembodied and oppressive masculinity.
the double bInd/ary oF gender and embodIment
Jane Eyre is a novel of competing discourses about gender and embodi-
ment. This section foregrounds the significance of male embodiment in the 
novel by examining the construction of male disembodiment in theory and 
in Jane Eyre. The subsequent sections take up two possible ways of reading 
Jane’s response to these constructions. For the purposes of this chapter, I use 
the word embodiment to mean the understanding of the self and/or other 
selves as bodies. Embodiment is conceptually developed by an awareness 
of various visceral realities such as bodily processes, sensations, physical 
manifestations of strong emotion, and pain. As reflected in the work of such 
theorists as Peter Stallybrass, Allon White, and Martha Nussbaum, embodi-
ment is often associated with nebulous corporeal boundaries, with the leaky 
and permeable, with the excretion of bodily fluids and a susceptibility to 
various forms of penetration from the outside. Embodiment frequently is a 
reminder of the “animal” or “mortal” nature of humanness.
 There is almost a complete overlap between embodiment and disability; 
embodiment is in fact often read as the opposite of an ideal state of health 
in which the boundaries of the body are under careful control and visceral 
realities would therefore be invisible to others and virtually unnoticeable 
to oneself. Embodiment and disability, on the other hand, both involve the 
conscious awareness of oneself as a body. If there is a difference between 
embodiment and disability, it is perhaps a matter of timing: embodiment is a 
universal state (we—all of us—are bodies) and disability is a current identity 
for some, an eventual identity for most others. Perhaps because embodi-
ment and disability are often reminders of our animal and mortal status, 
they have been interpreted through discourse as highly undesirable, facts to 
be anxiously denied as opposed to embraced. As a means of accomplishing 
this denial, embodiment and disability are often conflated, perceived pejora-
tively, and, as Nussbaum demonstrates in “‘Secret Sewers of Vice’: Disgust, 
Bodies, and the Law,” broadcast on marginalized people as a way of main-
taining the privileged status of dominant social groups.2
 2. Nussbaum attributes the existence of the disembodied/embodied binary to people’s 
strong desire to eschew thinking about themselves as mortal. As a result, they project char-
acteristics of embodiment onto others: “We need a group of humans to bound ourselves 
against, who will come to exemplify the boundary line between the truly human and the 
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 The flight from embodiment, then, forms a discourse that is a foundation 
for ethnic, class, gender, and other oppressive social divisions. While many 
of these are active in Jane Eyre, the focus here is on the construction of gen-
der. The conflation of “female” with embodiment and disability in patriar-
chal discourse is evident, as Rosemarie Garland-Thomson observes, at least 
as early as Aristotle’s Generation of Animals. She powerfully explains the 
insidiousness of the double binary: “I want to suggest that a firm bound-
ary between ‘disabled’ and ‘nondisabled’ women cannot be meaningfully 
drawn—just as any absolute distinction between sex and gender is problem-
atic. Femininity and disability are inextricably entangled in patriarchal cul-
ture” (Extraordinary Bodies, 27). By extension, male privilege is gained by 
a comparative disassociation from the body. The mechanism works by way 
of discursive sleight of hand. Like the magician who directs his audience’s 
attention to his scantily clad assistant so that he can perform his trickery 
undetected, the emphasis on women’s embodiment detracts attention from 
the male body, encasing it in a protective cloak of invisibility and normativ-
ity. Calvin Thomas sketches out how this construction operates: “the repres-
sion of the abject vulnerability of the male body—as repression necessary 
for the construction of heteronormative masculinity—demands a displace-
ment of that vulnerability and all that it materially entails, onto the femi-
nine” (63). In fact, the practice of projecting corporeality onto women in 
order to emphasize male “hardness” and comparative disembodiment is so 
common that Paul McIlvenny lists it as one of the foundational elements of 
dominant masculinity:
[C]ontemporary hegemonic masculinity in relation to the male body often 
emphasizes ability, superhuman strength and stamina, physical violence, 
unemotionality, hardness, autonomy, potency, assertiveness, authority, the 
abjection of other bodies (the feminine, the homosexual, the grotesque), 
and the shame of failure. (103)
basely animal. If those quasi animals stand between us and our own animality, then we are 
one step further away from being animal and mortal ourselves. Thus throughout history, 
certain disgust properties [associated with embodiment]—sliminess, bad smell, stickiness, 
decay, foulness—have been repeatedly and monotonously associated with, indeed projected 
onto, groups by reference to whom privileged groups seek to define their superior human 
status” (“Secret Sewers of Vice,” 29). Davis, in “Constructing Normalcy: The Bell Curve, the 
Novel, and the Invention of the Disabled Body in the Nineteenth Century,” notes that during 
the nineteenth century, such constructions were particularly active as various social changes 
triggered a desperate desire for people to assert that they were “normal.”
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Even physical characteristics that are associated with the male body, such as 
physical strength and muscular power, become understood as features of the 
idealized body under perfect control. The “hard” male body is constructed, 
by way of comparison to other bodies, as disembodied—that is, less associ-
ated with the visceral realities of embodiment.
 The insistence on male strength, toughness, and infallible physicality 
coupled with the connection of women to markedly weaker, faulty bodies 
has historically been a means of maintaining gender inequality. R. W. Con-
nell notes that when advances in women’s equality or other social changes 
trigger a masculinity crisis, a characteristic response is for there to be a 
greater emphasis on the hard, muscular male body. This configuration of the 
male body, Connell argues, functions as a way to suggest “men’s superiority 
and right to rule” (84, 54–55).3 Jane Eyre comes out of a time of particularly 
intense gender flux, one of those points in history during which there was 
a crisis in masculinity that resulted in the reinforcement of gender boundar-
ies. In Victorian England, women’s equal rights movements, industrializa-
tion, and class redefinition among other factors contributed to rethinking 
of gender and thereby promoted the production of cultural narratives 
that emphasized female and denied male embodiment. On the one hand, 
dominant masculinity became associated with emblems of ideal health—
for example, strength, vigor, physical and emotional control. On the other 
hand, there was an increased construction of women as embodied. Thus, as 
Helena Michie puts it, the Victorians didn’t just “inherit” the double binary 
of gender and embodiment but indeed “perfected it” (408–9) in response 
to a change in gender roles that threatened preexisting social hierarchies. 
As a result, differences in male and female embodiment were emphasized 
to maintain a clear division between the sexes. As Michie writes, there is “a 
historically unprecedented sense of the differences between the sexes that 
expressed itself, among other ways, in corporeal terms” in Victorian Eng-
land (409).
 A double binary is thereby set up in which a central difference between 
male and female identity occurs at the crossroads of disembodiment and 
 3. For more on the male/disembodied vs. female/embodied dichotomy as it plays out 
historically during times of crises in masculinity, see, for example, Breitenberg’s Anxious Mas-
culinity which examines how social changes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries pro-
duce an acceleration of masculinist discourse and Theweleit’s Male Fantasies which explores 
the reinforcement of the gender dichotomy in Germany by men involved in the Freikorps 
movement in the wake of World War I. Bordo, in The Male Body, in addition to Thomas and 
McIlvenny who are mentioned above, are among the critics who observe this dichotomy in 
more contemporary times.
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embodiment. Although embodiment is natural and normative, the prefer-
ence given to masculine disembodiment is actually quite binding—that is, 
both stubbornly reinforced and severely restrictive. That this double binary 
is active in Jane Eyre is clear: the most central male characters are mouth-
pieces for masculinist narratives that elevate the status of men by empha-
sizing male disembodiment and female embodiment. For example, as the 
novel opens, John Reed verbally assaults Jane. In fits of patriarchal postur-
ing through which he enacts his position as “master” of the household, he 
tells her she is a “bad animal” (9; ch. 1) and later reports that she is a “mad 
cat” (26; ch. 2), emphasizing her ties to her animal nature. The embodi-
ment of Jane is carried forward by Mr. Brocklehurst, who announces to 
the pupils and teachers at Lowood that Jane is a source of contagion and 
sickness: because Mrs. Reed is afraid that Jane’s “vicious example should 
contaminate” the purity of the Reed children, Jane is discharged to Lowood 
so that she can “be healed, even as the Jews of old sent their diseased to the 
troubled pool of Bethesda” (63; ch. 7). Rochester also emphasizes Jane’s 
embodied status and is curiously more forthright about linking her with ill-
ness when he is in the guise of the gypsy fortune teller: “You are cold; you 
are sick; and you are silly,” he insists, reading her lonesomeness as a type 
of sickness and feminine folly (187; ch. 19). Other comments about Jane 
by Rochester associate her with something for him to control and own, 
such as his configuration of her as “pet lamb” to his “shepherd” (204; ch. 
20), a construction that—like John’s—associates Jane with the animal. Even 
St. John’s religious beneficence is built on such constructions: for example, 
when Jane all but rejects his marriage proposal and prepares to return to 
Rochester, St. John slips a note under her door in which he exhorts her to 
pray to avoid temptation. He cautions, “the spirit, I trust, is willing, but the 
flesh, I see, is weak” (393; ch. 36).
 It is worth noting that at moments when Jane threatens the position of 
male characters, they increase their emphasis on her embodiment. These 
instances are microcosms of cultural dynamics in which movements toward 
female independence trigger a crisis in masculinity that leads to an accelera-
tion in embodied constructions of women. For example, it is when Jane acts 
independently of St. John’s wishes for her and opts not to spend her life in 
India with him that he connects her decision to a weakness of her flesh (393; 
ch. 36). Later, he is still concerned about whether Jane is following spirit or 
fleshly desire even after he receives news of her marriage (420; ch. 38). The 
embodied construction of women is likewise exacerbated when men are in 
the threatened position of having their cloak of invisibility cast from their 
bodies. For example, when Jane confronts Rochester about the shadowy fig-
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ure who tramples her wedding veil, Rochester discredits Jane by suggesting 
fallibility in her perception. When she asks who the woman is, he reassures 
her that she is merely Jane’s hallucination: “The creature of an over-stim-
ulated brain; that is certain. I must be careful of you, my treasure: nerves 
like yours were not made for rough handling” (268; ch. 25). His response 
is to suggest, rather forcefully, Jane’s inherent unreliability, easy excitability, 
and general frailty, a sense he maintains even as she argues against it (266–
67; ch. 25). Through the discursive sleight of hand which emphasizes her 
embodiment, Rochester’s flaw remains hidden, his cloak still intact.
back to Flesh: 
Jane’s counternarratIves oF male embodIment
The main male voices in the novel thus reproduce traditional patriarchal 
configurations by drawing on a double binary that emphasizes male disem-
bodiment through an ableist and masculinist rhetoric that associates women 
with embodiment. However, Jane’s narrative disrupts such oppressive con-
figurations: the story she tells is one in which embodied status is attached 
to men as well as to women. Her narrative thereby functions as a coun-
terdiscourse that troubles gender and ability binaries active in the text and 
culture.
 In the two remaining sections of this chapter, I explore two ways that 
such a counterdiscourse might be deployed in the text. This section consid-
ers the possibility that Jane draws from a discourse of embodiment that 
is used to marginalize women and applies it to men (as well as to other 
women4); in essence she repurposes tools of gender oppression to situate 
herself in a less embodied and therefore more socially privileged position. 
This reading of the novel is in line with the recent disability studies inspired 
scholarship of David Bolt and Chih-Ping Chen. In the final section of the 
chapter, I probe Jane’s counterdiscourse for more emancipatory configura-
tions of gender and embodiment.
 As we explored in the previous section, John Reed, Mr. Brocklehurst, 
Rochester, and St. John tell a tale of Jane’s embodiment through their spo-
ken words; however, the story she tells in her narrative is one which empha-
 4. The depiction of female “others” in Jane Eyre has received comparatively more criti-
cal attention than the construction of male characters. For more on the gendered politics of 
the portrayals of women in the novel, see Spivak, who considers Bertha as “a figure produced 
by the axiomatic of imperialism” (“Three Women’s Texts,” 247) and Chen, who examines 
Bertha and Blanche through the dynamics of the freak show.
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sizes their corporeality and human fallibility. This embodied construction 
of them attenuates the power inherent in their embodied construction of 
Jane. For example, seemingly in response to John Reed’s “bad animal” com-
ment, Jane connects her cousin with corporeal characteristics, telling us “he 
was not quick either of vision or conception” (9; ch. 1) and depicting him 
in highly physiological terms that verge on the grotesque: he has “a dingy 
and unwholesome skin [ . . . ] heavy limbs and large extremities. He gorged 
himself habitually at the table, which made him bilious” and is generally 
in “delicate health” (9; ch. 1). This portrayal is continued throughout the 
novel, as John is aligned with other embodied and more female attributes 
of the time, such as excessive, uncontrollable impulses, eventually leading 
to his presumed suicide and his family’s ruin (209; ch. 21). Mr. Brocklehu-
rst’s mission is to perform a type of disembodiment on his all-too-corporeal 
female charges—“to mortify in girls the lusts of the flesh” (61; ch. 7). How-
ever, the telling arrival of his own very well-coifed daughters and his stingy, 
hypocritical treatment of the Lowood pupils suggest, to turn his own dis-
course on himself, a heavy inclination toward the lusts of his flesh (61; ch. 
7). Likewise, at the novel’s close, St. John is not the spiritual, work-driven, 
unfeeling machine he makes himself out to be, but he is instead mortal, fal-
lible, and enfleshed (422; ch. 38).
 Rochester’s introduction in the text, when he falls from the horse and 
must rely on Jane’s help (109; ch. 12), is a model for several other moments 
that emphasize his connection to his body and situate Jane as a type of 
caregiver. For example, when Bertha sets fire to his bed, he is at first just a 
body—that is, he is inert flesh, completely unable to be aroused despite Jane’s 
efforts to wake him. He is then soaked in fluids from his ewer and basin. 
Both are full—the ewer (or pitcher) with water, the basin with what must be 
“used” water—and so whatever bodily residue the basin water has washed 
off Rochester, Jane now casts back at him, a rather appropriate reminder 
of his embodiment. Finally, with a temporary realization of his own frailty, 
Rochester understands that he is helpless without Jane’s intervention (142; 
ch. 15). Later, Rochester’s shock at the news of Mason’s arrival affords Jane 
another glimpse beneath the armor of his disembodiment. Unable to speak 
in full sentences, his breathing undergoing spasms, his face extremely pale, 
too weak to move by his own power, he again relies on her physical sup-
port (193–94; ch. 19). Rochester’s blindness and amputation maintain these 
dynamics (and are the focus of the last section of this chapter).
 Further, Rochester’s earlier family and personal history also situate him 
outside of more traditional masculine roles. He is a second-born son who is 
not poised to inherit his father’s fortune and the reputed victim of his father 
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and brother’s manipulations. As such, he is somewhat removed from the 
system of masculine privilege. In addition, his early marriage to Bertha and 
his various affairs belie a character aligned with strong physical passion, one 
that he cannot completely offset by projecting illicit sexual natures onto his 
assorted female partners. Likewise, although he defends his treatment of 
Bertha by depicting her as insane and monstrous, details in his own depic-
tion reveal, as Julia Miele Rodas argues in “Brontë’s Jane Eyre,” that he is 
very similar to his first wife.
 Thus, if John Reed, Brocklehurst, St. John, and Rochester all don simi-
lar discursive masks of masculinity in an effort to render their bodies trans-
parent, Jane’s accounts reveal the flesh that lies beneath their discourse of 
denial. Rochester may request Jane’s help with escaping from his India-rub-
ber exterior; however, her narrative suggests that his disembodied identity, 
like that of the other male characters who put on a cloak of invisibility in 
their attempts to embody her, has been maintained by a social discourse that 
by its very nature is unstable and illusory.
 For most of the novel, Jane’s reconstruction of John, Brocklehurst, St. 
John, and Rochester appears to be predominantly accomplished through 
an inversion of the gender binary that maintains the hegemonic structure 
of the ability binary. When the privileged side of the gender binary is asso-
ciated with embodiment, the seemingly stable terms of the double binary 
become unfixed, allowing alternative models of gender and ability to estab-
lish themselves. Embodied status is attributed to men and, following the 
pattern, Jane is by comparison situated in a less embodied and therefore 
more socially valued position. Because both sides of a binary exist in syn-
ergistic relationship to one another, the construction of men as embodied 
refashions both male and female identity. As Calvin Thomas argues, in fact, 
there is a “certain feminist urgency” in “the project of male embodiment” 
because the association of men with their bodies undermines a construction 
that has historically powered oppressive gender divisions (71). According to 
this reading, the masculinist discourse governing gender difference is thereby 
interrogated, but ableist assumptions about embodiment appear to remain 
firmly in place.
 This argument is taken up by disability studies scholars who are rightly 
suspicious of how disability is portrayed in the novel. They convincingly 
contend that the process of reassigning gender positions results in a per-
petuation of ableist thinking. For example, Bolt, in his study of Roches-
ter’s blindness, powerfully demonstrates that the text reconstructs women’s 
positions by placing the stress on male as opposed to female embodiment: 
“Male and female roles may well be inverted in the novel, but the underpin-
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ning hierarchies of normativism over disability and ‘the sighted’ over ‘the 
blind’ remain intact” (271). Along a similar line, Chen insightfully argues 
that by the end of the novel, Jane is not only in the more masculine and 
able position but that, as the narrator, she puts Rochester on display, almost 
like the host of a freak show would exhibit and capitalize on the physical 
alterity of the performers: “The subversion of freak show power relations 
concludes with the reinstatement of power hierarchy. Gender inequality and 
social marginality faced by a woman are ‘corrected’ only by the reversal of 
the gendered roles of the host and the exhibit” (383). For both Bolt and 
Chen, then, Jane Eyre questions gender hierarchies but raises the status of 
Jane by way of attributing more embodied identification to men. Jane’s role 
as caregiver to Rochester, active at their first meeting and carried through 
to the novel’s end, especially supports such a reading. The caregiver is in 
a position, as Garland-Thomson observes, of using the disabled body to 
“organize a more empowered and prestigious selfhood” (Extraordinary 
Bodies, 90). In this reading, Jane Eyre thereby replaces social discourses 
that suggest women’s inferiority with a counterdiscourse that suggests male 
inferiority. In doing so, it transmits and perpetuates disempowered, pejora-
tive conceptions of disability.
 This reassignment of embodied identity to empower women has also 
been observed in other nineteenth-century literature. For example, Hugh 
McElaney’s study of disability and freakery in Louisa May Alcott’s work 
suggests that the disability of male characters in Alcott’s and other nine-
teenth-century American women’s writing is often a punishment for a male 
child’s “excessive manifestations of masculinity” (148). By disabling young 
males, McElaney posits, the female writer asserts the comparative suprem-
acy of women who are written as able-bodied and therefore less embodied 
than these male characters (156–57).
 Rochester’s own shifting status from blind man to partially sighted man 
replicates the ability binary in another way, as Elizabeth Donaldson and 
Bolt both demonstrate. Donaldson reads Rochester’s return to partial sight 
as a reassertion of normalcy after his blindness (“The Corpus of the Mad-
woman,” 110). As such, Rochester’s disability becomes a point of assur-
ing readers of their own wholeness, both because he gets some sight back, 
thereby allowing the reader to envision a happy ending, and because he 
remains disabled, thereby ensuring the presumably nondisabled reader of 
her own wholeness and normalcy. As Bolt also argues, “by the end of the 
novel it becomes apparent that the misery of the blindman is integral to the 
happiness of not only the sighted woman, but also the sighted man who 
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Rochester becomes” (285). These readings underscore the insidious connec-
tions between embodiment and disempowerment. Rochester’s status as a 
blind man is used to privilege the relative disembodiment and consequently 
elevated status not only of Jane and the reader but also of the partially 
sighted Rochester.
 The reading of the novel I have been considering in this section sug-
gests that Jane’s growth and empowerment are dependent on her ability to 
repurpose the tools of oppressive discourse to her advantage. While gender 
construction may become more mobile in her narrative, the pejorative terms 
of embodiment appear to be far more difficult to budge. However, they are 
not completely inflexible, and in the final section of this chapter I provide 
another reading of the novel that diverges from previous interpretations, 
one in which both the terms of gender and ability are reconfigured.
dIspersed dIscourses: 
toward an alternatIve readIng oF 
embodIment and gender
My reading of Jane Eyre in this section demonstrates a model of gender 
reconstruction that agitates the abled–disabled binary at the same time that 
it questions the gender binary. In essence, when Brontë sets about to trans-
form men back into flesh, the terms of gender and ability binaries are not 
reversed but indeed dismantled. The goal in this section is to explore how 
gender and embodiment identifications are altered when embodiment is 
attributed to both sides of the binary. After examining the shifting nature 
of language and the status of Jane’s embodiment, this section specifically 
focuses on disabled masculinity theory and its application to Rochester, 
since his embodiment and masculinity are especially remarkable pairings.
 By way of transitioning into the final section of the chapter, I would 
like to call attention to the dispersive nature of language and discourse, 
both to theorize the sometimes oppressive/sometimes empowering workings 
of gender and ability in the novel and to qualify my reading of Rochester, 
even before I begin it. Language has an expansive quality—it can be used 
to advance a kind of emancipatory thinking necessary for social justice—
and at the same time it is also limited (the binary nature of the linguistic 
structure itself presupposes the existence of latent hierarchal relationships). 
James Wilson and Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson recognize the multivalent prop-
erties of language in “Disability, Rhetoric, and the Body”:
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Language’s effects are dispersed, uneven, and contradictory. People wield 
language for many purposes, but at the same time language’s effects also 
spill or seep out, beyond the immediate container of the situation and 
intention for which it was crafted. Language can only be partly harnessed 
as an instrument of agency, never wholly so, for it always carries along 
many other material histories and purposes and the arbitrary and differen-
tial traces of its systematic functioning. If language can be said to transform 
economic systems, institutions, and social practices, then its power flows 
diffusively in uneven currents. (3)
Wilson and Lewiecki-Wilson are both cautious and optimistic about the 
power of language. Language can be used in the service of emancipatory 
thinking, but “never wholly so”; it is almost always inflected by remnants 
of the power structures it is employed to interrogate. Likewise, liberatory 
models of identity can be advanced through counter discourses, but these 
are rarely free of the imprint of social hierarchies. In fact, the model of male 
embodiment in the novel I have so far discussed is liberatory in the sense 
that it reseats hierarchical gender identifications, but at the same time it is 
oppressive because it accomplishes its work by reproducing ability hierar-
chies. Similar inversions take place in the construction of socioeconomic 
class, where, for example, Aunt Reed’s prolonged illness might be read as 
narrative backlash for her trenchant embodied constructions of her niece. 
Jane herself employs such a strategy to uphold her womanly virtue by way 
of contrast to the French Adèle, the Creole Bertha, and the continental mis-
tresses of Rochester, forging “foreign” women’s connection to various lusts 
of the flesh in order to elevate her white English womanhood.
 These are just some of the places where oppressive thinking may “seep 
out” by way of the disembodied–embodied binary, even as the novel chal-
lenges such constructions of women by men and even as the narrative works 
toward situating embodiment as a more normative state. In acknowledging 
the “diffusive” and “uneven currents” of language, I hope to validate read-
ings of the text based on the limits of discourse, as I have done so far, as 
well as to discover moments where discourse has more expansive potential, 
moments in the text where language does begin to work more holistically 
out of the oppressive master narratives of a culture, as I do below.
 Before turning to the analysis of Rochester, I will briefly address the issue 
of Jane’s embodiment because it has an impact on how her constructions 
of male corporeality might be interpreted. Specifically, the notion that Jane 
enforces her own disembodiment when she links men to their bodies might 
be reconsidered. To follow the India-rubber metaphor, when Jane shows 
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Rochester’s hard, tough exterior to be merely a self-constructed discursive 
mask, she does not don that same mask to render her body invisible. In 
fact, her narrative suggests the futility and hypocrisy—indeed the danger—
of denying one’s connection to the body.
 Thus, although Jane does not consistently align herself with disabled 
identity, her concept of herself is inextricably tied to her body. Because 
she tells her story by way of recollection, the plentiful moments of bodily 
awareness in her narrative reflect a fairly unified sense of her corporeal 
identity from the standpoint of a grown woman. Only six sentences into her 
narrative, as she recalls her experiences as a girl of ten, she remarks on her 
“physical inferiority” to her cousins and her painfully cold “nipped fingers 
and toes” (7; ch. 1). Soon after, the head injury caused by John’s attack on 
her results in pain, bleeding, and unconsciousness and has long term effects 
on her health, making her feel “physically weak and broken down” (19; 
ch. 3). The deprivations she experiences at Lowood are likewise described 
in embodied terms. The cold “nipped” and hunger “gnawed” her (46; ch. 
5). Exposure to the snow causes her torturous pain, and she describes her 
“wretched feet flayed and swollen to lameness” (72; ch. 9). Jane is also 
prone to a restless excitement that is described in physical terms. For exam-
ple, she “felt the pulses throb in [her] head and temples” as she consid-
ers her options for departing Lowood (82; ch. 10). Several times during 
her narrative, Jane emphasizes her small frame, pale complexion, and her 
“irregular,” “marked” features (94; ch. 11). It is these that Jane compares 
unfavorably to Blanche Ingram’s classic beauty to attempt to check her 
own growing interest in Rochester (153–4; ch. 16). This embodied por-
trayal is maintained through to Jane and Rochester’s reunion, where, upon 
the anticipation of being with Rochester again, Jane’s body is so uncontrol-
lable she cannot hold her trembling frame still—emblematically, the water 
spills from the glass on her tray and her “heart struck [her] ribs loud and 
fast” (404; ch. 37). Her pregnancy and motherhood carry her embodied 
status to and beyond the novel’s close. It is also worth noting that other 
female characters, such as Mrs. Reed and Helen, are configured as embod-
ied alongside Jane.5 To be sure, additional studies of Jane’s embodiment 
(and that of other female characters) are needed to more fully articulate 
how the textual presence of women as bodies alongside of men as bodies 
can impact the gender-embodiment binary; these observations are starting 
points.
 5. Interestingly, Helen’s religious leaning allows her to accept her own embodiment and 
forecast a sense that all bodies are “corruptible” and mortal (55; ch. 6).
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 In this brief account of Jane’s body, the suggestion is that when she con-
tradicts masculinist discourses by asserting male embodiment, she leaves 
the discourses that equate femaleness with corporeality intact. The result is 
a narrative that tells the story of embodiment across gender identification, 
one that thereby rewrites the terms of corporeal identity alongside a rein-
scription of gender. No longer exclusively associated with the disparaged 
side of the binary, embodied status begins to shed its association with the 
anomalous, disempowered, and exclusively female and is situated as a more 
normal and natural condition of being. Attributing embodied status to men 
as the privileged side of the binary (while maintaining women’s embodiment 
alongside of it) offers a recasting of masculinity apart from its association 
with social dominance and oppression. It is this formulation of masculinity 
in scholarship and Jane Eyre to which I now turn my attention.
 It is challenging to conceive of an embodied masculinity because the 
gender/ability binary continues to remain in place, although not without 
increasing critical interrogation, in contemporary thinking. The root of the 
challenge is that masculinity and embodiment are understood as incongru-
ous states. Thomas Gerschick explains the nature of this contradiction: “for 
men with physical disabilities, masculine gender privilege collides with the 
stigmatized status of having a disability, thereby causing status inconsis-
tency, as having a disability, erodes much, but not all, masculine privilege” 
(“Toward a Theory,” 1265). As a result, the contradictory nature of mascu-
linity and disability has been known to cause disabled men to internalize a 
sense of failure at not meeting traditional masculine standards (“Sisyphus,” 
123). In fact, the relationship between female embodiment and masculine 
disembodiment is so potent that it is usually the case that a reversal of the 
terms of embodiment often presumes a correlating reversal of the terms of 
gender. Judith Halberstam elaborates: “The male body is feminized when 
sick and the female body is masculinized when healthy, invigorated, and 
active” (354). It seems that even in contemporary culture, physical disabil-
ity is at odds with masculine identity and tends to act as a demasculinizing 
agent.
 Yet as difficult as it is to conflate these socially contradictory identities, 
male embodiment has been singled out by masculinity studies and disabil-
ity studies alike as an inroad to alleviating gender and ability oppression. 
Scholars working in these areas advocate for a type of male transformation 
into flesh—for the study of men as bodies that are fallible, mortal, leaky, 
and subject to cultural inscription. As Thomas explains, “one possibly pro-
ductive way to analyze male power and hegemony, and to reconfigure male 
identification and desire, involves a specific sort of attention to the ‘matter’ 
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of the male body and to the materialization of that body in writing” (62). 
Connell goes further, suggesting that “a politics of social justice” for gender 
inequality necessitates “re-embodiment for men, a search for different ways 
of using, feeling and showing male bodies,” including placing male bodies in 
more traditionally female situations and roles (233). The notion of mascu-
linities—masculinity in many forms, especially as it intersects with other cul-
tural identities—reinforces the potential multiplicity of this gender category. 
Disability studies researchers such as Gerschick, Adam Stephen Miller, and 
Russell Shuttleworth have shown how some disabled men successfully access 
such alternative notions of masculinity and embodiment. For example, they 
expand their “masculine repertoire” so that they can more flexibly accom-
modate feminine roles when it is advantageous to do so (Shuttleworth, 175), 
and they craft their masculine identity “along the lines of their own abilities, 
perceptions, and strengths” (Gerschick and Miller, 265). This leads to posi-
tive experiences of disabled masculinity—indeed, to a diversity of disabled 
masculinities.
 These insights from masculinity studies and disability studies theorists 
begin to unravel the cloak of invisibility from the male body, establishing 
in its place a proverbial and emancipatory coat of many colors. Locating 
the male body in various experiences, forms, and conditions erodes the pri-
macy of masculinity as a disembodied identity, showing these to be cultural 
constructs that have little bearing on lived experience. This conception of 
men as bodies, then, is a way out of the gender and ability binary because it 
makes progress toward detaching disempowerment and emasculation from 
embodied status.
 These maneuvers are accomplished because of the dispersive nature of 
discourse. The double binary may seem so locked in place that masculinity 
and embodiment are an impossible pairing. However, the terms of ability, 
like the terms of gender, are based in discourse and can thereby be redefined 
by counter discourse. Judith Keegan Gardiner argues this point: “The con-
flation of emasculation, castration, feminization, and femininity is a political 
maneuver, not a psychological law, and masculinity and femininity have dif-
ferent meanings and uses in male and female bodies and in differing cultural 
contexts” (15). We have been trained to read the intersection of embodi-
ment and masculinity as an undesirable loss of power because we have 
also been trained to associate embodiment with femininity and weakness. 
Gardiner reminds us that these constructions are dependent on culture and 
political system, noting also that their connection does not occur cross cul-
turally. Thus, the grouping of disability, embodiment, femininity, weakness, 
and death, like the grouping of their opposites, is a function of a discourse 
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that maintains social hierarchies and can therefore be challenged through 
critique and counter discourse. With this in mind, the task before us is how 
to understand embodied masculinity not as disempowering and emasculat-
ing, but instead as a catalyst for more expansive thinking about gender and 
ability.
 To be sure, the first accounts of Rochester’s disablement suggest the pre-
sumed incongruity of masculine and embodied identity. The host of the inn 
(who was also butler to Rochester’s father) provides the initial report, pro-
jecting severe pity on Rochester’s current state. With one eye “knocked out,” 
“the other eye inflamed [so that] he lost the sight of that also,” and one 
hand crushed and amputated, Rochester is “now helpless, indeed—blind 
and a cripple” and as such “quite broken down” (401; ch. 36). With no 
available alternative masculine identity to assign to Rochester, the host can 
only read his change in body as a loss of status. Rochester’s life has become 
so tragic, so unplaceable in the schema of social value, that the host reports 
that “many think he had better be dead” (400; ch. 36). When Jane first 
observes the disabled Rochester coming out of the door at Ferndean, grop-
ing, uncertain, his movements fall short of any masculine ideal (403; ch. 37), 
reflecting Shuttleworth’s observations that the nature of one’s disability may 
make it impossible to perform the expected movements and comportment 
of dominant masculinity (167). Upon Jane’s reunion with Rochester, we find 
that he himself has subscribed to the masculine ideal of his time. Unable to 
align his disabilities with his masculinity, he feels degraded and puts himself 
into social isolation. He can no longer think of himself as attractive or eli-
gible for romance or marriage. Concerned that Jane would “suffer [ . . . ] to 
devote [herself] to a blind lameter like [him]” (406; ch. 37), he fears his arm 
(“a mere stump—a ghastly sight”) and his “cicatrized visage” will revolt 
her (408; ch. 37). Understandably, she does initially feel some sorrow mixed 
with pity at seeing him again, and she seems particularly taken by his sad-
ness and powerlessness (410; ch. 37).
 However, undercurrents in Jane’s narration assert Rochester’s masculin-
ity and indeed his sexual desirability alongside his disability. To her, he is 
muscular, manly, and sexy. Despite a change in his countenance, she finds 
that he has maintained his “athletic strength” and “vigorous prime” (403; 
ch. 37). As she observes his aimless, uncertain movements on Ferndean’s 
doorstep, she can barely keep herself from going to him and “dar[ing] to 
drop a kiss on that brow of rock, and on those lips so sternly sealed beneath 
it” (403; ch. 37). While he may not perform masculinity in his movements, 
his stoic face is inherently masculine, and she wishes to kiss both brow and 
lips—suggesting her sexual attraction to him as a disabled man. In a sub-
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sequent construction of him, she writes of his crying in a way that also 
maintains masculine identification: “I saw a tear slide from under the sealed 
eyelid, and trickle down the manly cheek” (412; ch. 37). Here, she con-
flates the emotional and embodied (indeed the leaky) with the manly—as a 
result—a new composite of masculine traits begins to form.
 Her desire for Rochester also accomplishes a rewriting of conventional 
notions of disabled masculinity. Under Jane’s pen, he is not asexual, an 
object of disgust, a person to be shunned, but is instead someone who stokes 
her desire and allows her an outlet to experience it. This is a concept that 
is built into the caregiver interactions that appear throughout the text and 
culminate in the final chapters. The moments in Jane Eyre where Jane acts 
as caregiver/rescuer to Rochester are particularly erotically charged. Physi-
cal touch between them, especially before any declaration of affection is 
made, would ordinarily be impermissible in Victorian society, but in Jane’s 
narrative it is sanctioned—made proper and presumably asexual—by the 
terms of the caregiver relationship. In the romance of Jane and Rochester, 
however, these moments are an outlet for the sexual desire Jane has for 
Rochester, allowing her the thrill of physical contact while upholding her 
virtue and purity under the guise of caregiving. For example, when Jane first 
encounters the intriguing stranger on the road, she says she “should have 
been afraid to touch a horse when alone,” but the rules of Victorian female 
propriety suggest that she certainly should be even more afraid to come into 
close physical proximity with—indeed to be touched by—an unknown man, 
if not for concerns about her own safety then surely for concerns about her 
reputation (109; ch. 12). However, under the guise of “necessity,” Rochester 
and Jane have their first physical encounter as he puts his arm around her 
and she helps him to his horse. This dynamic is repeated again at the other 
moments of her coming to Rochester’s aid. All suggest erotically charged 
eruptions in their developing relationship.
 A similar dynamic permits Jane to narrate the eroticism of her reunion 
with Rochester. The touch of his “wandering hand” which a few lines later 
becomes his “muscular hand” on her “arm [ . . . ] shoulder-neck-waist” is 
just as longed-for by her as when he subsequently “entwined and gathered 
[her] to him” (405; ch. 37). She really means it (in more ways than one) 
when she tells him “I am glad to be so near you again” (405; ch. 37). His 
“groping,” “wandering [and muscular] hand” becomes a site of sexual viril-
ity and enacts an erotic touch that is desired by both Rochester and Jane. I 
therefore do not read this moment according to the stereotype of the blind-
man as lecherous (where “touch becomes a grope and ultimately a lecher-
ous grip”) as Bolt does (275), but instead as an erotic moment, desired by 
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both parties, from which new associations between disabled masculinity 
and female sexual desire may “seep out” (Wilson and Lewiecki-Wilson, 3).
 Thus, Jane’s narration asserts Rochester’s masculinity and sexual desir-
ability alongside his disability, imbuing male embodiment with new value. 
In addition, she also emphasizes a developing interdependence in their rela-
tionship that suggests a diffusion of the oppressive hierarchies attendant to 
both gender and ability. For example, on the second day of their reunion, 
as their love is confirmed through their dialogue, Rochester calls attention 
again to his “seared vision” and “crippled strength,” likening himself to a 
decaying, ruined, lightning-struck tree. Jane answers him back, reinscrib-
ing the image with the more positive association of a “green and vigorous 
tree”: “Plants will grow about your roots, whether you ask them or not, 
because they take delight in your bountiful shadow; and as they grow they 
will lean towards you, and wind round you, because your strength offers 
them so safe a prop” (415; ch. 37). Her reconstruction of him emphasizes 
his vigor, strength, and generosity, as well as his ability to be of use and sup-
port—all descriptors of masculinity, but not necessarily dominant, oppres-
sive masculinity.6 He thus may need her help (indeed, just a few lines later 
he says she will “have to lead [him] about by the hand” and “wait on” 
him), but he also will be her support.
 This interdependence powers Jane’s love for him even more, as she 
asserts: “I love you better now when I can really be useful to you, than I did 
in your state of proud independence, when you disdained every part but that 
of the giver and protector” (416; ch. 37). His dependence on her (perhaps 
because it is coupled by her dependence on him) allows a more equal dis-
tribution of power in the relationship and at the same time does not affect 
his masculine vigor, desirability, or strength. In fact, she tells him he has 
no deficiencies (416; ch. 37), an assertion that surprisingly counters ableist 
attitudes about embodiment. The ending chapter confirms their interdepen-
dence is still strong after years of marriage. She asserts, “I am my husband’s 
 6. There are several earlier readings of Rochester that understand his disability as an 
avenue toward freeing him from the pressures of dominant masculinity, but these analyses 
predate many insights later developed through disability studies. For example, Kendrick 
identifies the potential of Brontë’s text to redefine masculinity by placing Rochester in posi-
tions that are removed from dominant social discourses of gender and class. Kendrick argues 
that Rochester “represents a man who is quite at odds with the dominant narrative of being 
an ‘English Gentleman’” from the start (247), and from his final vantage point of social 
exile, he “rearticulates and redefines his position as a masculine subject” (235). Likewise, 
Wylie attaches a liberatory significance to Rochester’s disability. As Wylie argues, Rochester 
recognizes that the terms of dominant masculinity are impossible fictions to live up to and in 
doing so, he becomes “a new type of masculine hero: one who is more in keeping with the 
flawed humanity of [Brontë’s] own experience” (68).
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life as fully is he is mine” and “all my confidence is bestowed on him, all 
his confidence is devoted to me; we are precisely suited in character—per-
fect concord is the result” (420–21; ch. 38).7 It is a union based on interde-
pendence in which no partner has greater privilege than the other, one that 
seems to have worked successfully out of the double binary.
 Thus, three elements in Jane’s reinscription of Rochester suggest a 
nascent liberatory model of embodied masculinity in her depiction of him. 
First, through Jane’s narratives, Rochester’s masculinity is asserted alongside 
his disability and embodiment. Even as he himself cannot yet read his new 
status according to the models of masculinity available to him, she redefines 
the borders of masculine identity to admit male embodiment. This redefi-
nition of masculinity suggests, if we return to disability studies theories, a 
type of gender flexibility or expansion of the “masculine repertoire” (Shut-
tleworth, 175). Rochester retains more masculine and Jane more feminine 
attributes, so there is not a complete removal of the conventional terms of 
gender, but there is certainly more freedom to access elements of masculin-
ity and femininity as necessary. Second, Jane’s assertion of her desire for 
Rochester forges a connection between disability and sexual desirability that 
is absent in conventional thinking about disabled masculinity. Third, the 
interdependent nature of their union forecasts a dispersion of power that 
is a foundation for achieving greater social equality. Ironically, these new 
possibilities for understanding male corporeal identity may be more readily 
conceivable by Jane because she has experience with understanding herself 
as embodied, according to patriarchal constructions of female identity that 
have been projected onto her. Her narrative’s rather sweeping overview of 
their happy marriage suggests that Rochester has adopted such a positive 
understanding of himself, most likely through her influence.
 It is curious that Brontë (or God’s mercy, according to the narrative) 
grants Rochester a return to partial sight in the last paragraphs of the novel 
as opposed to closing with him remaining blind. This is an admittedly ocu-
larcentric turn, as Bolt asserts (285), and indeed represents an “uneven” 
current in the flow of the text and this reading (Wilson and Lewiecki-Wil-
 7. Rochester and Jane’s strong interconnectedness is depicted in a highly positive way, 
with the possible exception of her admission that she finds his willing and total acceptance 
of her help “sad”: “And there was a pleasure in my services, most full, most exquisite, even 
though sad—because he claimed these services without painful shame or damping humilia-
tion. He loved me so truly, that he knew no reluctance in profiting by my attendance” (421; 
ch. 38). However, in the context of Jane’s narration, I favor reading her use of “sad” as evok-
ing “grave” or “serious,” which were earlier uses of the word. In that sense, she finds her role 
as helper pleasurable but also serious (that is, important and bearing heavy responsibility) 
because he trusts her implicitly.
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son, 3), but it is not a completely ableist one. Rochester’s fulfillment, sexual 
attractiveness, paternity, and interdependent relationship with Jane predate 
the return of his sight, so he is granted such positive identifications as a blind 
man. Further, his identities as a disabled man (a vision-impaired amputee) 
and as a fulfilled person are intact at the novel’s close.
 Overall, Rochester’s is an unusually progressive portrait of disabled mas-
culinity. He has achieved an integration of identity characteristics that coun-
ters traditional understandings of gender and ability: he is vision-impaired 
and an amputee; he embodies elements of femininity that are intermingled 
with undeniable masculine traits; he depends on Jane, but she, too, relies on 
him; he is sexually active in a happy marriage—a perpetual honeymoon, as 
he refers to it; he is attractive; he is, Jane reports, fulfilled and happy.
 Among the “uneven currents” of the competing discourses of Jane Eyre, 
then, is a rewriting of the terms of gender and ability. Some narrative strands 
use disability to invert gender binaries and reflect ableist thinking, especially 
in the transformation into flesh of John Reed, Mr. Brocklehurst, and St. 
John Rivers. Other narrative strands, particularly those that construct the 
embodiment of Edward Rochester, work to diffuse both gender and abil-
ity hierarchies and anticipate more emancipatory blendings of models of 
identity.
 While Rochester’s “re-transformation [ . . . ] into flesh” may serve as an 
avenue to Jane’s empowerment, it is thus not necessarily an expressway to 
his disempowerment. Instead, it is an inroad to an alternative, nonoppres-
sive model of masculinity. His life may have been altered by accident, and 
Jane’s narration is somewhat affected by elements of conventional think-
ing about the body, but to presuppose that he remains disconsolate due to 
his impairments is to embrace the mainstream, pejorative understanding of 
disability, to uphold traditional definitions of masculinity, and to miss an 
alternate, emancipatory reading of the ending of Brontë’s text. Through the 
lenses of disability studies and masculinity studies, Rochester’s “re-trans-
formation [ . . . ] into flesh” is really a transformation of cultural attitudes 
about gender and ability; just as the India-rubber stretches into flesh, so too 
does the model of masculinity stretch to encompass new, more inclusive pos-
sibilities for male embodiment.
“ a l l  J a n e  e y r e  l o v e R s , ”  writes Gail Griffin, “have been strangely 
drawn to Bertha Mason Rochester” (89), and this attraction is in itself 
noteworthy, given that, as Laurence Lerner puts it, she is a “minor charac-
ter” who “does not speak a single word” (280). Initially, a disability stud-
ies reading of Bertha and Jane Eyre would appear unpromising, for both 
seem to offer examples of what David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder term 
the “negative image” school of “humiliating” literary depictions of people 
with disabilities (Narrative Prosthesis, 18). Cora Kaplan writes that this text 
“offers Bertha Mason no sympathy at all” (“Afterword,” 310). David Bolt 
states that Brontë “actively endorses the binary opposition of normativism 
and disability” (286). And Kathleen Jones writes that Bertha “remains ‘the 
monster,’ ‘the maniac’—a grim and hated figure [ . . . ]. It is with the great-
est satisfaction that the author and reader reach the final dénouement—the 
fire, the death of the ‘maniac’ as she hurls herself from the burning build-
ing, and Rochester’s freedom to marry Jane” (21). However, by observing 
that “even the most ‘derisive’ portrait harbors within it an antithesis, its 
own disruptive potential,” Mitchell and Snyder also suggest the possibility 
of a “transgressive reappropriation” (Narrative Prosthesis, 35–40). Such a 
reading could turn the tables by asking, for example, not why the disabled 
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Bertha is killed off according to the stereotypical “cure or kill” formula, but 
why those charged with her care are not doing a better job of preventing her 
from harming herself.
 Reading disability in Jane Eyre as a static element—as something almost 
exclusively associated with Bertha—will indeed yield a “negative image” 
interpretation; however, Bertha is merely the text’s first disabled character. 
By reading disability dynamically, as a category that is disclosed slowly, 
and by attending to the interlocking but shifting roles of caregiver and dis-
abled, one begins to understand that the text presents two phases of care-
giving and disability—the first featuring Rochester and Bertha, the second 
Jane and Rochester. Narrated by Jane in the mid-1840s, when public policy 
reforms were being instituted for improving the treatment of mentally ill 
and disabled people, Brontë’s novel can be understood as incorporating 
these reforms and reflecting negatively on Rochester’s custodial care prac-
tices. In other words, the novel’s closing chapters have Jane enact in minia-
ture the spirit of the national reforms and, by so doing, Brontë’s narrative 
thematizes the transition from one caregiving paradigm to another, from 
custodial care to caring labor.1
 This transition from one paradigm to another can only be determined by 
attending closely to the text’s subtleties of discourse. Ostensibly a bildungs-
roman focusing on the protagonist’s mastery of communication, Jane Eyre 
paradoxically compels the reader to infer what the narrator does not say. 
Between the disclosure scene in the attic and her return to the ruined Thorn-
field, Jane does not record all or even most of her thoughts (ch. 26, ch. 36).2 
This chapter is concerned with Jane’s unwritten thoughts as they pertain to 
 1. The terms care and caregiving should not be used uncritically. Kelly writes that “per-
sistent use of the term ‘care’ without engaging with disability critiques signals an ignorance 
at best, or dismissal at worst” of the “oppressive legacies” and “potential for abuse” associ-
ated with the concept (7, 8). Disability critiques view care as a complex form of oppression 
because, in “the context of disability, care is haunted by the spectres of institutionalization, 
medicalization and paternalistic charities” (3). Kelly goes on to state that “[n]aming this 
ambiguous work [of providing support with dressing, bathing, etc.] is an ongoing debate” 
(2). To disassociate it from paternalistic charity, advocates have substituted such terms as 
support work, attendant care, personal support, and personal assistance. (Kittay uses the term 
dependency worker.) However, Kelly acknowledges that “[s]omething is lost when the con-
cept of care is eliminated” (17), and she presents a case for a new model of “accessible care” 
that resembles Cushing and Lewis’s caring labor model. Concerning Jane Eyre, terms such as 
personal assistant or dependency worker might be applicable to Grace Poole but would be 
inappropriate for Rochester and Jane, who fulfill functions vis-à-vis disabled spouses within 
a familial rather than paid context. For this reason, this paper will employ the terms care and 
caregiver.
 2. The version of the primary text referred to in this chapter is Charlotte Brontë, Jane 
Eyre, 2nd ed., ed. Richard J. Dunn (New York and London: Norton, 1987).
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her development from the attic scene, in which she panics at the sight of the 
disabled Bertha, to the Ferndean section, in which she exhibits tranquility 
regarding Rochester’s disability. In part, I present the case that Thornfield’s 
attic functions for Jane as, what Mary Louise Pratt terms, a “contact zone” 
(6). This zone entails a space of encounter between two groups who have 
been separated geographically and who are unfamiliar with one another. 
Such contact produces change. In this case, the contact zone facilitates the 
meeting of the able-bodied Jane and the disabled Bertha and changes the 
former. Jane does not speak explicitly about this change, but the reader can 
surmise that what inaugurates her subsequent transformation is her direct 
encounter with Bertha and that what advances it further are her periods of 
wandering on the heath and convalescence at Moor House, where she learns 
the difference between the Rivers’ caring labor and Rochester’s grudging 
and negligent custodial care. In sum, this chapter argues that Jane Eyre is 
less a bildungsroman centering on Jane’s mastery of communication than 
one of her moral education about disability and that what instigates this 
moral development is her close contact with Bertha.
 Of course, thinking of Bertha as any kind of constructive influence other 
than as a cautionary tale runs against the conventional wisdom, for few (if 
any) critics have entertained the possibility that Bertha presents Jane with 
anything positive or useful. For example, in the influential Madwoman in 
the Attic, Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar assert that “Bertha does [ . . . ] 
provide the governess an example of how not to act” (361; emphasis 
added). Critics do not consider Bertha a catalyst of Jane’s moral develop-
ment because Jane herself says nothing about it. However, I argue that this 
moral development takes place within a discursive gap and use the concept 
of the implied interlocutor to provide an inductive reading of Jane’s silence 
and Bertha’s nonverbal world. By way of the implied interlocutor, one can 
conclude that Jane develops morally through her contact with Bertha and, 
more importantly, grows in her understanding and acceptance of diversities 
of ability and their requisite ethical considerations.
bertha’s ImplIed Interlocutor
Jane Eyre has been understood as portraying its protagonist’s efforts to 
gain recognition as a modern liberal subject. As Suzanne Shumway points 
out, the novel “rests upon a valorization of, as well as an investment in, 
language and its powers” and mainly consists in “the story of a woman’s 
search for subjectivity through language” (159, 161). Janet Freeman con-
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curs, stating that “the power of speech” in the novel “is supreme. It enables 
Jane to take more and more control of her life” (686). Sally Shuttleworth 
agrees, maintaining that from “the opening paragraphs [ . . . ] it becomes 
clear that the narrator [ . . . ] is a figure involved in the processes of self-
legitimation” through the acquisition of “rational discourse” (153, 164). 
Pursuing a related line of inquiry, Julia Miele Rodas argues that reading 
Jane as an individual on the autistic spectrum contributes to an understand-
ing of her childhood struggles and increasing control in adulthood “over 
her passionate emotional life, reducing her affect and concealing her deeply 
rooted feelings with ever greater success” (“On the Spectrum”). Disadvan-
taged by gender and class, Jane, from the beginning, strives to acquire a 
voice that will allow her to take her place in society. The advantages of 
rising socially accrue to her when she learns to practice linguistic self-con-
trol. This development becomes manifest through Jane’s increasing facility 
with words against the foil of Bertha’s supposed inability to communicate. 
Indeed, recognizing the role of increasing language facility in Jane’s social 
ascent, critics have commented on the pairing of the speaking Jane with 
the “silent” Bertha. Jane’s early, unrestrained, explosive outbursts align her 
with Bertha, but as the novel progresses and as Jane gains control over 
her tongue, Bertha metamorphoses into her counterpoint. Shuttleworth 
observes that “Bertha’s laughter and ‘eccentric murmurs’ constitute another 
narrative within the text, running in counterpoint to Jane’s rational dis-
course” (164). While Bertha supposedly rages incoherently and eventually 
dies, Jane gradually modulates her tone and, by doing so, achieves self-
determination and personal integrity, thereby empowering herself as the 
modern independent subject and achieving rough parity with Rochester. As 
Gilbert and Gubar note, by the Ferndean section Rochester “and Jane are 
now, in reality, equals” (368).
 In contradistinction to Jane’s mastery of speech is Bertha’s supposedly 
nonverbal status. Jane affirms that, during the attic scene, Bertha uttered a 
“fierce cry” and “bellowed” (258; ch. 26), but she does not report having 
heard Bertha speak intelligibly. Bertha thus illustrates the model set forth by 
Catherine Prendergast, who notes that mentally ill people are often placed in 
“a rhetorical black hole” and that to “be disabled mentally is to be disabled 
rhetorically” (198, 203). In other words, “If people think you’re crazy, they 
don’t listen to you” (Prendergast, 203). Bertha is a character caught in the 
breakdown of communication due to what is, in essence, “a sociomedi-
cal condition, a secret family history of mental illness” (Donaldson, “The 
Corpus of the Madwoman,” 102). Concerning such a person, Lucy Burke 
asks, “[w]hat does it mean [ . . . ] to represent someone who is unable to tell 
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their own story?” (ii). Exploring this prospect would require reconceiving 
what it would mean for the nonverbal person to speak. For example, min-
utes before her death, Bertha vociferates loudly from Thornfield’s rooftop. 
For the narration of Bertha’s final moments, Jane relies upon the report of 
the host of the Rochester Arms (374; ch. 36), who informs her that he “wit-
nessed, and several more witnessed” Bertha just prior to jumping, when 
“she yelled” and “was standing, waving her arms, above the battlements, 
and shouting out till they could hear her a mile off” (377; ch. 36). In this 
oxymoronic “second-hand eye-witness” account, the innkeeper describes 
hearing her voice but indicates neither one way nor the other whether her 
language could be understood. In sum, he does not stop to consider what 
Bertha is shouting or to whom. Yet Bertha’s verbalization and frantic gestur-
ing constitute a speech act, one that, considered dialogically, is meant for an 
addressee. Taking into account that this speech act is a message broadcast in 
a loud volume and from a high place—voluble enough to be heard “a mile 
off”—one reasonably could speculate that the intended recipients would be 
just about everyone within hearing (377; ch. 36). Her rooftop statement is 
delivered to a generalized recipient, one that is diffused over a wide social 
expanse.
 Bertha’s delivery to this generalized recipient implicates her as a speaker 
in a unique dialogic situation that can be explored by recourse to the notion 
of an extralinguistic realm of communication. Far from the usual interac-
tions between addresser and addressee, this kind of discourse is one in which 
an atypical mode of communication predominates: Ato Quayson’s implied 
interlocutor. This is a narrative device that unfolds as extralinguistic dis-
course for the purpose of disclosing a nonverbal character’s participation in 
a dialogic setting. The concept is rooted in Mikhail Bakhtin’s model of dia-
logism in which an addresser and an addressee exchange language between 
them. Put simply, anything a person says is a response to something already 
said and anticipates something that will be said in response. This model 
takes for granted that all parties in such interchanges are fully verbal. Quay-
son’s implied interlocutor extends Bakhtin’s model to disability studies by 
questioning this last aspect: two sides of an exchange exist but with one con-
sisting of a nonverbal person and the other serving as his or her addressee or 
“implied interlocutor” (Quayson, 29). For the nonverbal person, there can 
be an “anticipation of an interlocutor even when the context of communi-
cation does not seem to explicitly denominate one” (29). Quayson further 
adapts Bakhtin’s work by advancing the idea that “the addressee/interlocu-
tor” does not have to be “a human character at all” (154). Instead, the inter-
locutor could consist of “a structure of societal and cultural expectations 
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not attributable to any single source,” that is, the cumulative cultural atti-
tudes and/or ingrained prejudices circulating within the fictive social setting 
(154). Quayson explains “that for the disabled, that interlocutor may be an 
aggregation of attitudes” of the “normate,” Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s 
term for “the corporeal incarnation of culture’s collective, unmarked, nor-
mative characteristics” (Quayson, 151; Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary 
Bodies, 6). Lastly, and most importantly, such an interlocutor is unobtru-
sive, for it recedes into the background of the storytelling. In fact, the more 
it does so—becoming ever more naturalized and fluid—the more operatively 
influential it becomes (167).
 Judging from the unvoiced thought processes that seem to rage inces-
santly within Bertha, one can surmise that she is engaged in some sort of 
ongoing conversation with an implied interlocutor. While it would be rea-
sonable to assume that she seethes with anger against her estranged husband 
and his new love, it is equally reasonable to assume that she also reacts 
against the attitudes motivating these two, the same attitudes that demar-
cate her existence as a person with a mental disability, and that might best 
be interrogated by examining the attic scene. After the aborted nuptials, 
when Rochester leads “the three gentlemen” and Jane up to Thornfield’s 
third story, he chooses to be a “guide” who puts Bertha on display in the 
titillating prospect of a freak show (257; ch. 26).3 Until the wedding, Roch-
ester has secreted Bertha in the attic, as he tells Jane later, due to a sense 
of shame and “dishonour [ . . . because of his] connection with her mental 
defects” (272; ch. 27). However, after Bertha’s brother Richard disrupts the 
ceremony, Rochester reverses his position: instead of hiding her, he now 
makes a spectacle of her. This spectacle begins when he injects a bit of the-
atrical panache into the act, “lift[ing] the hangings from the wall,” thereby 
introducing “the brief scene with the lunatic” (257, 260; ch. 26, emphasis 
added). By pulling back what is in effect a stage curtain, Rochester trans-
forms himself into a showman. As Hermione Lee points out, “the climactic 
unveiling of Bertha [ . . . ] is done as a dumb show with Rochester as Inter-
preter. He raises the curtain, goes on-stage for the fight, and then comments 
 3. Bogdan would argue that the display of Bertha technically does not qualify as a 
“freak show” because he defines the phenomenon as a “formally organized exhibition of 
people with alleged and real physical, mental, or behavioral anomalies for amusement and 
profit [ . . . with the exhibition being] attached to organizations such as circuses and carni-
vals” (Freak Show, 10). Garland-Thomson observes that, whether one follows Bogdan’s strict 
definition or not, “[w]hen the body becomes pure text, a freak has been produced from a 
physically disabled human being” (Extraordinary Bodies, 59). Garland-Thomson also points 
out that 1847, the year of Jane Eyre’s publication, is the year the word freak “become[s] 
synonymous with human corporeal anomaly” (Freakery, 4).
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on the scene to ‘the spectators’” (239). Rochester’s transformation into both 
showman and “Interpreter” calls attention to his exclusive role in telling 
Bertha’s story and especially to the discursive template he uses to guide the 
gentlemen and Jane through a reading of her body. As Robert Bogdan points 
out, because the chief task of the freak show exhibitor was to make certain 
that every spectator saw what he wanted them to see, every exhibit “was, 
in the strict use of the word, a fraud. [ . . . ] [E]very person exhibited was 
misrepresented” (Freak Show, 10). Because the evidently speechless Bertha 
does not tell her story, she is mediated through Rochester’s account, which, 
given his bigotry about disability and his melodramatic tendencies, cannot 
be taken at face value.
 Rochester’s theatrical framing of Bertha reflects several historically reso-
nant tropes having to do with the presentation of living human subjects in 
scientific and medical demonstrations, especially in the then “new” sciences 
of teratology (the study of monsters) and ethnology (the study of human 
race and ethnicity) and in the developing enterprise of exhibiting “freaks” 
as commercially viable entertainment. In fact, Rochester’s propensities as 
a scientific naturalist come to light several chapters prior to the attic scene, 
when, during an evening outdoors and accompanied by Jane, his attention 
is captured by a moth. “Jane, come and look at this fellow. [ . . . ] Look at 
his wings [ . . . ] he reminds me rather of a West Indian insect” (218; ch. 
23). The garden incident momentarily delineates him as an amateur natural-
ist and foreshadows the way that he will later direct the notice of the three 
gentlemen and Jane to the human West Indian specimen, Bertha.
 This scientific rhetoric invokes what Margean Purinton terms the 
“techno-Gothic grotesque,” a phenomenon of the period in which scientific 
and medical information were presented in theater-like settings, with aspects 
of drama being “appropriated by science” (301). Purinton argues:
[Especially in cases in which a living human subject was placed on display, 
the] physicality of the techno-gothic grotesque was simultaneously a spec-
tacular, extraordinary body, gothically designed for pleasure and culturally 
coded for education, display[ed] at the public “clinic” where theatergoers 
could participate in scientific and medical anatomizing. (302–3)
Living human illustrations served as a key component in these displays 
and were particularly useful for explicating both teratology and ethnol-
ogy. Aspects of the “techno-Gothic grotesque” were particularly pertinent 
to the former: the “burgeoning nineteenth-century science of teratology” 
constituted a new approach to studying monsters that was far more system-
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atic than it had been in previous centuries (Philip K. Wilson, 11). Indeed, 
with Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire’s Traité de Teratology, published about a 
decade prior to the appearance of Brontë’s novel, talk about so-called mon-
sters rose to the level of a fad (Huet, 108). Perhaps inspired by Saint-Hilaire, 
Brontë has Rochester refer to Bertha as “a monster,” and it is of her sup-
posed monstrosity, especially, that he wishes to convince the three gentlemen 
and Jane (272; ch. 27).
 Related to the era’s new interest in monsters was the emergence of the 
science of ethnology. Richard Altick writes that “by the late 1840s, the 
infant science of ethnology” had come into formation and, with it, the need 
for “living specimens of barbaric or savage races” (268). The rise of ethnol-
ogy merged with desire in London for spectacle, which could be satisfied at 
the Egyptian Hall and Bethlem Royal Hospital. At the Egyptian Hall, people 
from various European colonies became popular and profitable exhibitions: 
Sartje Baartman or “the Hottentot Venus” from South Africa, Tono Maria 
or “the Venus of South America,” native Americans, and south African 
Bushmen were put on stage (Altick, 268, 272, 273, 275–79). An 1846 Egyp-
tian Hall advertisement for “The Wild Man of the Prairies” closely resem-
bles Rochester’s presentation of Bertha: “Is it an Animal? Is it Human? Is it 
an Extraordinary Freak of Nature, or is it a legitimate member of nature’s 
works?” (Altick, 265). At the city’s main state-run insane asylum, the Beth-
lem Royal Hospital (or “Bedlam,” as it was commonly known), public audi-
ences could find similar displays of human oddity in the form of mentally ill 
residents. According to Allan Ingram, Bedlam had served since the seven-
teenth century as a venue for “spectacle, a place of entertainment,” a prac-
tice that was ongoing at the time of Jane Eyre’s publication (2). Londoners 
went to Bedlam to gawk at the lunatics, paying a penny to peer into their 
cells. A vivid illustration of this practice can be found in William Hogarth’s 
series of engravings, “The Rake’s Progress” (1735): a Bedlam cell is por-
trayed in the eighth and last plate, and in it the crazed Tom Rakewell occu-
pies the foreground while behind him several fashionably dressed women 
appear to be amused by his antics.
 In the attic, Rochester inscribes Bertha’s body with the discourses 
derived from naturalism, teratology, ethnology, the commercial exhibitions 
of exotics and “defectives,” and Bedlam lunacy. As a result, Bertha’s implied 
interlocutor can be located partially in this aggregation of discourses that 
determine how she is viewed. Moreover, the interlocutor can be situated 
in the other assumptions that surface as Rochester performs the combined 
roles of overburdened, caregiving spouse and freak-show barker:
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“That is my wife,” said he. “Such is the sole conjugal embrace I am ever 
to know [ . . . ]. And this is what I wished to have” (laying his hand on my 
shoulder): “this young girl, who stands so grave and quiet at the mouth 
of hell, looking collectedly at the gambols of a demon. [ . . . ] Compare 
these clear eyes with the red balls yonder [ . . . ] this form with that bulk.” 
(258–59; ch. 26)
Rochester alludes to his fourteen-year “burden” of caregiving, his tone oscil-
lating between self-pity and exasperation. Using Jane as a prop for compari-
son, “laying his hand on my shoulder,” he draws together the implications 
of the study of monsters and exotic freaks to emphasize Bertha’s lack of 
humanity. More exotic even than either Tono Maria, the Venus of South 
America, or Sartje Baartman, the Hottentot Venus from South Africa, is Ber-
tha Mason—the Venus from Hell. Thornfield’s attic room is the “mouth of 
hell,” Bertha’s behavior “the gambols of a demon,” and her “red balls” the 
devil’s eyes. Furthermore, he characterizes Bertha as a “bulk,” metonymi-
cally referencing excessive behavior and an animalistic body. This “bulk” he 
contrasts with Jane’s “form,” meaning Jane’s comportment, which accords 
“to prescribed or customary rules” regarding “etiquette, ceremony, or deco-
rum” (“Form, n.15. a”). Rochester conflates corporeal difference with tera-
tology and demonology. The implied interlocutor with whom Bertha must 
contend and to whom she shouts from Thornfield’s rooftop sees her not 
only as monstrous but also as that ultimate incarnation of the Other—the 
devil.
the ableIsm oF rochester and Jane
During his tenure as Bertha’s provider, Rochester’s negative attitudes about 
mental disability are reflected in the type of care he arranges for her. His 
normative framework of caregiving is an inherently dichotomous, asymmet-
rical, custodial one in which Bertha is, or, in his view, should be, the passive 
recipient of care. In other words, his approach parallels the “popular con-
ception of the one-way flow of benefits in care relationships rooted in medi-
cal and charitable paradigms” (Cushing and Lewis, 174). Power and control 
accrue entirely to him. While Rochester’s assumptions may have aligned 
with the prevailing standard in an earlier era, in which families of means 
either sequestered relatives with mental illness within their own homes or 
lodged them in private asylums, these assumptions invite scrutiny, especially 
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when considered in light of 1840s efforts to reform treatment for mentally 
ill and cognitively impaired persons.
 Situating the novel historically helps one to understand why Roches-
ter’s attitudes about mental disability and caregiving may not be shared or 
endorsed by the novel’s implied author. Jane tells her story in the middle 
of the 1840s, an historical moment when the neglect and ill treatment of 
“lunatics” and “idiots” caught the public’s attention, and when a number 
of liberal reforms were enacted with regard to improving their conditions 
(McCandless, 84–104; McDonagh, 209, 211). For example, the later part of 
the decade witnessed the founding of Britain’s first asylum for idiots, High-
gate, later renamed Earlswood, which Charles Dickens visited “on more 
than one occasion in order to draw inspiration for his novels” (Wright, 
137). Hence, Rochester’s approach to caregiving represents what a sizable 
segment of the reading public by 1847 would have recognized as reflect-
ing outdated attitudes, the ones holding sway back in the 1820s and 1830s, 
when most of the story takes place. Sally Shuttleworth explains that the 
“system at Thornfield represents the vestiges of a prior era, when the ‘ani-
mal’ insane were kept hidden and mechanically restrained (as Bertha is after 
each attack) and no attempt was made at cure or recuperation” (160).
 By 1847, a sizable portion of Brontë’s reading public would have con-
sidered Rochester’s caregiving manner to be archaic for three reasons. First, 
Rochester confines her to the equivalent of a tower—a windowless attic 
(264; ch. 27). Second, even though by the time of the novel’s publication 
cures or at least ameliorations of mental illness were thought possible, he 
makes no provision once the couple has returned to England for her to be 
seen by physicians with expertise in mental illness (McCandless, 85; Sally 
Shuttleworth, 36–37).4 Rather, he employs a single attendant, someone he 
found at the Grimsby Retreat, Grace Poole, and this lone attendant seems 
unable to perform the job adequately, for Bertha in the course of the story 
comes into possession of a knife, wanders Thornfield’s halls at night (seem-
ingly at will), and, on at least two occasions, lights fires. Hiring a single, 
“gin-sodden attendant” to supervise an ambulatory, physically powerful, 
forty-five-year-old mentally ill adult female would have been recognized by 
some contemporaries at least as reckless endangerment of the person cared 
for (Jones, 21). Improperly attended, Bertha brings about her own death, 
a death representing a catastrophically unsuccessful episode of caregiving. 
Moreover, by the 1840s, the public was starting to believe that lodging a 
 4. Neither Carter, the surgeon who dressed Mason’s wounds, nor any typical rural or 
town physician, would have been recognized as being competent to treat Bertha’s mental 
illness.
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“lunatic” in a private home was backward, while accommodating him or 
her in an asylum was progressive, therapeutic, and humane (regardless of 
what is believed today in the wake of Foucault). In the 1820s and 1830s, 
several public and private asylums were operating in Yorkshire, and if Roch-
ester were a progressive thinker, he would have lodged her in one of them. 
In sum, Rochester implicitly makes choices about Bertha’s care that a por-
tion of Brontë’s audience in the late 1840s would have recognized as inade-
quate and outdated. As a consequence, given the reform mood, a number of 
readers would have identified his conduct toward the woman in his custody 
as negligent, abusive, and cruel—a dereliction of responsibilities.5
 Calling into question both Rochester’s outdated notions and his care-
less practices is Jane, who strongly censures him. Following the attic scene, 
Jane tells him to modulate his tone when speaking of his wife, chiding him 
for being “inexorable for that unfortunate lady” and for speaking “of her 
with hate—with vindictive antipathy. It is cruel” (265; ch. 27). In the same 
scene, after Rochester asks her, “If you were mad, do you think I should 
hate you?,” her reply is sharply critical: “I do indeed, sir” (265; ch. 27). 
However, what makes Jane most wary of Rochester’s way of thinking and 
doing things is the fact that, just as he alludes to one set of pseudoscientific 
notions to explain Bertha to Jane, so too has he alluded to a second set ear-
lier when explaining Jane to herself. Previous to their nuptials, he has told 
her that she suffers from “hypochondria” and has addressed her as “Little 
nervous subject!” (246, 248; ch. 25). Additionally, the night before the wed-
ding, he dismisses her fear about a bedroom intruder by intimating that she 
is experiencing a nervous disorder. Her fear, he informs her, is the “creature 
of an over-stimulated brain; that is certain. I must be careful of you, my 
treasure; nerves like yours were not made for rough handling. [ . . . ] [T]here 
shall be no recurrence of these mental terrors” (250; ch. 25). Shuttleworth 
insightfully observes that Rochester is not “content with defining one wife 
as ‘maniac’” but also must place “his future bride in that other category 
of female weakness, the nervous, hysterical woman” (171). However, Jane 
 5. Along these lines, Grudin points out that Brontë “was a devoted disciple of Har-
riet Martineau, who in ‘The Hanwell Lunatic Asylum’ [ . . . ] sought to eradicate” the cruel 
and negligent treatment that those with mental illness suffered (147). Brontë may have as-
sumed that most readers would consider Rochester’s practices slipshod and backward. “It 
is no wonder that the novelist was obliged to apologize for the message a literal reading of 
her novel seems to produce” (Grudin, 147–48). Concerning her portrayal of Bertha, Brontë 
writes the following: “I agree with [Miss Kavanagh and Leigh Hunt] that the character is 
shocking [ . . . ]. It is true that profound pity ought to be the only sentiment elicited by the 
view of such degradation, and equally true is it that I have not sufficiently dwelt on that 
feeling; I have erred in making horror too predominant. [ . . . ] [T]he truly good behold and 
compassionate [insanity] as such” (“To W. S. Williams,” 3).
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immediately refutes his explanation by stating, “Sir, depend upon it, my 
nerves were not at fault” (250; ch. 25). Producing the torn wedding veil, she 
demonstrates the basis of her fears. Having proven him wrong once, she has 
reason to not accept at face value whatever he says about Bertha.
 And yet, however critical of Rochester’s attitudes Jane may be, she is far 
from enlightened, at least at this stage of the narrative. In fact, it is not just 
Rochester who contributes to the aggregation of attitudes of the normate 
but Jane as well. As the fourth attic spectator, Jane recounts her first impres-
sions of Bertha, and these betray her extreme nervousness in the presence of 
disability:
[A] figure ran backwards and forwards. What it was, whether beast or 
human being, one could not, at first sight, tell: it groveled, seemingly, on 
all fours; it snatched and growled like some strange wild animal: but it was 
covered with clothing; and a quantity of dark, grizzled hair, wild as a mane, 
hid its head and face. (257–258; ch. 26)
Jane’s description reveals more about herself than about Bertha. Her dis-
gust and fear become evident in her impulse to animalize the mentally dis-
abled woman, who becomes in her telling an inhuman “figure” scurrying 
“backwards and forwards” as though without direction or purpose. Com-
menting on the scene, Grudin asserts that “[e]ven to the relatively charitable 
Jane, Bertha is essentially subhuman, terrifying, and disgusting,” and view-
ing her prompts Jane to see “something more deserving of annihilation than 
of charity” (147). Interestingly, Jane’s vocabulary references the language 
used about Jane by Mrs. Reed: by employing the pronoun it and reducing 
Bertha to animal status, Jane inadvertently echoes her former guardian’s 
words about herself. On her deathbed, the ailing Mrs. Reed says of her 
young charge, “I hated it the first time I set my eyes on it” (203; ch. 21), a 
characterization reinforced when, later, referring to the youthful Jane’s epi-
sode of explosive anger, Mrs. Reed states that it was “as if an animal that 
I had struck [ . . . ] looked up at me with human eyes and cursed me in a 
man’s voice” (210; ch. 21). Jane’s visit to the dying woman calls attention to 
how hard she has struggled to free herself from dehumanization. Now, hav-
ing been recently reminded of this objectification as “it” and “an animal,” 
Jane reassigns these attributes to Bertha. Thus, Jane’s use of Mrs. Reed’s lan-
guage to describe Bertha symbolically transfers these qualities from herself 
to another.
 Transferring the dehumanization from herself to another, however, also 
signals the end of one phase of Jane’s development and the beginning of 
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another. As has been observed above, the principal skill that Jane learns 
to master in this bildungsroman is a modulation of language and tone; by 
the time the eponymous hero enters the attic, for all intents and purposes 
she has thereby achieved a considerable degree of self-determination and 
personal integrity, empowering herself as the modern independent subject. 
Therefore, by the time of the attic scene, Rochester and Jane have already 
become “in reality, equals” (Gilbert and Gubar, 368), a rough equality 
accomplished through Jane’s linguistic accomplishment. However, contact 
with Bertha profoundly unsettles Jane because it forces her to confront 
something she heretofore had not anticipated—the limits of language. This 
confrontation instigates the final major phase of her maturation: the explo-
ration of extralinguistic discourse. Whatever Bertha may vocalize during 
the attic scene, and whether those within hearing are capable or willing 
listeners, Bertha’s presence is especially meaningful for the narrator. At the 
first sight of Bertha, Jane can acknowledge only an abject, subhuman fig-
ure lacking linguistic capability, the very capability that she has striven to 
master and that, Jane has come to believe, underwrites full membership in 
the human species. Seemingly devoid of intelligible speech, Bertha instan-
tiates for her a disturbing humanoid form, human and subhuman com-
bined, an embodiment of the animal-human nexus—an uncanny double. 
This encounter with the uncanny instigates a paradoxical reaction: while 
the meeting should reinforce the primacy of language for Jane, in effect 
it does the opposite, highlighting instead the fragility of the self she has 
assiduously constructed and challenging the very definition of the human. 
Because of Jane’s encounter with Bertha, the questions of what it means to 
be human and how speech fits in as to resolving this issue become less cer-
tain, not more so. Jane has assumed language was worth mastering because 
doing so meant everything, but her sudden close proximity to an alternative 
verbal position raises the alarming possibility that a realm exists in which 
conventional mastery of language is of little use. Far from eliciting a sense 
of wonder, this revelation arouses revulsion.
Jane’s ImplIed Interlocutor: 
From custodIal care to carIng labor
This revulsion reflects the approach to disability in the earlier part of the 
novel that ends with Bertha’s death. The aggregation of normate attitudes 
that underwrites Rochester and Jane’s conduct earlier in the text comes 
under implicit scrutiny in the latter part of the narrative. Here, the sub-
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ject-positions shift, with the former caregiver switching places to occupy 
the disabled position, and Jane, formerly a bystander, entering to become 
a caregiver. One could argue that, for Rochester, the hubristic ableist, to 
become disabled himself, constitutes poetic justice. However, to suggest 
such an idea would be to replicate the ancient prejudice—that disability 
serves as a punishment or symptom of wrongdoing. A more coherent and 
consistent way to address this role reversal is the recognition that, “as lin-
guistic creations, the disabled in literature may trade a series of features 
with the nondisabled, thus transferring some of their significations to the 
nondisabled and vice versa” (Quayson, 27). Some characters, like Bertha, 
became disabled sooner than others, and, with Rochester eventually join-
ing her in this category, his example validates the observations of those dis-
ability scholars who have “noted the provisional and temporary nature of 
able-bodiedness” (Quayson, 14). Bertha thus trades a series of features with 
the formerly nondisabled. As Rodas notes, “in the end [ . . . ] husband and 
wife both wind up participating in disabled identity” (“Brontë’s Jane Eyre,” 
151). Neither immune nor invincible, Rochester must come to terms with 
both the vicissitudes of the body and his former ableism.
 Jane, too, is drawn into the circle of disability by moving into the care-
giver role. However, the novel’s second phase of disability and caregiving 
will not replicate the mistakes made in the first. By the time Jane steps into 
the caregiving position (vis-à-vis a disabled life partner) once held by Roch-
ester, her attitude about the responsibilities it entails varies considerably 
from what his had been. In fact, her approach differs radically, for hers is 
rooted in what Pamela Cushing and Tanya Lewis term a “philosophy of rela-
tional mutuality” (174). What Jane effects with Rochester is, using Cushing 
and Lewis’s language, “a shift from custodial care to ‘caring labor’” (180). 
As they observe, “Sharing power [between caregiver and disabled] is a radi-
cal ideal in a field where workers are tacitly trained to value ‘compliance’ 
over agency in their charges” (186). The relational mutuality approach aims 
to build a relationship of reciprocal respect by mitigating dependency and 
achieving parity between the person with a disability unable to live indepen-
dently and the person undertaking his or her care.
 The vehicle for this transition from one model of care relationship to 
the other is the alteration in Jane’s worldview that occurs between the time 
she views Bertha in the attic and that of her return to the ruined Thornfield. 
Jane’s psychological development after the attic scene supplants the novel’s 
earlier preoccupation involving the narrator’s mastery of language and tone. 
Her growing respect for and comfort with extralinguistic discourse com-
mences with her initial, panicked reaction at the sight of Bertha, a point 
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at which her uncritical, ableist assumptions about the human and about 
discourse and disability become painfully apparent and against which her 
later behavior can be contrasted. By the time she returns to Thornfield after 
wandering on the heath and staying with the Rivers, she has grown in her 
tolerance for extralinguistic discourse, in her appreciation of divergent lev-
els of ability, and in an understanding of dignified caregiving. The evidence 
of her “education” can be read in her willingness to act in accordance with 
the principles of relational mutuality once she is reunited with the disabled 
Rochester at Ferndean.
 Because the phase between the attic scene and her Thornfield homecom-
ing is so important, it will be necessary to retrace several of her steps. After 
Jane flees Thornfield, three episodes unfold by which she learns what it means 
both to see the world through Bertha’s eyes and to be seen in the world as 
Bertha. In the first of the three episodes, Jane becomes implicated in Bertha’s 
supposed animality. Recounting what she saw in the attic, Jane reports that 
“it [Bertha] groveled, seemingly, on all fours” (257; ch. 26). However, soon 
after she leaves Thornfield, and yet prior to boarding the coach, she falls and 
is reduced to “crawling forwards on my hands and knees” (283; ch. 27), a 
description strongly reminiscent of Bertha “grovel[ing], seemingly, on all 
fours.” Thus, as Shuttleworth points out, Jane “mirror[s] Bertha’s animal 
posture” (166). Earlier, this chapter examined Jane’s unwitting deflection of 
Mrs. Reed’s attempt to dehumanize her by assigning the same animalizing 
language and objectivizing pronoun it to Bertha. Yet, with the phrase crawl-
ing forwards on my hands and knees, she lapses back into the bestial posi-
tion into which she had attempted to substitute Bertha, thereby rendering 
the earlier transference unsuccessful.
 In the second episode, after wandering from the heath into a village, 
Jane feels a sense of “moral degradation” because people regard her as “an 
ordinary beggar” (289; ch. 28). The villagers avoid her, even shun her as a 
pariah, perhaps concluding that she is “crazy.” As was noted earlier, “If peo-
ple think you’re crazy, they don’t listen to you” (Prendergast, 203). In these 
circumstances, Jane simply cannot approach the villagers and explain she is 
as rational as they are, for the very attempt would confirm their initial unfa-
vorable assessment. Bertha’s character is momentarily superimposed over 
her own on account of this public perception of her mental incapacity: she 
steps into Bertha’s role as a mentally deranged spectacle and, by so doing, 
takes on the role of reviled Other. Thus, she experiences firsthand an alterity 
far more profound than anything she previously has encountered.
 The third episode is anchored in a moment long prior to her leaving 
Thornfield. Upon learning of her impending marriage to Rochester, Mrs. 
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Fairfax attempts to caution Jane, and the latter rebuffs her, asking “Am 
I a monster?” (233; ch. 24). As it turns out, Jane’s question is far from 
rhetorical, for several chapters later she undertakes an action that alludes 
to nineteenth-century British literature’s most well-known monster, Victor 
Frankenstein’s creation in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, The Modern Pro-
metheus (1818). After leaving Thornfield and wandering on the heath, Jane 
comes upon Moor House and, approaching it stealthily, creeps up to a win-
dow and reports observing the family within through an “aperture” (292; 
ch. 28). This action parallels the one Victor Frankenstein’s humanoid per-
forms when he discovers a remote dwelling and through an “imperceptible 
chink” secretly observes the De Lacey family (100; ch. 11). The similarity 
between these scenes serves to mitigate the reader’s sense of Bertha’s mon-
strousness by intimating that Jane, too, possesses a share of this quality. This 
mutual apportionment blurs any simple binary between the monstrous and 
the “normal.” For a moment, Jane’s identity blends with the monstrousness 
of Frankenstein’s creation and, by implication, with that of Bertha.
 In these three episodes, the parallels with Bertha are unmistakable, and it 
would be reasonable to suppose, given her quickness of association, that the 
narrator herself glimpses some of these similarities. And yet, she does not 
acknowledge recognizing them, nor, indeed, does she reference Bertha at all 
between chapter 27, when she leaves Thornfield, and chapter 36, when she 
returns and learns of her demise. In fact, Jane never once names Bertha in 
the novel: “Bertha” is a name uttered only by others. The closest Jane comes 
to speaking of her directly is in conversation with Rochester, when, before 
leaving, she refers to her in the line, “Sir, your wife is living” and in back-to-
back sentences: “Sir [ . . . ] you are inexorable to that unfortunate lady: you 
speak of her with hate [ . . . ]. It is cruel—she cannot help being mad” (267, 
265; ch. 27).
 Though the reader can assume that Bertha and everything associated 
with her must cross Jane’s mind, the narrator does not inform the reader 
about having such thoughts. Indeed, it becomes downright curious that, 
over the next nine chapters after leaving Thornfield, she never once speaks 
of or even alludes to her rival. While Bertha is the text’s most obvious non-
verbal character, Jane too, for long stretches, and depending on the subject, 
can be said to be nonverbal. Hence, Rodas has proposed that Jane’s unusual 
communication and affect are suggestive of autism. For the purposes of the 
present chapter, however, Jane’s language gaps can productively be under-
stood as suggesting an implied interlocutor. Quayson observes that the 
implied interlocutor is not necessarily confined to situations in which a non-
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verbal disabled character such as Bertha appears: “all literary characters,” 
disabled or not, “in the end interact with an implied interlocutor” (154).
 Of course, it could be objected that to suppose a narrator is engaging in 
an unrecorded conversation with an implied interlocutor is pure specula-
tion, for, by the very definition unrecorded, no evidence can be produced to 
support the claim. However, it is helpful to consider that, in the case of Jane 
at least, the implied interlocutor serves as a variety of structural irony. Just 
as a naïve narrator does not fully comprehend the events he or she narrates, 
and just as an unreliable narrator cannot be fully trusted, so a narrator with 
an implied interlocutor discloses less than everything he or she thinks. As 
a narratorial device, Jane’s implied interlocutor to some degree serves the 
purpose of avoiding redundancy: the reader can perceive the existence of 
an implied interlocutor through the dynamic that not everything needs to 
be uttered for Jane’s views to be made known. In other words, the reader 
can imagine what her thoughts must be, given her recent history and cur-
rent circumstances. For example, the reader does not need to be told that 
Bertha in the attic and Rochester’s manner of dealing with her occupy Jane’s 
mind. Also, a reader expects the implications of these spectacles to weigh 
on her, especially as she wanders the heath, where she is homeless, shunned 
by the villagers, and needing care. More to the point, a reader anticipates 
her apprehensions concerning the type of care (or lack of it) she is likely 
to receive, based on the models of caregiving presented by Mrs. Reed, Mr. 
Brocklehurst, and Rochester. In fact, the very excuse she makes on behalf of 
the villagers (they “knew nothing about my character” [289; ch. 28]) inti-
mates that it is a response to these unrecorded anxieties.
 In addition to avoiding redundancy, this device sharpens the contrast 
between her hopeless plight on the heath and the deus-ex-machina solution 
of Moor House, the very juxtaposition of which renders her so receptive 
to the relational mutuality model. This receptivity can be measured by the 
extent to which Jane becomes part of Moor House and embraces its phi-
losophy. She goes from being a stranger looking through an “aperture” at 
its occupants to becoming literally a part of the family (292; ch. 28). Diana, 
Mary, and St. John accept her into Moor House despite the fact that she is 
a stranger to them, an Other, even a potentially “crazy” one. Demonstrat-
ing skill and respect as they nurture her back to health, they showcase a type 
of care based on the relational mutuality principle. Having been well cared 
for during this period, Jane comes to understand the difference between 
humane and dignified treatment of people in positions of dependency versus 
Rochester’s scorn and disregard.
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 By the time Jane goes back to Thornfield, she has embraced the caring 
labor model of relational mutuality. And yet, as with so much else in this 
part of the narrative, she does not acknowledge the development. Wide gaps 
emerge in the storytelling, one of which concerns the fact that she returns to 
Thornfield expecting to find Bertha alive but about which she says nothing 
to the reader. Moreover, she goes back to Rochester even though his pro-
posal—that they live together unmarried—has not become any less “sophis-
tical” during her stay with the Rivers (267; ch. 27). Because it would be 
absurd to suggest that she is not aware of the implications of returning, her 
lack of disclosure further substantiates that she engages sotto voce with an 
implied interlocutor. Whatever her expectations regarding a reunion with 
Rochester, she cannot help but understand that his wife will continue to 
require care and that this care hitherto has been inadequate and inhumane. 
While Jane most certainly does not return to Thornfield for Bertha’s sake, 
it is plausible to infer that it cannot be far from her mind while in transit 
that the manner of the wife’s care would have to be reformed. However, she 
arrives too late to accomplish this, learning instead that the woman shouted 
from the rooftop before to jumping to her death (377; ch. 36). Jane is as 
silent about what she thinks of Bertha’s final speech act and demise as she is 
about her prospects upon returning to Thornfield.
 Whatever Jane’s thoughts, her subsequent behavior and attitude reveal 
a great deal. For example, she adopts an upbraiding tone with Rochester 
soon after, when, alluding to the difference between his approach to care-
giving and that of the Rivers, she tells him, “I have been with good people; 
far better than you: a hundred times better people; possessed of ideas and 
views you never entertained in your life” (385–386; ch. 37). In assuming the 
caregiver role with him, she will play it in the same way these “good people 
[ . . . ] a hundred times better” would do it. Consequently, she inaugurates 
in the novel’s second phase of caregiving what amounts to reform measures, 
ones that align with those being implemented historically on a wider social 
scale. For example, rather than equating people with disabilities with the 
subhuman, as Rochester had done, Jane will acknowledge their full human-
ity, and this new attitude is evidenced when she tells him, “It is time some 
one undertook to rehumanise you” (384; ch. 37; emphasis added). Taking 
her at her word, it would be impossible for the reader to imagine Jane mak-
ing a degrading spectacle of Rochester as an exotic, subhuman specimen in 
any way resembling the manner he did with Bertha. Thus, when he asks, 
“Am I hideous, Jane?” and she replies, “Very, sir: you always were, you 
know,” her line is both humorous and telling (385; ch. 37). She is referring 
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not just to his postfire physical configuration but also to the monstrousness 
of his former ableist attitudes and negligent practices.
 It could be objected that Jane falls into the category “of those who care 
passionately—rather than compassionately” (Flint, “Disability and Dif-
ference,” 165). However, Eva Feder Kittay notes that for caregiving to be 
“well-done,” it must be characterized by “care, concern, and connection” 
(31). Either way—passionately or compassionately—the responsibilities and 
occupations of caregiving are taxing enough, as Jane acknowledges when 
she finally sends Adèle away to boarding school: “my time and cares were 
required by another—my husband needed them all” (396; ch. 38). As Kit-
tay observes, “the care of dependents is work” (30). Jane’s position with her 
husband is the mirror image of what Rochester’s had been with his wife, 
namely, of one spouse caring for the other.6 The comparison of the way 
Rochester and Jane fulfill their roles vis-à-vis a life partner underscores the 
preference for a caregiver who cares passionately over one moved by com-
passion, an emotion that can corrupt into pity. Most importantly, one of this 
novel’s core themes is the passion (or lack of it) in the individual who cares 
for those living dependently. Jane’s reform mode brings into consideration 
the novel’s other, positive examples of caregivers: not just Mary, Diana, and 
St. John Rivers but also, and most particularly, Maria Temple. Conversely, 
Jane’s approach implicitly critiques those who are cruel and negligent: Mr. 
Rochester, of course, but also Mrs. Reed and Mr. Brocklehurst.
 By recourse to the implied interlocutor, the reader can infer that Jane 
grows in her understanding and ethical appreciation of disability. She over-
comes the panic the disabled woman initially elicited and becomes able and 
willing to gain knowledge from her. Indeed, to argue that Brontë’s novel is a 
bildungsroman of moral development instigated by an inarticulate woman 
with a mental disability is counterintuitive, given both the text’s preoccupa-
tion with language and its characterization of a “madwoman” that easily 
could fall into the “negative image” school (Mitchell and Snyder, Narrative 
Prosthesis, 18). Yet Jane’s attitude regarding disability clearly changes from 
the contact zone of Thornfield’s attic to the closing section at Ferndean. 
Three interpretive maneuvers open up this transgressive reappropriation: (i) 
utilizing the implied interlocutor to disclose concealed aspects of Jane and 
Bertha; (ii) superimposing the narrative’s timeline over its historical one; 
and (iii) taking into account the reform movement unfolding at the time of 
 6. Jane’s fulfilling the caregiving role more satisfactorily than Rochester did replicates 
the gendered pattern so characteristic of such activity, for women disproportionately assume 
the caregiving position. For the feminist critique of care, see Kittay and Kelly.
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publication—the novel’s narrative instant. Telling a story that unfolds over 
several decades, Jane brings the fictional histories of Bertha, Rochester, and 
herself into the historical present of 1847. By doing so, she looks back and, 
by doing so, looks askance at the caregiving practices that once held sway 
at Thornfield. The protagonist’s reformed caregiving practices enacted in the 
narrative’s present (the mid-1840s) vis-à-vis her spouse vastly improve upon 
those carried out by Rochester with his spouse one-to-two decades in the 
past. Thus, at the conclusion, rather than the story of disability coming full 
circle, gesturing toward an ever-repeating cycle, the ending points to a new 
beginning, to the hope of reform.
c h a R l o T T e  B R o n T ë  was an adept commentator, absorber, and 
interpreter of biblical material, and it is no surprise, given both the ubiquity 
of biblical allusion in Jane Eyre and the extent of the novel’s concern with 
disability, that her biblical intertexts engage with disability. Theologians 
and scripture scholars have frequently read biblical disability as a condition 
that has a negative personal and social impact. Commenting on the Hebrew 
Bible, Saul Olyan observes that the “stigmatizing association of disability 
with weakness, vulnerability, dependence, and ineffectuality constitutes an 
exceedingly widespread literary topos in biblical texts” (8). People with dis-
abilities are commonly associated, in biblical narratives, with “the poor, 
the afflicted, and the alien, on account of a perception of shared vulner-
ability and weakness” (Olyan, 128), and disability in the Bible is often a 
marker of low social status as much as it is a physical or mental condition. 
In a groundbreaking essay collection, This Abled Body: Rethinking Dis-
abilities in Biblical Studies (2007), David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder point 
out “the skepticism with which disability-studies scholars have traditionally 
approached religious frameworks” that interpret disability (“Jesus Thrown 
Everything Off Balance,” 174), but suggest that, in spite of the “alarming 
array of ways in which disability prompts cultural disavowal” in biblical 
“i Began To See”
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narrative (174), “disability-studies based analyses can guide reform-minded 
readers to alternative applications of Christian narrative traditions” (183). 
This chapter examines Brontë’s alternative application of biblical disability 
in order to establish how these biblical references inflect Brontë’s overall 
presentation of disability in Jane Eyre.
bIblIcal models oF dIsabIlIty
Motivations for the study of disability in the Bible are varied but have been 
neatly schematized in This Abled Body as “redemptionist,” “rejection-
ist,” and “historicist” (4–5; Avalos, 91). A redemptionist approach seeks 
“to redeem the biblical text, despite any negative stance on disabilities, by 
recontextualizing it for modern application” (Avalos, et al., 4; Avalos, 91). 
Rejectionists oppose this, arguing that “the Bible has negative portrayals 
of disability that should be rejected in modern society” (4–5). Historicists 
situate biblical texts within their surrounding cultures, and “without any 
overt interest in the consequence of the conclusions for modern applica-
tion” (Avalos et al., 5; Avalos, 92).1 Scholars often, as Avalos, Melcher, and 
Schipper point out, “combine, in varying proportions, at least some of these 
approaches” (4). Olyan, for example, presents a balance between an his-
toricist agenda that seeks to identify “the various taxonomic categories” of 
disability in the Hebrew Bible and a redemptionist-rejectionist reading that 
recognizes stigmatization where it occurs yet sees the God of the Hebrew 
Bible as “an advocate for disabled persons, just as he is for other categories 
of persons represented as weak and marginal” (Olyan, 126). This recent 
work has aimed at revising traditional scholarly approaches that concen-
trate on the diagnosis of disability and illness, and at exposing ideologically 
informed interpretative strategies that have limited the definition of disabil-
ity to a hybridized medico-religious model.
 Disability-studies scholars often approach biblical writings with some 
unease and focus their attention on how to provide a coherent response to 
the multiplicity of ways in which the Bible presents disability. Henri-Jacques 
Stiker and Nancy Eiesland, for example, attempt to resolve some of the con-
trasting viewpoints by positing a division between approaches to disability 
in the Hebrew Bible and in the New Testament. Eiesland’s The Disabled 
 1. Avalos uses these various terms to describe the reclamation or rejection of the Bible 
as a whole. When I use his terms, I mean to signify Brontë’s choice to include or exclude 
biblical narratives that are redeemable or not redeemable and do not mean to suggest that 
Brontë is redeeming or rejecting the Bible as a whole.
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God outlines the ways in which biblical texts present an overwhelmingly 
negative attitude toward disability. This, she argues, can result in a disabling 
theology. In rejectionist mode, she identifies three central biblical themes 
associated with disability. First, in appearing to conflate disability with sin, 
the Bible offers an understanding of disability that sees it as a punishment 
for immorality or pride, and as an imperfection that does not reflect the 
image of God; it also presents disability as “un-wholeness” (72). Second, 
disability in the Bible, Eiesland argues, is associated with “virtuous suffer-
ing” (72) and operates as a form of trial through which a person becomes 
pure and accepting of God. As Pauline Otiento observes, along rejectionist 
lines, this theme “encourages passive acceptance of social barriers for the 
sake of obedience to God” (2). Finally, disability is associated with social 
ostracism, charity, and healing: “Failure to be ‘healed’ is often assessed as a 
personal flaw in the individual, such as unrepentant sin or a selfish desire to 
remain disabled” (Eiesland, 117). In redemptionist mode, Eiesland presents 
a new thesis, that the resurrection of Christ’s tortured body is an important 
symbol not of the “negation or erasure of our disabled bodies in hopes of 
perfect images, untouched by physical disability” (107) but of the “hope 
that our nonconventional, and sometimes difficult, bodies participate fully 
in the imago Dei” (107). Simon Horne, conversely, offers a continuity of 
vision between the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament.2 Horne argues 
that the “central paradox of the New Testament is that ‘within inability is 
striking capability’” (88). Disability functions as a kind of paradox that is 
a surprising and aesthetically pleasing occurrence in narrative because of its 
unexpectedness; it is not simply a condition that “Jesus eliminates” (88). 
Disability is, for Horne, a strong indicator of the coming to discipleship: 
“characters with impairments embody the process of full discipleship and 
particular qualities, such as obedience, persistence, and trust” (98). There 
is a range of motivations behind this revisionism. Principal among these is 
the theological need to produce a sense of a benevolent and just God from 
a set of narratives that are meant to be a guide to living ethically, and the 
need to find justification for an inclusive Church. These pragmatic goals 
are important for disability scholars because to “contemplate the mecha-
nisms of stigma,” as Mitchell and Snyder point out, is to begin the process 
of providing “ourselves with the opportunity for changing perceptions and 
alternative ways of comprehending disabled lives today” (“Jesus Thrown 
Everything Off Balance,” 176).
 2. Stressing this kind of continuity is not a commitment to thinking that accounts 
within both Testaments are incompatible.
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Jane eyre and bIblIcal models oF dIsabIlIty
Although Jane Eyre has long been understood to have moral education as 
one of its central concerns, it is only in recent years that there has been sus-
tained discussion of the biblical sources of the novel. Focusing on Brontë’s 
rewriting and renewing of biblical texts with attention to gender politics, 
Keith Jenkins suggests, following Joan Chard, that Brontë’s selection and 
manipulation of biblical allusion provides a basis for understanding Jane 
Eyre as a form of spiritual autobiography. Brontë, Jenkins argues, breaks 
the biblical stories down into their component parts and manipulates them 
into a bricolage that challenges patriarchal authority. He makes the case 
that the gender reversals apparent in the ascription of male biblical roles to 
female characters and vice versa, and the undermining of God’s providential 
role in controlling human action in favor of a larger degree of human self-
determination, work to strengthen Brontë’s social agenda in the novel: to 
argue for greater self-determination for women. Brontë’s uses are sometimes 
“surprisingly casual” (Jenkins, 134), and scripture is often deployed nega-
tively to emphasize a theological position with which Brontë does not agree 
(e.g., Calvinism). Catherine Tkacz highlights Brontë’s technique of contrast-
ing uses of a single Bible passage, her process of embedding scripture within 
speech, her amalgamation of ranges of Bible passages, and her evocation 
of scripture both with and without direct quotation. Tkacz is interested in 
Brontë’s method, rather than the theological explanation for her selectivity, 
and proves that Brontë’s assimilation of biblical material is extensive and 
that it plays a significant role in characterization, plot, imagery, commen-
tary, and narrative comment. I argue elsewhere (Joshua, “Almost my hope 
of Heaven”) that the biblical allusions have a distinctly anti-idolatry theme 
that points to the novel’s distrust of false Messiahs.
 To extend understanding of disability in Jane Eyre, I will use a method-
ology similar to that used by Jenkins and Tkacz: that of employing biblical 
allusions to explicate aspects of the novel with which these allusions con-
nect. Brontë’s approach to the Bible’s representation of disability is highly 
selective. She emphasizes the spiritual worth of disability and the role of a 
person with a disability as an agent for the power of God. In essence, Brontë 
locates her discussion of biblical disability around one central question: 
what is the relationship between the physical body and the spiritual self? 
The nature of this relationship is explored more particularly through two 
further questions: What is the theological significance of sight and blind-
ness? What is the theological significance of madness? Through redemp-
tionist selectivity, Brontë dissociates stigma and disability, choosing biblical 
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quotations that imply that disability is a symbol of being saved and that 
it is a route to salvation. Although there has been much discussion of the 
theological significance of the novel, critics have approached disability not 
through the biblical allusions to it but through a more secular understand-
ing of the conditions the novel presents. Nonetheless, the meanings critics 
associate with the disabilities included in the novel are theological: Edward 
Rochester’s disability is seen as a punishment for his immoral behavior, for 
instance. It seems fitting, then, to explore the possibility of whether Brontë’s 
biblical allusions to disability in any way contribute to a theological under-
standing of the condition. The novel’s positive characterization of disability, 
which I demonstrate by examining its use of certain biblical texts, rules out 
the punishment interpretation, an interpretation which is plausible only on 
the assumption—always unargued—that disability is something negative.
the relatIonshIp between the 
physIcal body and the spIrItual selF
In general, Brontë rejects the idea of the equation of spiritual cure with 
physical cure, preferring to dwell on the benefits of disability for spiritual 
insight, and on the experiences of people with disabilities who demonstrate 
great faith. St. John Rivers warns Jane to remember the fate of Dives “who 
had his good things in this life” (423; ch. 35 [Luke 16.19–31]).3 Dives, the 
rich man, is punished in the afterlife; Lazarus, the man covered in sores 
who begged at his gates, is rewarded, and his impairments do not disqualify 
him from recompense in Heaven. To reject St. John’s proposal would be to 
live as Dives in the luxury of not being a missionary’s wife. Jane is urged to 
become Lazarus: her uncomfortable life, St. John urges, will make her fit for 
Heaven.
 This story exemplifies the novel’s tendency to include biblical references 
to disability (or illness) that indicate unexpected salvation, though the ref-
erence is misapplied by St. John in his false assessment of Jane’s spiritual 
worth and in his associating her with the indulgent rich man. As I have writ-
ten elsewhere, “St. John’s path is rejected by Jane, not because he places too 
much emphasis on the role of Christ, but because he overlooks the fact that 
prioritizing Christ does not entail refusing to allow a secondary place for 
human affection” (Joshua 100). The novel proposes that this is not the cor-
 3. The version of the primary text referred to in this chapter is Charlotte Brontë, Jane 
Eyre, ed. Margaret Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
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rect spiritual path for Jane. Brontë undermines this reference by making St. 
John use Lazarus as a false example; nonetheless, this is a positive account 
of disability as an indicator of the spiritual reward to come, even if it is 
misapplied.
 The link between faith and the healing of a physical disability is present 
when Edward makes implicit reference to Matthew 8, the passage in which 
the centurion’s servant or son, who is “sick of the palsy” (v. 6), is healed by 
Jesus because of the centurion’s faith.4 In Matthew, the centurion expresses 
his faith by telling Jesus that he is a man of command and that he trusts 
Jesus’s ability to heal by command: “Just say the word, and my servant will 
be healed” (v. 8). It is this vocation for command that Edward echoes when 
he cites Matthew 8.9 and excuses his tone by saying to Jane, “I am used to 
say ‘Do this,’ and it is done” (125; ch. 8). Edward’s allusion signals that he 
has avoided a religious life. His echo of this passage may also hint that he 
supplicates for a healing—he is in charge of a sick wife, and it may be that 
his pursuit of Jane is a misguided form of healing. Like the reference to Luke 
16, the passage indicates that Jesus will heal those who do not feel entitled 
to it. Matthew 8 is another form of elevation of those who are not tradition-
ally regarded as worthy. The chapter is referred to again when Jane is dis-
cussing St. John Rivers. He, like Edward, has a commanding nature and is 
in the role of centurion; but, unlike Edward, he is ostensibly a man of faith, 
and so the reference may hint at his problematic status as a future martyr. 
Jane says of St. John, “When he said ‘go,’ I went; ‘come,’ I came; ‘do this,’ 
I did it. But I did not love my servitude” (402; ch. 34.). Jane takes the hum-
bler role of the centurion’s servant, and the reference may hint at her patient 
wait for spiritual renewal.
 Brocklehurst references what he perceives to be Jane’s lack of spiritual 
wholeness by associating her with the healing of a physical disability. He 
announces that Jane’s aunt has sent her to his school “to separate her from 
her own young ones, fearful lest her vicious example should contaminate 
their purity: she has sent her here to be healed, even as the Jews of old sent 
their diseased to the troubled pool of Bethesda; and, teachers, superinten-
dent, I beg of you not to allow the waters to stagnate around her” (67; ch. 
7). John 5.2–9, the passage referenced here, is an account of a man who had 
been ill for 38 years, and who is waiting to be healed at the pool of Bethesda. 
 4. Although it is conventional to use the names Jane and Rochester, I refer to characters 
of both genders consistently by their first names, where the first name is known. I think it is 
more appropriate, when discussing the egalitarian agenda of a novel, to use gender-neutral 
language than it is to follow a convention that has been for some time regarded as patronizing 
to women. 
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The healing is expected to take place when an angel disturbs the water. The 
man’s mobility impairment prevents him from going into the pool quickly 
enough, and, since he has no one who is willing to assist him, he is unable 
to be healed. Jesus tells him that he does not need to enter the pool because 
he has cured him. John 5 explicitly represents disability as lack of wholeness 
and suggests that there are two ways for the man to be made whole: either 
by stepping into the pool or through a miracle performed by Jesus. In both 
cases, to be cured is to be made whole. Jesus links sin and catastrophe to dis-
ability or illness when he tells the man “sin no more, lest a worse thing come 
unto thee” (v. 14). Brontë distances herself from this irredeemable account 
of disability by giving the allusion to Brocklehurst: the healing of a physical 
disability is undermined as an indication of spiritual cure as the pool is not 
the cause of the healing in the biblical story.
 Through her reference to Mark 5.24–34, Jane links herself to the healing 
of a physical disability that cannot take place. Here, she describes another 
self-interested character, Blanche Ingram, as “a great lady, who scorned to 
touch me with the hem of her robes as she passed” (187; ch. 18). Like her 
use of John 5.2–9, Brontë’s use of Mark 5.24–34 is also ironic. Reflecting 
on what she supposes is a courtship being conducted between Edward and 
Blanche, Jane recalls the woman with the gynecological ailment (“an issue 
of blood” [Mark 5.25]) who is healed by Christ, whose robes she touches 
as he passes by her.5 The association between Blanche and Christ may be 
part of the novel’s motif of identifying characters as false Messiahs and is 
another example of disability as lack of wholeness in these contexts: Christ 
says to the woman “go in peace, and be whole of thy plague” [Mark 5.34]). 
Brontë uses the passage negatively, by emphasizing the impossibility of the 
healing (as Jane does not touch her), to signal that disability is not lack of 
wholeness.
 In contrast, Brontë’s reference to the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5.28–
29) lends itself to a redemptionist reading and offers a more positive link 
between the spiritual body and the physical body than the reference to dis-
ability as the product of sin in John 5 and Mark 5. Having shut herself in 
her room to grieve over her aborted wedding, Jane converses with herself 
about what she should do next. She identifies that her conscience holds her 
“passion by the throat,” warning her of the temptation with which she is 
faced: to become Edward’s mistress. It tells her to be active in removing 
herself from moral danger, “[Y]ou shall tear yourself away; none shall help 
 5. Candida R. Moss makes a case for Jesus’s discharge of power mirroring the leaky 
body of the woman. This is part of her wider discussion of impairment as a symbol of con-
nection to God. 
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you: you shall, yourself, pluck out your right eye; yourself cut off your right 
hand: your heart shall be the victim; and you the priest, to transfix it” (307; 
ch. 27). The words of Jane’s conscience echo, closely, those of the Sermon 
on the Mount, but with a reversal of genders: “For whosoever looketh on 
a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his 
heart” (Matt. 5.28–29). As Tkacz points out, “the loss of the hand and eye 
is a ‘profitable’ sacrifice enabling one to avoid full punishment for uncoun-
tered lust” (10). Disablement is, here, an indicator of being in a position to 
avoid moral turpitude. This biblical fate is seen more explicitly in the sym-
bolism of Edward’s “mutilated” (441; ch. 37) left hand, and in the ultimate 
blindness in one of his eyes.6 Jane’s positive reference to the disabilities of 
Matt. 5.28–29 (307; ch. 27) points toward the possibility that Edward’s dis-
abilities could be read as an indication of his spiritual worth.
the theologIcal sIgnIFIcance oF 
sIght and blIndness
Edward’s blindness has been read in various ways, most of which have been 
negative. From the identification of blindness with castration by Richard 
Chase, to the reading of blindness as symbolic of the author’s fear of sex and 
her resistance to her supposed forbidden love for her father by Lucile Dooley, 
Edward’s blindness is generally understood as a punishment, an affliction, 
or a humiliation.7 We see the beginnings of a redemptionist approach to 
blindness in its association with a feminist equalization of power in The 
Madwoman in the Attic (1979) by Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar. They 
are lukewarm in their endorsement of the view that Edward’s injuries are a 
“symbolic castration” (Chase, 467); they argue, instead, that his blindness 
is an attempt to make Jane “an equal of the world Rochester represents” 
(368), pointing out that the pair are only able to drop their “social dis-
guises” once one of them is blind (368). For Peter Bellis, Edward’s blindness 
signals the novel’s shift from characterizing Jane’s perspective as merely “an 
alternative source of visual power” (645) to presenting Jane as the dominant 
source—this is by virtue of the removal of Edward’s challenging sight. When 
 6. Tkacz nevertheless reads Edward’s disabilities as punitive, observing that “On one 
level the loss of his left hand and eye punishes him [Edward] for attempting bigamy; in gain-
ing faith through his experiences, however, he finds that his loss proves profitable and, in 
regaining Jane and his sight, he discovers that justice is tempered with mercy” (12).
 7. Robert Martin’s The Accents of Persuasion calls Edward’s blindness a “humiliation” 
(91), though he suggests that “the reader is never invited either to sentimentalize over him 
[Edward] or to disregard the brutal facts of his humiliation” (91).
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Jane becomes her husband’s eyes, Bellis sees her as dominating him (649), 
rather than identifying her as his aide. Sharon Marcus proposes an alterna-
tive version of this idea by seeing Jane as a prosthesis. But Marcus argues 
that Jane is fragmented by her role as aide: “Critics have often interpreted 
Rochester’s blinding and mutilation as a form of symbolic castration, but 
Jane appears to adopt—rather than to triumph over—her husband’s bodily 
fragmentation by transforming herself into a prosthetic part” (213). Marcus 
limits the attraction of seeing Jane as a prosthesis through this subordinating 
definition of the role of caregiver.
 The question of whether Edward’s blindness can be positioned as 
something positive has gained attention recently. David Bolt argues that, 
although the novel challenges gender hierarchies, “the underpinning hier-
archies of normativism over disability and ‘the sighted’ over ‘the blind’ 
persist” (271). Georgina Kleege interprets Edward’s blindness as “divine 
retribution for the sin of wishing to marry Jane when he already has a wife 
in the attic” and as an event that allows Jane to “rise to power” (70, 71). 
Kleege rejects the novel for this reason, classing it as one of the “old stories 
of blindness” (73) that make her “weary and a little afraid” (73). Mari-
anne Thormählen regards Edward as a man “blighted by severe disabilities” 
(80), suggesting that it “goes against the grain of a present-day reader to 
regard them as Divine chastisement,” but that Edward is fundamentally a 
man who has been “made aware of the power of God” and who “learns to 
repent” because he is “stricken” (80). Like Thormählen, Kate Flint follows 
Edward’s own account of his religious conversion: “Divine justice pursued 
its course [ . . . ]. His chastisements are mighty; and one smote me which 
has humbled me for ever [ . . . ]. I began to see and acknowledge the hand of 
God in my doom” (Jane Eyre, 452; ch. 37). Edward asserts that his blind-
ness is the result of retributive justice and that it is also the beginning of his 
spiritual sight. Flint observes that Edward’s blindness is a “form of punish-
ment that ultimately proves to be a means of illuminating the inward eye” 
(The Victorians, 80). Thomas Vargish also argues along these lines, sug-
gesting that “Rochester’s punishments are necessary to his spiritual salva-
tion and therefore to his rise toward spiritual equality with Jane” (66, n8). 
Blindness can be seen, then, as part of his spiritual recovery; but it is, for 
these critics, still a divine punishment.8 That Edward regards his physical 
blindness as a divine punishment is without question, but the issue here is 
 8. Flint and Vargish are close to my own view that Edward’s blindness, when under-
stood in the context of the novel’s references to Messianism and idolatry, “symbolizes the 
abandonment of idolatry” and is “a positive symbol for his religious well-being” (Joshua, 
95).
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its meaning in the novel as a whole, rather than the character’s own presen-
tation of his viewpoint to another character with whom he has a particular 
and evident agenda. The novel’s biblical allusions provide an important con-
text that takes us beyond this negative view of the religious or moral mean-
ing of Edward’s blindness.
 Edward’s own admission that he sees clearly in a spiritual sense in his 
blind state (“I began to see and acknowledge the hand of God in my doom” 
[452; ch. 37]) alludes indirectly to John 9, a chapter that plays throughout 
on the meanings of seeing as sensory experience, as understanding, and as 
recognizing Jesus. Edward’s words are closest to “whereas I was blind, now 
I see” (John 9.25), which means, at this stage in the biblical story: though 
I had been physically blind, I now have spiritual insight. In John 9.3, Jesus 
explicitly dissociates blindness from sin, asserting that the blindness in this 
man was not a punishment for his sins or for the sins of his parents, and that 
he has been made blind so “that the works of God should be made mani-
fest in him.” The narrative as a whole suggests that the blind man is the one 
person who recognizes that Jesus is the “Son of God” (John 9.35)—a Mes-
sianic title. John 9 explicitly states that blindness is not punitive and that it 
has a purpose that derives from God. In various ways, this healing narrative 
presents the positive religious significance of blindness: spiritual insight and 
innocence. In associating Edward with the idea that being blind is a neces-
sary condition for spiritual insight, through the echo of John 9, Brontë sig-
nals Edward’s recognition of his religious role.
 This chapter of John is quoted more directly by St. John Rivers. Tkacz 
has explored thoroughly Brontë’s preference for giving the same biblical 
allusions to pairs of characters who are in conflict as a way to signal her atti-
tude to them. Edward’s allusion contrasts with St. John Rivers’s use in sev-
eral ways. St. John concentrates on John 9.4. Emphasizing the importance 
of recognizing Christ’s role in the world, he stresses to Jane the urgency of 
his missionary work by suggesting that “the night cometh when no man 
shall work” (423; ch. 35). This quotation closely ties the idea of working 
while it is day, that is, working while one can see, to a set of definitions 
of blindness and sightedness that are concerned with spiritual insight and 
the lack of it. This passage, which quotes Jesus’s words about his mission, 
closely allies being able to see light and being able to do religious or other 
kinds of work. Through it, St. John warns Jane that he believes his mission 
to convert Indians to Christianity to be urgent. In echoing Christ’s words, 
here, St. John implies that, because the “night” (or the end of his life) is on 
its way, it will be too late for her to demonstrate her spiritual worth. Jesus 
says, in this passage, that he and his followers must “work the work of him 
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who sent me, while it is day; night comes, when no man can work. As long 
as I am in the world, I am the light of the world” (John 9.4–5). Jesus is both 
the person who works in the light and the light itself. St. John hints here at 
his false Messianic role: he measures Jane’s allotted time to do her spiritual 
work as the same length as his own life, echoing Christ’s instruction that 
everybody must work hard as long as he is in the world. Equally, the refer-
ence to sight focuses on what is, for Brontë, a negative component of the 
John 9 narrative. When Edward echoes John 9, his use of the passage places 
him in the role of discipleship and not in the religiously irregular Messianic 
role that he has formerly attempted to adopt. St. John uses the same chapter 
of John as Edward but aligns himself with its sighted aspects. Thus Brontë 
subtly suggests that St. John lacks spiritual insight in his pursuit of Messi-
anic glory. The interplay of these positive and negative uses of spiritual sight 
and blindness, in the allusions to John 9 by Edward and by St. John, when 
taken together, signal that Edward is not being punished, as he and his crit-
ics are suggesting, but that his blindness indicates his spiritual worth and his 
discipleship.
 Edward is compared with another biblical blind man, Samson.9 In 
Judges, Samson sacrifices himself for the greater good of his people, and his 
blindness may be read as a means to the end of destroying God’s enemies.10 
Samson’s disability is read by some as an example of a punishment, but the 
biblical story is more subtle than this, and it may just as easily be supposed 
to be an example of a condition that leads to Samson’s becoming an agent 
of God. Brontë’s reference to the biblical Samson offers the parts of the tale 
that signify her redemptionist approach, and she combines a number of dif-
ferent aspects of this narrative in her three references to it in Jane Eyre. The 
first allusion is to Samson’s temptation by Delilah. Samson, who has been 
a Nazirite from birth and has therefore been bound to the rules outlined in 
Numbers 6.1—to avoid wine and the fruits of the vine, to avoid cutting his 
hair, and to stay away from any corpse—is tempted, by his wife’s charms, 
to break his oath. Forming part of a discussion between Jane and Edward 
on the past effects of female beauty on Edward’s character, Jane replies to 
Edward’s appreciation of her face, and to his embrace of her influence over 
him (“the conquest I undergo has a witchery beyond any triumph I can 
 9. I am grateful to Jeremy Schipper for discussing disability in the Samson narrative 
with me.
 10. I am presenting a different argument from Bolt, who suggests that Jane Eyre is in 
conversation with Milton’s Samson Agonistes rather than with the biblical source, and am 
departing from his view that the novel leaves “the underpinning hierarchies of normativism 
over disability and ‘the sighted’ over ‘the blind’ remain intact” (271).
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win” [263; ch. 24]), with an enigmatic facial expression. When questioned 
about what she is thinking, Jane responds to Edward that she “was thinking 
of Hercules and Samson with their charmers” (263; ch. 24). Here Jane hints 
that Samson’s (and Edward’s) downfall is his sight—Samson’s susceptibility 
to the physical charms of his wife Delilah, and to the conflict that this cre-
ates with his devotion to God. The sighted Edward is an echo of the sighted 
Samson at this point because he is overcome by Jane’s particular kind of 
beauty. As Edward and Jane are discussing “women who please me only by 
their faces” (263; ch. 24), Brontë draws attention to Edward’s temptation by 
Jane’s physical appearance as well as by her character—her “clear eye and 
eloquent tongue” (263; ch. 24).11
 Edward himself refers to Samson when he longs for the physical strength 
to convince Jane to become his mistress after the aborted wedding. He says, 
“By God! I long to exert a fraction of Samson’s strength, and break the 
entanglement like tow” (306; ch. 27). The reference is one of the moments 
in the biblical narrative when Samson plays with the possibility of break-
ing his vows. He suggests (falsely) to Delilah that if she weaves seven locks 
of his hair with a “thread of tow,” his strength will be broken (Judg. 16.9). 
When Delilah does this and Samson is set upon by the Philistines, Sam-
son breaks the bonds with ease. Like Samson, Edward signals here that he 
both wants and does not want to break the vows he has made before God. 
Edward likens Jane’s life, in classical terms, to a “silken thread” that has 
been smooth until this point, and that has now developed a “knot”—“The 
hitch in Jane’s character,” as Edward describes it (306; ch. 27). It is likely 
that he is not referring to his prior marriage as the sticking point—which is 
a hitch not in Jane’s character but in his—but to Jane’s commitment to her 
chastity. His wish is to break that commitment with the strength of Samson. 
But to use divinely sanctioned strength for ill by pursuing Jane as a mis-
tress and committing adultery is clearly an indication that Edward is on the 
wrong religious path; it is his sightedness that leads him to this point.
 The final reference to Samson is made by Jane and is to Samson’s blind-
ness and to the strength that has returned with his hair:
But in his countenance, I saw a change: that looked desperate and brood-
ing—that reminded me of some wronged and fettered wild-beast or bird, 
 11. Daniel Margalioth notes that “Delilah charmed Samson away from the right path, 
while Jane charms Rochester into it, but the mastery over the strong is the same, and so are 
the blinding results” (204). Jane’s charms are a temptation to Edward, but it is difficult to see 
how he can be on the right religious path at this point. Edward’s conversion occurs without 
Jane’s mediation, though it may be a consequence of his love for her.
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dangerous to approach in his sullen woe. The caged eagle, whose gold-
ringed eyes cruelty has extinguished, might look as looked that sightless 
Samson.
 And reader, do you think I feared him in his blind ferocity?—if you do, 
you little know me. (436; ch. 37)
Bolt suggests that Brontë’s reference to a “caged eagle” (272) echoes Mil-
ton’s Samson Agonistes (line 1695).12 Although Milton’s eagle, part of 
an epic simile describing Samson’s triumphant death, is a free bird whose 
“cloudless thunder bolted on” (line 1697) the heads of the Philistine audi-
ence who have come to watch him profane himself with his performance 
in honor of their god, Brontë, nevertheless, appears to be using Milton as 
her source for the description of Samson’s pitiable state. The biblical source 
contains no reference to Samson’s self-pity, or to his being pitied by others, 
but this occurs extensively in Samson Agonistes. Bolt’s identification of Mil-
ton as the source is significant, because it confirms that Brontë consistently 
has a redemptive approach to biblical passages about disability; this refer-
ence to Edward’s pitiable state as Samson-like can be set aside as it is not a 
direct reference to the Bible. Moreover, Jane immediately corrects her pity-
ing of Edward’s blindness when she speaks directly to the reader, through 
her claim to be unafraid of his “blind ferocity” (436; ch. 37).
 Brontë’s references to blindness that come directly from biblical sources 
avoid presenting the condition as disabling or as an indication of low social 
standing, associating it instead with positive spiritual gains. Blindness is nei-
ther compensatory nor punitive. In the case of Edward Rochester, it is an 
indicator of spiritual insight, one that helps preserve him from spiritually 
misleading judgments and that represents his right relationship to God and 
to mankind. Brontë’s use of Samson warns of the dangers of sight and of 
strength as a route to temptation, and, like her use of John 9, indicates a 
redemptionist agenda with regard to biblical texts. Her allusion to Sam-
son Agonistes complicates this picture, in that, when she gives Edward and 
Jane moments of self-pity and pity, their recognition of the spiritual gain 
of blindness is in abeyance. In her reference to Samson Agonistes, Brontë 
is not drawn to the part that alludes to Samson as having his “inward eyes 
illuminated” (line 1689) but to the idea of the eagle. The eagle is triumphant 
in Milton’s version, but it is, in this moment of doubt, a caged bird. In this 
Brontë may be echoing the earlier parts of Samson Agonistes, which dwell 
on Samson’s captivity and self-doubt. Nonetheless, Brontë’s overarching rea-
 12. See also Martin, 98–99
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son for including the Samson references is Samson’s status as a biblical hero 
whose greatest feat as a warrior comes when he is blind, and who comes to 
see his blindness as the route to his glory.
the theologIcal sIgnIFIcance oF madness
The issue of the role of the disabled body in signaling spiritual worth is 
taken up again through the reference to King Nebuchadnezzar’s madness. 
On reuniting with Edward at the end of the novel, Jane refers to him as hav-
ing a “‘faux air’ of Nebuchadnezzar in the fields” (441; ch. 37). There are 
three aspects of the stories associated with Nebuchadnezzar that may be rel-
evant to the theological message of Jane Eyre: the King’s spiritual pride and 
association with idolatry; his dream of a tree; and his madness in the wilder-
ness and his recovery. Given that Jane’s reference is explicitly to “the fields,” 
it is likely that this is a direct reference to the King’s madness; but, as in the 
reference to Edward’s arm and eye, Brontë may be using the Nebuchadnez-
zar story in other ways too.
 Nebuchadnezzar dreams of an image—with a golden head, a breast 
and arms of silver, thighs of brass, legs of iron, and feet of clay—that is 
destroyed by a huge stone (Dan. 2.31–35). The prophet Daniel interprets 
the golden head as standing for Nebuchadnezzar himself, hinting that the 
baser substances symbolize the degeneration of his kingdom under differ-
ent leadership in successive years. Nebuchadnezzar is depicted here, and in 
the remaining stories in the book of Daniel, as “a foolish and arrogant self-
idolater” (Barton and Muddiman, 565). Having dreamt of this idol, Nebu-
chadnezzar constructs it, inviting all the leaders of his provinces to worship 
it, threatening death by fire if they refuse (Dan. 3.6). The King attempts to 
unite a region with diverse religions through commanding the worship of 
this idol, but the Jewish leaders in his kingdom refuse and are thrown into 
“the burning fiery furnace” (Dan. 3.21). Being true to their faith, they are 
saved from the fire’s effects (Dan. 3.25), but this is insufficient to convert 
Nebuchadnezzar. Next, the King dreams of being visited by a messenger 
from Heaven who tells him to fell a tall tree that provides shade and fruit, 
leaving a stump that will “be with the beasts in the grass of the earth” (Dan. 
4.15). Daniel interprets the tree as referring to the King himself. The dream 
predicts that Nebuchadnezzar will be forced to dwell with the beasts as an 
animal until he recognizes the God of the Jews, after which time he will be 
restored to power. Nebuchadnezzar ignores the warning of the tree and is 
told directly by a voice from Heaven that he will be driven from his home 
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and will live as an animal, until “his hairs were grown like eagles’ feathers, 
and his nails like bird’s claws” (Dan. 4.33). His “understanding” is removed 
from him, suggesting he has gone mad (Dan. 4.34). After his conversion, 
the King is restored to sanity and his kingdom and his greatness is even 
increased. He learns that “those that walk in pride [God] is able to abase” 
(Dan. 4.37). Just as the tree in Nebuchadnezzar’s narrative is a warning, so 
it is a warning for Edward. Echoes of this return in the scene when Edward 
refers to his hand as a “mere stump” (441; ch. 37) and sits on a “dry stump 
of a tree” (445; ch. 37). The tree is referenced again in connection with 
Edward’s disabilities when Jane asserts “You are no ruin, sir—no lightning 
struck tree: you are green and vigorous. Plants will grow about your roots, 
whether you ask them or not, because they take delight in your bountiful 
shadow” (450; ch. 37). Using the symbolism of Nebuchadnezzar’s benevo-
lent tree, Jane rejects Edward’s assumption that he is more like the blasted 
chestnut and hints that, in his blindness, he has returned to glory as Nebu-
chadnezzar does at the end of his narrative.
 Although the other parts of Nebuchadnezzar’s narrative (the blasted 
tree, dreams, and idols) are clearly part of the novel’s wider set of symbolic 
images, Nebuchadnezzar’s madness is the part of his narrative that is most 
directly referenced by the novel. Edward places himself in the position of 
a false God, encourages Jane to see him this way, sees her in this way him-
self, and is therefore strongly associated with idolatry—the other important 
theme of Nebuchadnezzar’s story. For instance, Jane says of Edward that 
she could not “see God for his creature: of whom I had made an idol” (277; 
ch. 24). From the moment Jane hears the Mighty Spirit—God’s voice in 
response to her prayer—and becomes “enlightened,” she renounces idolatry 
(425; ch. 35). Edward, coincidentally, renounces it at the same time, and his 
blindness symbolizes this rejection.
 Tkacz is unequivocal in her assertion that the Nebuchadnezzar reference 
signals that Edward is in “proud defiance of God” and in need of “beneficial 
correction” (12). Nebuchadnezzar’s madness is, for Tkacz, a punishment 
that ends “when his pride has been abased” (14). Elizabeth Donaldson sees 
Edward’s “punishment” as “paralleling Nebuchadnezzar’s [tree] dream,” 
reading Edward’s blindness itself as a kind of dream, suggesting that “the 
closed eyes of the sleeping dreamer seem temporarily blinded” and that by 
“[i]mprisoning and isolating the dreamer, the dream state represents the 
threat of inescapable interiority, or madness” (“The Corpus of the Mad-
woman,” 109). But the Nebuchadnezzar story does not offer this kind of 
detail on the paralleling of dreaming and blindness, and Brontë is less com-
mitted to the idea of punitive disability than she might appear. Nebuchad-
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nezzar’s madness is punitive (when Daniel reveals to the King that he will 
go mad for a period of time if he does not convert, he means this will be a 
punishment from God if he does not “break off” his “sins by righteousness” 
and “show mercy to the poor” [Dan. 4.27]); and madness is linked here to a 
loss of status and power. Jane makes her comparison between Edward and 
Nebuchadnezzar in such a way as to undermine it, however. In his blind 
state, Edward is the forgiven Nebuchadnezzar.
 Edward alludes to himself as sounding mad slightly later in the conversa-
tion. When recounting crying out Jane’s name during his conversion expe-
rience, he notes, “If any listener had heard me, he would have thought me 
mad: I pronounced them with such frantic energy” (452; ch. 37). Given that 
Brontë aligns the description of Edward with the symbolism of Nebuchad-
nezzar’s story, and given that her understanding of him as retaining his vigor 
and his central role as a provider of shade and strength in his blindness, we 
might make a case that Brontë presents disability here as no bar to power.
 Bertha Rochester is, obviously, the character most associated with 
madness. Demonic possession is, in biblical narrative, an explanation for 
madness. Interestingly, Bertha is associated with demons rather than the 
demonically possessed of the Bible, who clearly have an identity that is sepa-
rate from the demon. Bertha is called a demon on several occasions and 
Edward associates her with Hell, citing the Book of Revelation in connec-
tion with her. He explicitly sees Bertha’s madness as a religious trial that he 
must overcome and uses biblical language in order to convey this impression 
(312; ch. 27). In his descriptions of Bertha, Edward summons up all of the 
negative aspects of the biblical models of disability. Her disability is strongly 
connected with sin—he describes her as “at once intemperate and unchaste” 
(310; ch. 27); he regards her as unclean, and her illness taints him, according 
to his perception of how the world might see it: “In the eyes of the world I 
was doubtless covered with grimy dishonour: but I resolved to be clean in 
my own sight—and to the last I repudiated the contamination of her crimes, 
and wrenched myself from connexion with her mental defects” (311; ch. 
27). To portray life with someone who is mentally ill as hellish does not 
admit of a redemptive reading, it is clear, but Brontë is offering this model 
of disability as a way to characterize Edward’s misguided approach to his 
religious test and his marital obligations. He believes himself to “have done 
all that God and humanity” (313; ch. 27) required of him, but he embarks 
on a life of dissipation until he finds hope that Jane is his savior and his idol, 
disregarding what Jane calls “the law given by God” by attempting to marry 
her (321; ch. 27). Edward returns to his religious path when he realizes his 
duty of care to Bertha. His attempt to save her from the fire, risking his own 
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life, is an indication of this. Edward’s association of Bertha with Hell makes 
explicit his disordered religious state—he has the wrong attitude toward dis-
ability at this stage in the novel.
conclusIon
Brontë makes no distinction between the Testaments and does not opt for 
the solution that Stiker and Eiesland offer—that of seeing the New Testa-
ment, or even Christ’s disabled body, as redemptive. Instead, her selectivity 
connotes an inclusive theology of disability that presents it, as Horne does, 
as an indicator of coming to discipleship. Jane Eyre addresses the problem 
of stigma in many forms, and places disability as central to the theological 
and romantic resolution. This emphasis signals that biblical allusion is part 
of Brontë’s attempt to establish the social and religious worth of people with 
disabilities in this novel. Brontë’s use of biblical texts addresses the problem-
atic associations that the Bible makes between disability and punishment, 
sin, disruption, and uncleanness. She throws into a negative light the biblical 
identification of disability as lack of wholeness, as being an outcast, and as 
indicative of insufficient spiritual worth. She does this in two ways: by asso-
ciating negative passages, such as the healing of the man at Bethesda, with 
characters she moralizes against, and by associating passages that admit of 
a redemptionist reading with characters who show their spiritual worth. 
The biblical allusions to disability are remarkable in Jane Eyre for the con-
sistency of their approach and for their function as indicators of the stage 
that the characters have reached in their spiritual growth. When the sighted 
Edward is on what the novel deems to be the wrong religious path, he is 
associated with the foibles of the sighted Samson; when he has experienced 
his religious conversion, he is the blind man who spiritually sees (John 9). 
Edward’s failure in recognizing Bertha’s sacral purpose (or his ethical obliga-
tion to her), by associating her with the unclean and unworthy, is part of the 
lesson he is required to learn.13
 Biblical healings are controversial in disability studies, for the theology 
of cure that they may generate and for their reduction of people with dis-
 13. It is interesting to note that Brontë’s account of disability in Villette is much less sym-
pathetic. Miss Marchmont is an eccentric invalid with a commanding nature who shows little 
sympathy for others, and a character known only as the “crétin” is described as deformed, 
animal-like, and mendacious. Brontë’s later use of disability makes the strong connection 
between biblical references and disability and the consistency of the redemptive approach 
seem even more striking in Jane Eyre. I am grateful to Christine Went for reminding me of 
these references.
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abilities to passive tools of God. Mitchell and Snyder note the scarcity of 
comment in modern theology and biblical studies on the fact that Christ’s 
healing miracles resolve the difficulties that arise from disability through 
“the erasure of rather than the acceptance of disability” (“Jesus Thrown 
Everything Off Balance,” 178). Brontë’s positive use of people who are 
healed of their disabilities leaves her open to the criticism leveled by some 
critics that people with disabilities in the Bible are reduced to agents of God. 
But, one could just as well argue that to be an agent of God is the highest 
form of dignity within the Christian tradition. Brontë avoids this contro-
versy by the careful selection of aspects of biblical narratives that identify 
disability as a route to salvation and as an indicator of faith. Her selectivity 
and manipulation of biblical allusions reveals a redemptionist agenda that 
helps to clarify the more ambiguous uses of disability in the novel, caus-
ing serious doubts about readings that suggest that Edward is punished, 
Jane has ascended in power over him, and St. John is saved. The biblical 
intertexts point to a nonpunitive understanding of disability that provides 
a strong basis for understanding Edward’s disabilities not as a divine pun-
ishment but as a signal that he is righteous. Brontë takes her inspiration for 
Edward’s disabilities from the hand and eye of the Sermon and the Mount, 
strongly underscoring that she believes them to be markers of redemption.
i l l n e s s  a n d  d i s a B i l i T y  pervade Jane Eyre according to what 
seem like typically metaphorical patterns. From the death of Jane’s par-
ents to typhus to the loss of Rochester’s sight and hand, from minor fig-
ures like the unnamed students at Lowood school to the hero and heroine 
themselves, problematic bodies are repeatedly introduced and then rehabili-
tated or eradicated from the story in ways that bring presumed deviation 
under control. Illness tends to suggest the novel’s assumption of a progress 
narrative. When Jane and Helen Burns get sick, for example, their condi-
tions signify at once the problem of institutional corruption (as in families 
or schools) and the belief that compassion and benevolence will redress 
that failure, along with the conventional symbolism of the ill as both vul-
nerable and pure. Other cases, such as Mrs. Reed after her stroke, dem-
onstrate the flip side of the illness dichotomy, where recovery is thwarted 
by “ill”-will, so that Mrs. Reed’s inexorable physical decline manifests her 
unregenerate attitude and greed. The more static conditions of disability—
madness, blindness, and disfigurement (though of course these too are sub-
ject to change)—would seem to mock the novel’s faith in improvement, 
being resistant to the salutary effects of care. The troubled bodies of Ber-
tha and Rochester thus call our attention to a different institutional frame-
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work, marriage, within whose boundaries the unsightliness of dysfunction 
can be hidden or recuperated. Fascinated by, and clearly somewhat anxious 
about, the nature of corporeality, Jane Eyre participates in what scholars 
have cited as a particularly Victorian preoccupation: the porous boundar-
ies of the body, its internal unpredictability, its need for regulation, and its 
relationship to identity.1
 Multiple instances of sickness and recovery haunt the novel as remind-
ers of its complicity in the symbolic production of an ableist reality. At the 
same time, however, Jane Eyre reveals the cost of denying or suppressing 
difference—longing, in moments staged as confrontations with illness and 
disability, for alternatives. Making use of the psychoanalytic theory of rec-
ognition, this chapter argues that Brontë records the possibility of a form 
of interaction that acknowledges and accepts the frailties of the body. If, 
as Julia Miele Rodas writes, “disability in Victorian fiction indicates [ . . . ] 
a desire to experiment with places and roles” (“Mainstreaming,” 373), in 
Jane Eyre that experimentation takes the form of encounters with bodily 
difference that point toward intersubjective respect. Rochester’s impair-
ments, for example, as perhaps the most notable in the text, have been read 
as an emasculation whose recovery is signified by the son he can partially 
see, but they may also be regarded as accidental injuries that have little 
bearing on his chances for a happy life. The neatly predictable outcome of 
the novel’s marriage plot suggests that such injuries are intolerable unless 
compensated by legitimate class and relational status. But in Jane’s conclud-
ing avowal that “Reader, [she] married him,” we might also locate hope for 
an environment in which disability is neither hidden nor overly exposed as 
a way of managing the horror it supposedly represents. Far from covering 
over the problem of Rochester’s body (and Jane’s, for of course she has been 
damningly described as plain), marriage makes them at once obvious and 
inconsequential to relational success.
 Such a reading of the central relationship in Jane Eyre suggests that the 
novel, attentive as it is to bodily shape, facial features, and extremities of 
sickness and injury, renders these as axes of heightened intersubjective pos-
sibility, where subjects are tested for their capacity to tolerate and respect. 
In his discussion of the origins of the novel as entangled with the inception 
of an able/disabled binary, Lennard Davis claims that “to truly acknowledge 
the existence of another identity dilutes the general category of identity” 
(Bending Over Backwards, 101). Yet recognition as defined by psychoana-
lytic theory insists that true acknowledgment of another’s subjectivity is 
 1. See in particular Frawley; Holmes; Rodas; and Tromp.
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possible—indeed, that it is the basis of political and cultural understand-
ing. Jessica Benjamin has described recognition as an intersubjective space 
in which individuals “bridge difference,” “hold multiple positions,” and 
“tolerate nonidentity rather than wipe out the position of self or other” 
(Shadow, 107). To “recognize” is to take up a kind of “double position,” 
in Benjamin’s terms, from which the self maintains a sense of separateness 
without denying to the other an equivalent freedom of identity and self-
expression—or, to put this another way, an individual acknowledges the 
other as a legitimate subject without losing selfhood to the coercive pres-
sures of sameness. Anomalous bodies, tending to inspire both fascination 
and fear in the nondisabled and thus forcing the encounter with differ-
ence in an exaggerated way, may maximize what Benjamin calls the “con-
tinual misfiring of recognition, the very plurality that strains subjectivity” 
(Shadow, 101). But they also demand the hard work of acceptance—not 
only, or not even, of the apparently monstrous other but of the innately 
strange self. Brontë’s novel represents such an ethic of understanding across 
the boundaries of plurality that is the foundation of recognition.
 Representations of disease, disability, or atypical bodies throughout Jane 
Eyre complicate the idea that these are inevitably problematic conditions, 
rather than being incidental to problems of social arrangement. I use inci-
dental in both senses of the word: the afflictions of the body are secondary 
to or less significant than the problems of this world, but disability is also 
attendant upon those problems and thus worthy of attention insofar as it 
underscores the need for social change. This is not precisely equivalent to 
the so-called social model of disability (articulated by Tobin Siebers, Tom 
Shakespeare, Paul Longmore and Lauri Umansky, among others)—that dis-
ability is a function of cultural, architectural, and sociopolitical arrange-
ment, rather than a medical problem centered in the body—but it seems 
arguably a precursor of such arguments.2 In its emphasis on intersubjec-
tive regard as a means of disrupting hierarchical binaries of dis/ability, too, 
the novel seems intriguingly forward thinking, reminding its readers of the 
need for more engaged ways of thinking about bodies, selves, illness, and 
relationships.
 Jane Eyre has often been described as at once a naturalistic and a vision-
ary novel, one whose story must be understood as having an imaginative 
rather than strictly mimetic logic. In Helene Moglen’s words, “Brontë did not 
 2. The literature on the move from a medical to a social model of disability—and be-
yond these to phenomenological and even “posthuman” models—is extensive. In addition to 
Siebers, Longmore and Umansky, Couser, and Shakespeare, others who have written on this 
subject include Iwakuma, Hughes and Paterson, and Oliver.
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write of what was, but of what could be” (107). Against the text’s unsurpris-
ing participation in the structures of normalcy, then, can be set its depiction 
of what might obtain between people in a world where “irregularity”—a 
word that recurs frequently in the novel in reference to the shape and sym-
metry of people’s bodies—does not need to be repaired. In the context of 
illness and disability, this overlap often takes the form of tension between 
reasonable bodily reactions to circumstance and unreasonable psychologi-
cal reactions either to those bodies or to interpersonal engagement between 
differently embodied subjects. The novel openly displays troubled bodies—
not to make them the intriguing or pitiable spectacles of readerly stare, but 
rather to return, time and again, to the scene of potential recognition.3
uncouplIng the metaphorIcal and the real
Some of the more obvious metaphorical associations of illness are disrupted 
in discussions of Jane’s parents and Helen Burns. Jane’s clergyman father, 
for example, who dies administering to the “poor of a large manufacturing 
town,” would seem to represent a clash between spiritual uprightness and 
the injurious conditions of industry (21; ch. 3).4 This situation clearly fore-
shadows Jane’s future at Lowood School, where she and the other girls will 
also be exposed to a toxic institutional environment brought about by greed. 
The illnesses of Jane’s parents and the virtuous Helen Burns thus seem to 
symbolize the plight of subjects vulnerable to forces greater than themselves, 
the combined injustices of patriarchy, class hierarchy, and social intolerance. 
Helen in particular seems an obvious instance of what Cindy LaCom has 
called the “typically ethereal,” “sexless” and selfless invalid of nineteenth-
century English novels (192). In this compacted metaphorical loop, piety is 
both sign of and compensation for severe illness, which is further cause for 
devotion (the injustice of sickness made comprehensible through the mecha-
nism of faith); moreover, in different but simultaneous ways, illness and reli-
gious fervor make the individual unapproachable, untouchable by average 
folk whose recoiling from the threat of contagion can be masked as shame 
in the face of the other’s incomparable goodness.
 But to the extent that the novel is critical of the kind of zealous piety 
voiced by Helen, and later by St. John Rivers, her death as well as that of 
 3. Garland-Thomson’s Staring offers a detailed taxonomy and cultural history of star-
ing and a brief discussion of recognition in terms of specifically visual exchange (158–59).
 4. The version of the primary text referred to in this chapter is Charlotte Brontë, Jane 
Eyre, ed. Richard J. Dunn. 2nd ed. (New York and London: Norton, 1987).
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Jane’s parents suggest that adherence to one totalizing discourse, such as 
religion, cannot simply be substituted for another, such as industry or class 
superiority. Innocence and moral purity do not provide existential protec-
tion; on the contrary, they seem almost to constitute naïve capitulation to 
explanatory narratives. “By dying young, I shall escape great sufferings,” 
Helen tells Jane with a kind of abject logic; “I should have been continu-
ally at fault” (71; ch. 9). Unlike Helen, who “‘live[s] in calm, looking to the 
end’” (51; ch. 6), and by implication her clergy parents, Jane is resolutely 
of this world, her sense of indignation and independence trained not on the 
consolations of the afterlife but on effecting change in the conditions of this 
life (again, unlike Helen, Jane “questioned” [71; ch. 9]). Jane’s very survival, 
in fact, puts in relief the novel’s more realistic politicizing of the deaths of 
Helen and the Eyres. (“It is possible,” as Cindy LaCom argues, “to read dis-
ability both literally and as a metaphor that makes meaning” [199].) The 
living and working conditions Jane’s parents and her Lowood classmates 
have encountered will inevitably take their toll on bodies, and if there is a 
problem to be solved, it is thus one of systems rather than individuals.5
 In focusing our attention on the condition of bodies in social and mate-
rial settings, Brontë situates much of the imaginatively charged work of her 
story in the threshold space between subjects, a space where recognition can 
obtain or fail. This relational moment, to quote Benjamin, “corresponds 
to the political question, Can a community admit the Other without her/
him having to already be or become the same?” (Shadow, 94). The success 
or breakdown of recognition between selves thus has consequences beyond 
those individuals, leading to (because also informed by) attitudes of mutu-
ality and respect or domination and negation within the social group. It 
is the ambiguous body, Brontë suggests—excessive or depleted, ill or frail, 
disfigured or disabled—that places these already complex social dynam-
ics at a kind of maximum intensity, forcing a confrontation with differ-
ence but also encouraging alternative responses to what might be feared or 
misunderstood.
 To be sure, Jane Eyre identifies nearly all its characters in terms of physi-
cal attributes, usually with powerful characterological assessments attached 
to those descriptions, what David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder call the 
“strict mirroring relationship” of body to subjectivity (Narrative Prosthe-
 5. Writing of Shirley, Torgerson argues that while Bronte’s “true empathy is with the 
plight of the middle class, not the lower classes” (54), the novel nevertheless maps out the 
possibility for social and public health reform through the metaphor of disease. A similar 
strategy seems to be at work in Jane Eyre.
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sis, 58).6 In juxtaposition, however, those judgments tend more to cancel 
or contradict each other than to uphold a consistent taxonomy of meta-
phorical meaning. In the early scenes of the novel, for instance, Jane’s body 
takes on acute symbolic import in contrast to her cousin John, but it is not 
reliably clear what body types or tendencies mean. In her combination of 
physical vulnerability and intellectual resistance (manifested in a refusal to 
“remain silent” [5; ch. 1]), Jane seems representative of the middle classes 
bridled by a bloated, rapacious caste system, of which John, in turn, is the 
obvious emblem. Jane spares no rhetorical excess in her account of him: 
John is “large and stout for his age, with a dingy and unwholesome skin; 
thick lineaments in a spacious visage, heavy limbs and large extremities. He 
gorged himself habitually at table, which made him bilious, and gave him 
a dim and bleared eye and flabby cheeks” (7; ch. 1). His “disgusting and 
ugly appearance” is part and parcel of his violent nature (8; ch. 1); as Jane 
explains, “He bullied and punished me [ . . . ] continually: every nerve I had 
feared him, and every morsel of flesh on my bones shrank when he came 
near” (7; ch. 1). It could hardly be made more apparent that John’s spoiled 
arrogance signifies the appetites, the privileges, of a system run amok.
 Yet what does it mean that John also “ought now to have been at 
school; but his mamma had taken him for a month or two, ‘on account 
of his delicate health’” (7; ch. 1)? Is delicate health not the particular bur-
den of the morally good? Perhaps the difference is maternal coddling as 
opposed to orphanhood. Perhaps sickness is always the sign of untenable 
social relationships and beliefs about social value. Here again, bodily excess 
and extremity, however symbolically they point toward anxieties beyond 
themselves, are also literal. John’s health, like that of Jane’s parents or 
Helen Burns, is embedded in habit and the accidents of circumstance; sur-
rounded by food and opportunity, John indulges himself, as Helen, weak-
ened by deprivation, lacks the physical resources to withstand tuberculosis. 
Both are caricatures of inequity, yet neither is only that, since their respec-
tive physical conditions are also unremarkable in the context of the mate-
rial worlds they inhabit. Jane, too, reminds us that there is no inevitable 
correlation between spiritual and physical “health,” between the outline 
of the body and that of the “self,” for while we might expect her to appear 
self-restrained and temperate in order to accentuate the symbolism of her 
brutish cousin John, she is instead a set of apparent contradictions: feisty, 
plain, subject to prolonged “absence” through illness, audacious, and per-
 6. On the role of phrenology in Jane Eyre, see Mitchell and Snyder, Narrative Pros-
thesis, passim; Torgerson (1–17); Pickrel (167); and Donaldson (“The Corpus of the Mad-
woman,” 103).
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sistent. What, if anything, is thus inarguably good or bad in these physi-
cal representations? Jane’s story repeatedly returns us to the possibility of 
embodiment simply being, rather than representing some puzzle that needs 
to be solved.
 Jane Eyre also interrupts a stereotypical slippage between facial features 
and physique and temperament or psychology. Beauty may be fetishized, 
as when, for example, Jane extols the “perfect beauty” of Rosamond, that 
“earthly angel” (319; ch. 31). Yet beauty is also problematized by unex-
pected combinations of body and self. Ultimately, beauty guarantees char-
acterological goodness no more than ugliness is the sure mark of a sullied 
soul. Neither Blanche Ingram nor St. John Rivers, both of whom have what 
Elizabeth Donaldson calls “classically beautiful bodies” (“The Corpus of 
the Madwoman,” 103), is a particularly pleasant or forgiving person, and 
when Miss Abbot remarks that if Jane “were a nice, pretty child” she might 
be better cared for, the error is clearly Abbot’s rather than Jane’s (21; ch. 3). 
John Reed is ugly, but so is Rochester. In contrast to these two, it might seem 
surprising that Mrs. Reed, Jane’s formidable aunt, is described as unexpect-
edly average: she is “stout” but “not obese,” of “sufficiently regular” fea-
tures, and with a “constitution [as] sound as a bell—illness never came near 
her” (30; ch. 4). “Robust” and “strong-limbed” as she is, Mrs. Reed exhib-
its neither the repugnant physicality of her son John nor the exaggerated 
beauty of her daughter Georgiana—who, in turn, with “her pink cheeks and 
golden curls, seemed to give delight to all who looked at her, and to pur-
chase indemnity for every fault,” though she is really no less despicable than 
her brother (12; ch. 2). Perhaps most unexpected are Brocklehurst’s remarks 
before the assembled students at Lowood; he notes that “no signal defor-
mity points [Jane] out as a marked character. Who would think that the Evil 
One had already found a servant and agent in her?” (57; ch. 7). But in so 
observing, the manager of Lowood unwittingly refutes his own belief in the 
metaphorical properties of body feature. With subtle irony, Brontë has one 
of her more detestable characters articulate a central principle of the novel: 
that the signs of the body bear no stable relation to personal character.
when recognItIon succeeds or FaIls
The novel thus suggests that while its characters are obsessively focused on 
physical features as manifestations of interiority and, by extension, social 
value or worth, they are not particularly accurate in their assessment of 
those metaphors. What are the implications of such inaccuracy for the 
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attainment of recognition between selves when that encounter is fraught 
by anxiety about or intolerance of illness or disability? Bodies may matter 
to interpersonal engagement in the story, but do they matter in predictable 
ways?
 As feminist readings have emphasized, one of the more significant rela-
tionships in Jane Eyre is between Jane and herself. She is described through-
out the novel, and by different sources, as “strange,” but she initiates this 
epithet herself, during her banishment to the so-called red-room (10; ch. 
2). In a mirror-moment that precedes the “species of fit” that renders her 
unconscious (15; ch. 2), Jane encounters a “strange little figure there gazing 
at [her], with a white face and arms specking the gloom, and glittering eyes 
of fear” (11; ch. 2). This “tiny phanto[m], half fairy, half imp” seems an 
obvious symptom of Jane’s psychological struggle with her circumstances, 
an emanation of both her anger and her sense of powerlessness in the face 
of the Reeds’ cruelty (11; ch. 2). The vision is also, I think, a mark of Jane’s 
inability to recognize herself as a legitimate, legitimately embodied, subject. 
“I was a trifle beside myself,” she says; “or rather out of myself” (9; ch. 
2). The misrecognition has partly to do with being at such odds with her 
relatives—in her words, “I was like nobody there,” “a heterogeneous thing” 
(12; ch. 2). That anxiety about unlikeness is here experienced as dissociation 
from the image in the mirror; with the insult of a wound inflicted by John 
Reed still stinging on her body, Jane cannot reconcile her outrage at being 
wronged with the horror of her physical and emotional vulnerability.
 At the same time, of course, readers will understand that heterogeneity 
is precisely what differentiates Jane from others in the best sense, allowing 
her to be more flexible and tolerant, less rigidly didactic or opinionated. 
Her failure to take in her reflection as herself—a failure rendered in terms 
of bodily anomalousness, of being “strange”—is thus a missed opportunity 
to make contact with the diverse and less familiar parts of herself. It seems 
important that Jane’s first vivid experience of self-reckoning takes the form 
of this frightful misrecognition, as if to insist on the powerfully internalized 
effects of others’ regard. The problem here lies not so much in a need to 
integrate the contradictions of subjectivity into a unified “whole” (remem-
bering the Victorian connection between a “whole” body and a “whole-
some” soul [LaCom, 190]) but rather in Jane’s inability to “contain shifting 
and conflictual versions of self” (Mitchell, Hope, 105). From this perspec-
tive, the mirror-moment is significant less because it reveals Jane to be split, 
her frustrations “acted out” through projection (the standard reading of the 
scene since Gilbert and Gubar), than because it points toward the possibil-
ity of sustaining the tensions and contradictions of selfhood—its strangeness 
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and irregularity—without collapsing these through the negation of same-
ness. If this moment is originary, ushering Jane toward eventual realization 
of her adult selfhood, I would argue that the task it underscores is not one 
of subduing bodily unruliness in the service of psychological “health,” but 
instead learning how to maneuver between subject positions that do not 
necessarily adhere to an orderly, unstrange whole.
 Granting Davis’s point that Jane’s oft-remarked and lamented plain-
ness makes her an unusual nineteenth-century heroine (Bending Over Back-
wards, 96), we might also consider that what really makes Jane “strange” 
is her refusal to acquiesce, to succumb to others’ desires or authority. But 
could strangeness not also seem plain—that is, does the novel not reclaim 
the anomalous from the borderlands of recognition? The spectacle of Jane’s 
night in the red-room, her nervous shock and subsequent convalescence, 
for instance, culminate in a rather underwhelming manner: “no severe or 
prolonged bodily illness followed this incident” (16; ch. 3). We might again 
notice a foreshadowing in that this episode prefigures Jane’s later period 
of illness at the home of the Riverses, which is also depicted as an expli-
cable if not exactly ordinary event, given the extremity of her hunger and 
exhaustion. So, too, does the graphically described, piteous state of little 
girls’ hands and feet at Lowood, indicative of their material conditions, 
resolve somewhat naturalistically: “our ungloved hands became numbed 
and covered with chilblains,” Jane’s “feet inflamed,” and the act of “thrust-
ing the swelled, raw, and stiff toes into [her] shoes” is “torture” (51–2; ch. 
7); but later, those same “wretched feet, flayed and swollen to lameness by 
the sharp air of January, began to heal and subside” (65; ch. 9).
 What is suggestive about such scenes is that their dramatic force has to 
do less with the display of strange bodies, bodies under duress, than with the 
potential for engagement between individuals and contact among bodies. 
Importantly, no illness or pain or impairment is represented as fully singular 
or solitary, in large part because the travails of the body (including those of 
Bertha Mason Rochester) so often necessitate caretaking. Beth Torgerson 
has suggested that “Brontë’s personal experience of illness as both caretaker 
and survivor enriches her use of illness as motif” (15); from a disability per-
spective, care has an ethical dimension that extends the orthodox feminist 
critique of caretaking as an unpaid form of labor for which women, nearly 
exclusively, are held responsible.7 If the aftermath of Jane’s night in the 
red-room seems in one sense vaguely anticlimactic, it is also marked by the 
“inexpressible relief” Jane feels in the presence of the apothecary Mr. Lloyd, 
 7. On this point, see Lloyd. On the ethics of caretaking, see Engster.
138 M i n T z
C
h
a
p
ter 7
in addition to Bessie’s “softly” tending to her need to sleep, eat, and drink 
(15–16; ch. 3). And if her obviously metonymic feet suffer cruel neglect at 
the Lowood school, at Thornfield they are solicitously looked after by Mrs. 
Fairfax: “If you have got your feet well warmed,” she says, “I’ll show you 
your bedroom” (85; ch. 11). It is as if each episode emphasizes the possibil-
ity of intersubjective regard to imply, when that possibility goes unrealized, 
that the problem resides not with corporeal excess or insufficiency but with 
an emotional, psychological incapacity that derives from the pressures of 
ideology and discourse.
 Mrs. Reed again provides an instructive instance. On the night before 
Jane’s departure from Gateshead, Mrs. Reed approaches Jane in bed to ask 
that she be remembered as Jane’s “best friend,” but Jane responds with 
silence, “turn[ing] from her to the wall” (35; ch. 5). Later, after Mrs. Reed’s 
stroke, the scene is reversed: standing beside the bed, Jane “fasten[s]” her 
hand on her aunt’s, but Mrs. Reed “[takes] her hand away” and “turn[s] 
her face” away as well (202; ch. 21). The chiastic repetition in these scenes 
seems to juxtapose wellness and disease, virtue and vice—the young girl’s 
healthy, if unnurtured, body houses a pure soul; the older woman’s impaired 
body, grown “stout” and “not strong,” weakened by stroke and further 
diminished by an “apoplectic attack” brought on by the shock of John 
Reed’s suicide, has been stricken for her sins (195–96; ch. 21).
 There is, however, a more complex discontinuity at work, having to do 
with opposing motives or psychological intent exhibited as a more or less 
open interactional style. It is the obvious gestural tension between these 
scenes that matters, inviting us to gauge not better or worse bodies in 
relation to honest or dishonest selves but rather more or less capacity to 
approach boundaries, experience generosity, and receive expressions of care. 
The crucial difference is one of recognition rather than relative health. Mrs. 
Reed extends to Jane an inauthentic declaration of affection and in turn 
rebuffs a genuine willingness to forgive past betrayals; it is only Jane who 
can say, “I had once vowed that I would never call her aunt again; I thought 
it no sin to forget and break that vow now. My fingers had fastened on her 
hand [ . . . ] had she pressed mine kindly, I should [ . . . ] have experienced 
true pleasure” (202; ch. 21). Impairment and physical trauma do not make 
Mrs. Reed more or less spiteful and mean; on the contrary—and despite the 
rather dramatic piling up of her bodily predicaments—they seem simply to 
coincide with an ongoing nastiness in her character.
 Perhaps the most obvious instances of the breakdown of recognition 
involve Bertha. When Rochester explains to Jane the sordid history of his 
connection to the Masons, he delivers a string of demeaning epithets that 
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exaggerate his difference from that family as if he were violently expelling 
from himself any vestige of what they come to represent, which is being 
“mad,” “lunatic,” “a complete dumb idiot,” “feeble,” “common, low, nar-
row,” “coarse and trite, perverse and imbecile,” “violent and unreasonable,” 
“absurd, contradictory,” “pigmy” in intellect, and “giant” in propensity (and 
that is just one page [269; ch. 27]). This is no exciting “brush with other-
ness” that Benjamin describes as pertaining to the playful and “complex 
interaction” between selves responding to, translating, and recognizing each 
other, but rather a stark projection of “all that is bad and dreaded” onto 
the Other (LSLO, 87, 86). As is well understood, Rochester responds to the 
retroactive “degradation” of his desire for Bertha through radical repudia-
tion, “conceal[ing] it” and its embodiment in the “goblin’s cell” of his attic 
(272; ch. 27). To put this in terms of intersubjectivity, Rochester’s inabil-
ity to “own—assume responsibility for containing—” his own desire and 
destructiveness forces the mechanisms of splitting and subjection, and what 
Benjamin calls “the barbarism of incorporating the Other into the same” 
(Shadow, 99). Confining Bertha in the upper reaches of his own English 
manor house, Rochester allows himself the illusion of “the self-enclosed 
world of the subject,” nursing his narcissistic wounds through guilt, shame, 
and the pleasures of confession (Shadow, 98).
 The other, more prosaic “nurse” in this context, Grace Poole, fails Ber-
tha in a less dramatic way but one that returns our attention to the impor-
tance of caretaking. Rochester calls Grace a “good keeper” despite the fault 
of her drinking (272; ch. 27), but later, when we learn along with Jane of 
the events that led to the Thornfield fire and Bertha’s death, Grace emerges 
as careless, negligently lax. The innkeeper too describes Grace as “an able 
woman in her line, and very trustworthy” except for the “one fault—a fault 
common to a deal of them nurses and matrons—she kept a private bottle 
of gin by her”—but he goes on to assert that while such a habit may be 
“excusable” given a nurse’s “hard life [ . . . ] still it was dangerous” (376; 
ch. 36). Since the proximate cause of Bertha’s nocturnal excursions is that 
Grace Poole falls asleep after drinking, we might attribute at least some of 
the destruction that ensues to a neglectful watcher. But this is not to lay 
the “blame” for Bertha’s death at Grace’s doorstep. Grace Poole is merely 
the passive and occasional guardian of a “female grotesque” (to use Mary 
Russo’s phrase) for whom Rochester, at least in one instance, plays a kind of 
barker, pulling aside the curtain to an astonished audience on this “strange 
wild animal [ . . . ] covered in clothing,” a “clothed hyena” with “hind feet” 
(258; ch. 26). Such language exactly replicates the kind of advertising that 
compelled Victorian spectators to exhibitions of human oddities to recon-
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firm their status as properly arrayed and bounded selves, if also to experi-
ence the (perhaps unconscious) thrill of proximity to their own mysterious 
and unpredictable corporeality.8 Rochester makes just this type of confla-
tion obvious in his grindingly ironic juxtaposition of “‘my wife’” and “‘this 
young girl’” (258; ch. 26). In the horrified “retreat” of the gathered polite 
company, anything like sympathetic “affiliation,” to use Rebecca Stern’s 
word, collapses entirely.
 If both Grace Poole and Rochester demonstrate the breakdown of 
recognition in their relations with Bertha, is there anyone who does—or 
could—succeed? Or does Brontë suggest that madness, unlike ailments more 
conventionally understood to be of the body, precludes the very subjectiv-
ity upon which the notion of recognition depends? The argument that Jane 
Eyre repeatedly interrupts stock associations between atypical bodies and 
oddities of personality or sins of conduct may be complicated by the rep-
resentation of Bertha to the degree that she is identified as morally suspect 
from the start, her psychological condition presented as the exaggerated 
consequence of her inordinate fleshly appetites, her refusal to curtail her 
body’s willful behavior. In feminist readings, Bertha becomes Jane’s “truest 
and darkest double” (Gilbert and Gubar, 360), the embodiment of Jane’s 
“anger, female sexuality, and frustration” (Torgerson, 61). More intrigu-
ingly, Rodas has pointed out the extensive similarities between Bertha and 
Rochester, arguing that a “migration” of identity occurs between wife and 
husband (“Brontë’s Jane Eyre,” 149). But if such analyses seek to retrieve 
Bertha from the status of extreme Other by locating the putative evidence of 
her madness in supposedly “healthy” characters, they may also risk a kind 
of scholarly breakdown of recognition, depriving Bertha of separateness as a 
character in her own right.
 Importantly, in the “spectacle” scene invoked above, Jane does “recog-
nize” Bertha. She tells us that when Bertha “parted her shaggy locks from 
her visage, and gazed wildly at her visitors,” she “recognised well that pur-
ple face—those bloated features” (258; ch. 26). Literally, she has seen this 
face before, but her language also implies that she understands Bertha to 
be a separate subject; Bertha’s “features” are entirely her own, not meta-
phorical extensions of Jane. The failure of relational recognition might then 
reveal that Jane is not always the good caretaker she proves herself else-
 8. On the exhibition of anomalous bodies in both Victorian England and nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century America, cf. Tromp, Garland-Thomson’s Freakery, Altick, Gra-
ham and Oehlschlaeger, Bogdan, and Fiedler. What Garland-Thomson calls “baroque star-
ing” would also characterize the horrified but compelled looking at Bertha of the scene cited 
above (Staring, 50–51 and passim).
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where to be (Gilbert and Gubar have also likened her to the negligent Grace 
Poole [351]). For her part, Bertha, though violent in her reactions, is clearly 
quite cognizant of the events transpiring in the house below her. Would she 
be “capable” of the kind of recognition at issue here if others did not react 
to her by recoiling? This is not to ignore the extremity of her acts but to 
understand them in a certain context, where the problem is interactional 
rather than individual and pathological. In this, too, Jane Eyre might be 
said to intimate a basic tenet of disability scholarship concerning mental ill-
ness (argued perhaps most trenchantly by James Overboe), that designations 
of “madness” serve the perpetuation of narrowly defined conceptions of 
personhood.9
 Against the failed intersubjective situations of Bertha’s experience in 
Rochester’s attic and Mrs. Reed’s deathbed episode, as if to emphasize their 
inadequacies, the novel juxtaposes Jane’s period of convalescence with the 
Riverses. Jane’s collapse at the siblings’ door marks an overdetermined 
threshold moment. In a self-imposed state of homelessness, weakened and 
“starving” like a “dog,” Jane is once again unrecognizable to herself, not 
just strange but a “stranger” (288; ch. 28). Through the window at Moor 
House, she espies Diana and Mary—“ladies in every point” (292; ch. 28)—
and overhears them studying German and conversing. Inside are education, 
gentility, and domestic organization; outside is a harsh world in which Jane 
is an “outcast” (290; ch. 28) without connection to name, place, or “friend” 
(287; ch. 28). Jane—her very existence as an embodied subject—hangs in 
the balance, in a most extreme state of peril, “trembling, sickening; [ . . . ] in 
the last degree ghastly, wild and weatherbeaten” (296; ch. 28).
 What brings Jane back to “herself”? Her situation is importantly distin-
guished from Mrs. Reed’s (or from her own prior experience at Lowood) 
again not so much by sickness as by environment of sickness and quality 
of care. Although the housekeeper Hannah initially reacts with suspicion, 
rebuffing the person she calls “a beggar-woman,” St. John addresses her 
as a “young woman” and ushers her into his own home ahead of himself 
in a gesture of mannered politeness (296; ch. 28). Hannah “exclud[es],” 
St. John “admit[s]” her; Diana and Mary then go further, the one holding 
bread soaked in milk to Jane’s “lips,” the other removing Jane’s bonnet and 
helping her to eat (296; ch. 28). With each successive action, physical dis-
tance between the siblings and the “stranger” narrows, until Diana’s face 
is near enough that Jane can feel “her hurried breathing” and Mary’s hand 
“lifted her head.” The willingness to touch is crucial in that it breaches the 
 9. In addition to Overboe, see also Ingram; Wilson and Beresford; and Lewis.
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radical separateness that maintains what the novel elsewhere presents as dis-
tinct identity categories: the privilege of wellness against the untouchables 
of disease and disability. Writing about touch in the context of disability, 
Janet Price and Margaret Shildrick argue that “touch frustrates hierar-
chy,” because it “crosses boundaries rather than creates distance” (“Bod-
ies Together,” 69).10 Touch can thus be read as an ethically inflected act of 
engagement that has the power to disrupt devaluing fantasies of autonomy, 
superiority, and normalcy. In this sense, Jane’s recovery has as much to do 
with making contact with others, with the sisters’ readiness to touch, con-
verse, and care, as with the three days she spends “motionless” in a “torpid” 
sleep (298; ch. 29).
 Slumped in the shadows after Hannah has “clapped” and “bolted” the 
door (295; ch. 28), Jane resigns herself to dying. But once she has “crossed 
the threshold of this home,” “and once was brought face to face with its 
owners,” she says, “I began once more to know myself” (297; ch. 28). Self-
hood is defined here as requiring acceptance as a legitimate subject from 
a community of peers (precisely what is denied Bertha); when the siblings 
interact with Jane, rather than fearing or reviling her, Jane is restored to 
“[her]self,” to recognition or self-knowledge. More radically, Jane is reborn 
at Moor House when she renames herself as Jane Elliott. It might seem that 
bodily trouble then becomes meaningful only insofar as it can be survived 
and transcended, that the extremity of hunger and fatigue Jane experiences 
matters (or can be endured) only because it brings her to this act of naming 
and determining herself, away from the overbearing effects of Rochester’s 
attentions but within the confines of her proper class and domestic position. 
But Jane’s entrance into Moor House has another significance, in that it puts 
each of the characters into contact with the strange as much as with the 
familiar. Despite but also because of the presence of the unknown, Jane and 
the Riverses achieve recognition, demonstrated by the trust and respect that 
allows them to forge relationships and that defines intersubjective touch.
readIng the “Irregular”
While Jane lies in bed recuperating, she overhears St. John, Diana, and 
Mary discoursing about her physical appearance. In contrast to Mr. Brock-
lehurst, who once expressed surprise at the absence of “deformity” in one 
so clearly depraved as Jane Eyre (57; ch. 7), St. John remarks that Jane’s 
 10. For more on this topic, see also Shildrick; Chinn.
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“unusual physiognomy” is “certainly not indicative of vulgarity or degrada-
tion” (298; ch. 29; emphasis added). Whatever recourse the siblings have to 
phrenology in assessing Jane’s character, illness is also a contributing factor 
in how they react to Jane’s looks: They call her “emaciated, pallid,” “flesh-
less and haggard,” and one sibling remarks, “when in good health and ani-
mated, I can fancy her physiognomy would be agreeable” (298; ch. 29). At 
the same time, they each call attention to an underlying continuity in Jane’s 
face that derives from the structure of her features rather than the transient 
effects of sickness. St. John says, for example, that “ill or well, [Jane] would 
always be plain”—though in his coolly rational way this does not entirely 
sound like an insult—and one of the sisters goes further: “She has a peculiar 
face [ . . . ] I rather like it” (298–99; ch. 29).
 It seems provocative that illness is represented as negligible in its impact 
on a woman’s attractiveness, and also that whatever assumptions about 
character the siblings make on the basis of Jane’s “plain” and “peculiar” fea-
tures, they nonetheless see something appealing there. Brontë may have held 
to the precepts of phrenology, but scenes like this also imply that her con-
sideration of bodies is not so restrictively determinative, perhaps even locat-
ing “character” in some altogether other place—such as the threshold space 
of recognition between selves. It is part of the novel’s subtly contestatory 
nature to suggest that what makes people who they “are” derives from how 
they are in their intersubjective relation with others. This might put some 
pressure on our understanding of the novel’s references to physiognomy, 
to the degree that what so often becomes foregrounded is the interpretive 
moment more than cranial or facial structures themselves. To consider the 
source of at least some of Jane Eyre’s most explicit expressions of the prac-
tice, for example (such as the insufferable Lady Ingram’s announcement that 
she is “a judge of physiognomy, and in [Jane’s] [ . . . ] sees all the faults of 
her class” [155; ch. 17]), is to remember that bodies become meaningful in a 
discursive and ideological field sustained not by its truthfulness or accuracy 
but by a generally agreed-upon investment in its material benefits. The basic 
tenets of disability theory hold that the meaning of bodies is interpreted, not 
innate, and that bodily anomaly has currency only insofar as it is used to 
maintain the culturally powerful category of normalcy.
 And yet the novel overall consistently problematizes the boundary 
between “outsider” bodies and “normate” bodies in part because so many 
bodies move in and out of states of health, injury, illness, damage, and 
because the categories of normal and irregular come under such scrutiny. 
Both Jane and Rochester, for example, are described in terms of their unbal-
anced features, but the novel complicates easy assignation of motive, moral 
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character, or social worth based on those features. When Jane laments that 
“[she] felt it a misfortune that [she] was so little, so pale, and had features so 
irregular and so marked” (86; ch. 11), we might balance that self-judgment 
with her many fortunes in the story—or, to avoid the compensatory logic 
of such an equation, simply understand the statement as the hyperbole of a 
young woman who has been well schooled in the story of her insufficiencies. 
Rochester’s features have an equally prominent role in the text. Jane reports 
that “he had a dark face, with stern features and a heavy brow” (99; ch. 12); 
she comments that his face “was dark, strong, and stern” (101; ch. 12), that 
he is not “graceful” (105; ch. 13), and twice Jane remarks on the fact that 
he is “broad-chested” (105; ch. 13) or of “considerable breadth of chest” 
(99; ch. 12). According to Jane, Rochester’s eyes are “great, dark” (and she 
repeats this twice in rapid succession as well, 115; ch. 14). If nothing else, so 
much repetition tells us that Jane is paying very close physical attention to 
her employer, but there seems no clear or inevitable meaning attached to any 
of these characteristics.
 While forthright Jane does tell Rochester she doesn’t “think [him] hand-
some”—in fact, she says she is “sure most people would have thought him 
an ugly man”—her descriptions of him emphasize mood or facial expres-
sion more than facial structure (115–16; ch. 14). For instance, “his eyes 
and gathered eyebrows looked ireful and thwarted just now” (99; ch. 12), 
his “full nostrils” indicate “choler,” and his “mouth, chin, and jaw” are all 
“grim [ . . . ] very grim” (105; ch. 13). Those “great, dark eyes,” too, are 
“not without a certain change in their depths sometimes” (115; ch. 14). The 
focus on body language in these moments reminds us that corporeality signi-
fies in the subtlest of ways, and that interpretation not only happens all the 
time but manufactures complex states of mind out of minimal information. 
It also underscores the bodily conversation taking place between people; 
as Jane observes Rochester’s expressions and attempts to understand what 
they mean, and he carefully observes Jane’s attentions to him to determine 
her interest, their relationship evolves on a gestural and largely unarticu-
lated level. Such moments call attention to the dynamics of psychological 
filtering—that is, we perceive what people look like by what we understand 
their emotional states to be or, maybe more urgently, by how emotional they 
make us feel. Subjects enter “the transitional space of communication” con-
stantly, and always with the possibility for understanding another’s mood, 
needs, personal history, grief, pain, and desire (Benjamin, LSLO, 169).
 We might then compare the Rivers’ physical assessments of Jane with 
Rochester’s fanciful characterizations of her as otherworldly. In his descrip-
tion of their first encounter on the road near Thornfield, Rochester asserts 
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that Jane has “rather the look of another world.” The sight of her makes 
him think “unaccountably of fairy tales,” and he wonders “whether [she] 
had bewitched [his] horse” (107; ch. 13). Well into the novel, Rochester is 
still likening Jane to one of the “good genii” (133; ch. 15), “a dream or a 
shade” (215; ch. 22), an “almost unearthly thing” (224; ch. 23), a “pale, 
little elf” and “mustard-seed” (226; ch. 24), “a very angel” (228; ch. 24), 
his “cherished preserver” (133; ch. 15) and “ministrant spirit” (179; ch. 19), 
“‘provoking puppet,’ ‘malicious elf,’ ‘sprite,’ ‘changeling’” and so on (241; 
ch. 24). Paul Pickrel contends that Rochester “delight[s]” in thus naming 
Jane “when he knows her better” (173), but these are hardly actualizing 
terms of deep familiarity or understanding; on the contrary, such epithets, 
affectionate and even admiring as they may seem, reduce Jane to an anoma-
lous half-human, a magical, diminutive being who lacks substance. Indeed, 
Rochester’s language explicitly invokes that of Jane’s own description of 
the “spirit” figure she once saw in the mirror, the figure that reminded her 
of stories told by Bessie in which “tiny phantoms [ . . . ] com[e] out of lone, 
ferny dells in moors, and appea[r] before the eyes of belated travelers” (11; 
ch. 2). Confining Jane to the pages of those fairy tales, Rochester fails to rec-
ognize Jane in both a literal and psychical sense, revealing that his opinion 
of her is sometimes as faulty and dissociative as her own.
 Recognition is by no means an inevitable or easily achieved state of 
engagement between people, and in Jane Eyre, even the most apparently 
“good” characters (such as Jane herself) sometimes fail to grant a legitimate 
subject position to others when bodily distress seems to amplify difference. 
Although the Rivers siblings, for example, in contrast to Rochester, seem to 
engage in frank appraisal of Jane’s relative assets, identifying her through 
material clues such as clothing or accent rather than projecting their needs 
onto her, it could also be argued that they only fully accept Jane insofar as 
she seems—by those very material markers—to comply with the expecta-
tions of their social world. (As one of the sisters remarks, “She is not an 
uneducated person, I should think, by her manner of speaking; her accent 
was quite pure; and the clothes she took off, though splashed and wet, were 
little worn and fine” [298; ch. 29]). Unlike the Riverses, Rochester never 
engages with Jane in episodes of sickness that manifest her body’s incon-
sistency and need for care, and he is guilty of reducing her to a spectral 
emanation in the sway of fantasy. Jane makes her own mistakes, falsely 
elevating Rochester to an “idol” (241; ch. 24). Yet these “irregular” char-
acters do find each other across the threshold of their respective differences. 
It is “the process of recognition,” as Benjamin writes, that “breaks up” 
the mechanism of projection and “modifies omnipotence” (LSLO, 86). “I 
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never met your likeness,” Rochester tells Jane, admiring rather than despis-
ing her uniqueness (229; ch. 24), and at no point does he attempt to tame 
the “strange” that she consistently represents.
alternatIve conclusIons
If Rochester does, however, also seem to revel in the power struggle of 
romantic gaming and to want to keep Jane tethered to him, “figuratively 
speaking,” with a chain (238; ch. 24), what happens to address, to redress, 
the imbalance between its protagonists? Perhaps the obvious answer is, dis-
ability happens. As Gilbert and Gubar put it years ago, it is Rochester’s 
blinding that levels the field: “when both were physically whole they could 
not [ . . . ] see each other because of the social disguises [ . . . ] blinding them, 
but now that those disguises have been shed, now that they are equals, they 
can (though one is blind) see and speak” (368). Such a formulation insists 
on disability as just the kind of “narrative prosthesis” that Mitchell and 
Snyder cite; without some diminishment in status, this “surface manifesta-
tion” (Narrative Prosthesis, 59) on his body, there is apparently no way 
to register the readjustment of Rochester’s psychological position vis-à-vis 
Jane. Gilbert and Gubar construe embodiment in the most conservatively 
metaphorical way, with disability and scarring figured as loss of “whole-
ness,” sight as the privileged mechanism of psychological understanding, 
and blindness (according to the blindness binary) as ignorance and insen-
sitivity, intuition and insight. Disability is the threshold moment—nothing 
between Jane and Rochester can remain the same after its calamitous trans-
formations—but compensation arrives (“though one is blind”) in their rap-
prochement as “equals.”
 Yet Gilbert and Gubar go on to complain that while Jane Eyre seems to 
announce the possibility of a “democratically equal” marriage (354), by the 
end of the novel that “optimistic portrait of an egalitarian relationship” is 
effectively banished (369), its viability interrogated by the remote and seem-
ingly asocial setting of Ferndean. This suggests not only that “such egalitar-
ian marriages as theirs are rare, if not impossible” (369) but also that the 
very injuries they present as sufficiently mitigating Rochester’s domineering 
ways also make him unfit for society; the broken man and his improperly 
independent wife must retreat to the woods. David Bolt has taken to task 
the “classic [feminist] exposition” of Jane’s culminating empowerment for 
its complicity in denigrating disability (269); the ways in which Jane inter-
acts with the blinded Rochester—gazing upon him, guiding him by the hand, 
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later seeing “for” him—equate female authority with Jane’s visual advan-
tage. Furthermore, Bolt contends, in restoring sight to one of Rochester’s 
eyes, “the conclusion of Jane Eyre [ . . . ] endorses the ocularcentric belief 
that a person cannot live happily ever after without sight” (285). The fulfill-
ment of Jane’s subjectivity, from this perspective, comes twice at Rochester’s 
cost: first blinding him to grant her specular authority, then “sacrific[ing]” 
the blindman to restore visual dominance.
 If the ending of Jane Eyre seems to fail its critics in these different ways, 
I would propose that continuities of plot also disrupt the ways in which dis-
ability seems either the necessary conduit toward feminist parity or a reen-
trenchment of ableism. Donaldson protests that “when madness is used as a 
metaphor for feminist rebellion, mental illness itself is erased” (“The Corpus 
of the Madwoman,” 102), and, by a similar logic, when Rochester’s injuries 
are used as metaphors for emasculation on one hand or magical healing 
on the other, disability is erased. If, however, we read those injuries in the 
context of recognition and the novel’s sustained interest in challenging too 
quick assessments of subjectivity based on bodily traits, it becomes possible 
to understand the end of Jane Eyre as a continuation, rather than a reversal, 
of its protagonists’ relationship.
 Conventional readings of what happens to Rochester in the burning of 
Thornfield have a tendency to emphasize loss of sight over the loss of his 
hand, as well as the pathos of blindness as a signifier of his social and sexual 
weakening. As Martha Stoddard Holmes puts it, “the blinding of Roches-
ter [ . . . ] is melodramatic” (22); disability, she argues, “is melodramatic 
machinery, a simple tool for cranking open feelings” (3). But it seems worth 
remembering that well before he becomes “[a] poor blind man, whom [she] 
will have to lead about by the hand,” “[a] crippled man [ . . . ] whom [she] 
will have to wait on,” bearing his “infirmities” and “deficiencies” (Brontë, 
392; ch. 37), Rochester has repeatedly put before Jane the fact of his own 
“ugliness,” his “deformities” (127; ch. 15). And though Bolt argues con-
vincingly for the unequal dynamics inherent in Jane’s staring at Rochester 
in his blindness, we might remember that Jane has been staring at Rochester 
all along, as evidenced by the boldly delivered blazon she delivers when she 
falls in love and tells us that “beauty is in the eye of the gazer” (153; ch. 
17). To quote Janet Gezari, the novel “reconceiv[es] sight so that the very 
terms subject and object are false to the experience of Jane and Rochester” 
(68). Indeed, admitting that Rochester’s “colorless, olive face, square, mas-
sive brow, broad and jetty eyebrows, deep eyes, strong features, firm, grim 
mouth—all energy, decision, will,—were not beautiful, according to rule,” 
Jane singles out his “pith” and “power,” his “interest” and “influence,” 
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as Rochester’s most appealing characteristics (153; ch. 17). The “irregu-
larity” of their looks is precisely what attracts each to the other, and the 
novel seems to work hard to establish disfigurement and disability not as a 
traumatic turning point that separates prefire Rochester from the enfeebled 
man for whom Jane’s love is really a form of pity but rather a continuum of 
bodily types and aspects that have little to do—but also everything to do—
with their love.11 Such structural continuity works against the notion that 
disability marks a breach in the forward-motion of a life. On the contrary, 
these two discordant bodies come together throughout the novel.
 Similarly, Jane neither heals Rochester nor saves him—not just in the 
magical or fantastical way in which he construes her effect on him but also 
the recuperative sense of narrative closure provided by marriage. To read the 
final pages of the novel this way is to insist on injury as a crossroads where 
debility will either sequester Rochester at Ferndean, a helpless and broken 
man, or require marriage as his only hope of regaining social and mascu-
line position. But by the time Rochester is wounded and blinded by the 
fire, the novel has long established a pattern of “refusing,” to quote Gezari 
again, “the logic of opposition” (68). Jane is indeed called forth to resume 
her place with Rochester, but of course, Rochester leans on Jane before his 
injuries, too (“‘I’ve got a blow;—I’ve got a blow, Jane!’ he staggered. [ . . . ] 
‘Jane, you offered me your shoulder once before; let me have it now’” [179; 
ch. 19]), just as her willingness to offer her care—at least to Rochester, Mrs. 
Reed, Adèle, or Helen Burns—never wavers. Does the novel foreground 
these troubled bodies to repair them within the boundaries of good family 
and class hierarchies, or does it show us what happens when subjects recog-
nize each other as valuable and worthy of engagement, no matter what the 
contours or behaviors of their bodies? As Jane says of her interactions with 
Rochester in the first years of their marriage, before he has regained some 
sight in his one eye, “We talk [ . . . ] all day long: to talk to each other is but 
a more animated and an audible thinking. [ . . . ] [W]e are precisely suited in 
character—perfect concord is the result” (397; ch. 38).
 Given that Jane Eyre entertains a progress narrative based on fantasies 
of “benevolent” people who can intercede on behalf of the weak, the poor, 
the downtrodden, the oppressed—as Lennard Davis puts it, “the desire for 
a cure is also the desire for a quick fix” (Bending Over Backwards, 99)—
it seems interesting that the novel, so fascinated by the promise of recov-
ery, would end on forms of physical disability and disfigurement that do 
 11. Torgerson writes that nineteenth-century medicine produced a “new understanding” 
that health and disease were not “polar opposites” but rather “occurred along a continuum” 
(13). On scars as forms of disfigurement, see Jeffreys.
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not entirely “heal.” A competing narrative throughout the text has to do 
with the power of a woman who thinks about what she wants (75; ch. 10). 
“Restlessness was in my nature,” Jane tells us; “I believed in the existence of 
other and more vivid kinds of goodness” (95; ch. 12). It is in this realm of 
the what-else that Jane Eyre situates its engagement with forms of recogni-
tion and resists the seductive promise of cure. Many critics have reiterated 
this sense of Jane Eyre as a novel invested in changing patriarchal social 
structures, what Beth Torgerson calls “a little breathing room for [Brontë’s] 
middle-class heroines” (133). But more than just Brontë’s women are at 
stake; is there also more room for the anomalous body? When Jane says she 
“know[s] what it is to live entirely for and with what [she] love[s] best on 
earth” (396; ch. 38; emphasis added), she refers to a man she married when 
he had not regained sight in an eye, when he had lost the use of a hand—a 
man she recognized, in effect, both as disabled and regardless of disabil-
ity. In this she reminds us of the possibility of alternative relationships and 
states of being, ones in which the oddities and excesses of the body simply 
take their place alongside other aspects of identity.
a s  T h e  o T h e R  c h a p T e R s  demonstrate, Jane Eyre, particularly 
in its resolution, is significantly concerned with disability. Jane’s assump-
tions about disability as a source of dependency (for the disabled person) 
and service (for his or her loved ones) are familiar and still conventional. 
These assumptions, in turn, have been shared for decades by critics, whose 
interpretive work regarding the role of disability in Jane Eyre continues 
to gestate through an abundance of film and television adaptations (more 
than twenty screen versions since 1910, with a new release in spring 2011). 
Given the novel’s emphasis on visuality and embodiment, and the thriving 
relationship with its filmic offspring, the cultural impact of Jane Eyre and 
the exploration of disability themes within its narrative must be consid-
ered with reference to visual as well as verbal versions. Indeed, an impor-
tant minor thread in Jane Eyre and Brontë scholarship is film criticism.1 
Despite the centrality of disability and embodiment to written and screen 
 1. Fansites are a strong part of this critical community, including numerous blogs that 
catalog and comment on screen versions. Interposed between fan blogs and academic jour-
nals is the Brontë Society, a long-standing appreciation society that has—like many of the 
appreciation societies—an increasingly scholarly element. It has published film criticism since 
1944 in its journal. See Stoneman for the authoritative collection of explorations of Brontë 
culture; see also Rubik and Mettinger-Schartmann.
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versions, however, most film criticism does not consider disability as a key 
element in plot, characterization, or dialogue, much less within the cin-
ematographic grammar of gender and power. As such, it tends to miss what 
is most interesting—and most progressive—about the film versions: that all 
grapple, consciously or otherwise, with deeply engraved social fears and 
values regarding disability and desire. In an effort to focus on this gap and 
initiate discourse around these subjects, this chapter undertakes readings of 
disability and embodiment in a number of iconic screen adaptations of Jane 
Eyre—the 1944 film directed by Robert Stevenson and starring Joan Fon-
taine and Orson Welles; the 1983 BBC miniseries directed by Julian Amyes 
and starring Zelah Clarke and Timothy Dalton; the 1996 film directed by 
Franco Zeffirelli and starring Charlotte Gainsbourg and William Hurt; 
the 1997 A&E miniseries directed by Robert Young and starring Saman-
tha Morton and Ciáran Hinds; and the 2006 BBC miniseries directed by 
Susanna White and starring Ruth Wilson and Toby Stephens2—and inves-
tigates the most significant paradigms of disability and embodiment in the 
existing renditions on screen. It considers both the progressive possibilities 
that emerge and the enduring unease with which filmmakers and their audi-
ences approach the representation of disability and bodily difference.
 In academic contexts, where the main Jane Eyre text is usually literary, 
teachers regularly use screen interpretations of the novel to spark student 
engagement, illuminate key themes, and invite consideration of page-to-
screen challenges and interpretive issues. However, since the enjoyment of 
nineteenth-century novels requires some effort and persistence on the part 
of a twenty-first century reader, many people outside the classroom may 
only “know” Jane Eyre through a screen version. Jane Eyre is an inviting 
text for the screen because of its embodied, highly visual narrative style and 
its recurrent thematic concern with bodies—how they look, how we look at 
them, and how they connect. The word flesh recurs some thirty-one times 
in the novel, and, to borrow Chivers and Markotic´ ’s term, Jane Eyre is 
from its earliest chapters focused on a spectrum of “problem bodies” with 
profound range, complexity, and interrelatedness. While Rochester memo-
rably describes the “queer feeling” of “a string somewhere under my left 
 2. These versions are critically acclaimed and/or in active circulation through public 
libraries and video rental companies such as Netflix. While the 1970 British Lion television 
production directed by Delbert Mann and starring Susannah York and George C. Scott has 
generated substantial interest, it is no longer readily available for purchase or rental, at least 
in the United States, and thus not a focus of this chapter, which aims to be accessible to 
readers interested in viewing and possibly using film versions of the novel. While the 2011 
Focus Features film directed by Cary Fukunaga and starring Mia Wasakowska and Michael 
Fassbender appeared too late for full discussion in this essay, I discuss it briefly in a later note.
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ribs, tightly and inextricably knotted to a similar string situated in the cor-
responding quarter of [Jane’s] little frame,” theirs are hardly the only linked 
bodies in the novel (291; ch. 23).3 The abused and “passionate” child-body 
of its plain protagonist; the “majestic [ . . . ] dark as a Spaniard” Blanche 
Ingram; and the Creoled, “mad,” and animalized body of Bertha Mason 
seem no less interlinked than Rochester’s “stern features and heavy brow” 
and the “Grecian profile” of St. John Rivers (134; ch. 12 and 508; ch. 37). 
As Elizabeth Donaldson has argued, the novel relies on “juxtapositions 
between normative and non-normative bodies, between the accidental and 
the congenital, between masculine rationality and feminine embodiment, 
and between melancholy and raving madness. Reading the body is a central 
practice in Jane Eyre” (“The Corpus of the Madwoman,” 102). Julia Miele 
Rodas, similarly, has argued for the physiological likeness between Bertha 
and Rochester as well as between Bertha, Grace Poole, and Blanche Ingram 
(“Brontë’s Jane Eyre”).4
 Given that Brontë’s physiognomic emphasis in Jane Eyre includes recur-
rent views of the faces and bodies of all the significant characters, the novel 
provides substantial direction for its own translation from a verbal medium 
into the primarily visual one of film/television. Jane’s narration is precisely 
descriptive, lending itself to stage directions, props, casting, and makeup. Its 
emphasis on looking (particularly Jane’s looking at others) suggests camera 
orientations for point-of-view shots. Indeed, in its recurrent visuality and 
self-consciousness about the visual, the novel seems to invite representation 
in visual media despite being published some fifty years before the invention 
of cinema. The four scenes that construct disability illustrate both how films 
have taken careful direction from Brontë (and from earlier film versions) 
and also how they have diverged from the novel and from each other.
 At the same time, Jane Eyre poses some fairly significant challenges for 
mainstream film and television, given that its continuing popularity hinges 
partly on its core plot of a plain heroine finding love and money. “Plain” 
Jane Eyre and “ugly” Edward Rochester are marketing problems in a cul-
 3. The version of the primary text referred to in this chapter is Charlotte Brontë, Jane 
Eyre (London: Penguin, 2006).
 4. A fuller analysis of film versions would attend to each film’s casting choices for these 
interlinked bodies. For example, there is wide variation not only in the casting of Roches-
ter and Jane, but (much more so) in the casting of Bertha, who in the Zeffirelli 1996 and 
White 2006 versions is clearly beautiful; in others, barely visible under a mass of hair; and 
in the always curious 1947 version, dressed like a genteel lady of the house, with her hair 
up, enquiring if she and Edward are going to be married again. The Bertha-Rochester body 
language is also worth analysis; in several versions, the notion of her jealousy of Jane is more 
developed than others, and in the 1997 version, he is tender to her, holding her and kissing 
her head after her outburst.
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tural climate in which producers and viewers of popular film and television 
narratives (Ugly Betty, for example) typically denote “ugliness” by put-
ting thick spectacles and orthodontic devices on otherwise conventionally 
attractive people, with the implication that as long as we can easily see it as 
located in discrete, removable components, “ugliness” is a transitory state 
that resides on the highly mutable visible surfaces of the social body. We are 
willing to suspend our disbelief in the character’s ugliness because we don’t 
truly have to suspend it at all. Rochester’s multidimensional “ugliness,” in 
contrast, presents a series of tough questions for cinema and television to 
address with casting, makeup, script, and direction.5
 Even more significantly, the novel—and particularly its last few chap-
ters—requires decisions about the visual representation of disability. Dis-
ablement is an important layer in Rochester’s characterization, from Jane’s 
initial encounter with him to the novel’s close. Their first meeting engenders 
a temporary impairment, when Rochester’s horse slips and throws him; Jane 
must aid her future employer, whose ankle is sprained, to remount, a pros-
thetic relationship that recurs as the novel draws to a close. After seeing the 
burnt ruins of Thornfield Hall, Jane learns that her former master has been 
made “stone-blind” and “a cripple” in a fire set by his “mad” wife Bertha 
and is called, once again, to support Rochester in his impaired condition 
(494; ch. 36). How to represent Rochester’s disablement remains a fascinat-
ing question and opportunity for screen versions of the novel. Enactment of 
disability-inflected scenes is informed and complicated not only by the ques-
tion of “faithfulness” to the written texts but also by various audience- and 
culture-based challenges. A mass-marketed production needs to provoke 
desire—both in Jane and Rochester, and in the audience as sutured to Jane 
and/or Rochester—sufficient to the plausibility of the ending in the context 
of popular expectations about a romance plot and its key personnel.
 In negotiating these demands, most film representations of Rochester’s 
disability focus on dependency, without considering other functions that 
disability, seen as a continuum and a set of variations on human distinc-
tion, might have for the narrative. Most film versions assume that disabil-
ity means the end of sexuality, or else can only envision disabled sexuality 
within narrow limits. These expectations accord with a convention—dated 
 5. Physical appearance aside, for much of the novel he is rude, abrasive, cold, and sim-
ply unkind—disturbing, above all, not simply in his teasing of the besotted Jane but in his 
treatment of his “mad” wife Bertha. Even Jane, whose affinity for Rochester is at the start 
predicated on his “frown [and] roughness,” must correct him and remind him of the cruelty 
of his “vindictive antipathy” for his wife, who cannot help her condition (134; ch. 12 and 
347; ch. 27). Any of the dimensions of his disgust for Bertha, which intertwines sexism, rac-
ism, ableism, and colonialism, offers a cinematic production of Jane Eyre a hefty obstacle.
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at least from the nineteenth century and the reification of disabled people as 
objects of charity—that disabled people are not sexual people.6
 This is hardly Brontë’s message. While the Jane of the novel ultimately 
becomes Rochester’s “right hand” and “the apple of his eye,” the couple 
first has a series of conversations about disability that lead to and enable 
the happy ending of marriage (519; ch. 38). Jane and Rochester’s discus-
sions about marriage and disability are much less conventional and have 
been much less thoroughly explored than the desexualized characterization 
of disability referenced above. In fact, the novel’s distinctive enactment of 
desire for disability—not simply as that which mobilizes gendered power 
shifts or presents an opportunity for service but as a form of the difference 
that is part of the “sexual aesthetic”—is as innovative and important today 
as it was in 1847.7 While the original text cannot be said to endorse a vision 
of the disabled Rochester as unsexed, the resilience of this interpretation—
that sex and disability are mutually exclusive spheres—inflects Jane Eyre 
films and critical studies, and thus is ignored at the mainstream filmmaker’s 
peril. In short, those film analyses of Jane Eyre that address disability extend 
and reinforce what the films themselves often tell us about common assump-
tions about the meaning and nature of disability; both film and film criticism 
tell us more about popular constructions of disability than they do about 
Brontë’s use of disability in the novel.
 Aficionados often see popular screen versions of Jane Eyre as provid-
ing “faithful” or “unfaithful” renditions of the novel. They may also be 
considered as endorsing or correcting the longstanding critical argument 
that Brontë uses disability symbolically as the only way to level Roches-
ter’s power and enable her vision of egalitarian marriage. My reading of 
these films is not invested in weighing in on those issues. Rather, I am fas-
cinated by screen versions’ repetition of conventions derived from popular 
beliefs about disability, from other screen versions, and, to some extent, 
from the novel. Scripts, acting, and direction reveal resilient ideas about dis-
ability, including anger and pity as obligatory gatekeepers to a happy ending 
 6. As Higashi argues, film versions often capitulate to the “narcotic” power of the 
romantic formula in which women are “encouraged to daydream about masterful lovers but 
not to analyze the realities of power in their relationships with men” (28). Paulson traces 
the connections between sight and sexuality in eighteenth-century French melodrama. Hahn 
argues both for a “subversive sensualism” associated with disability and for charity culture’s 
desexualization of disabled adults (27). See Siebers’s Disability Theory for a discussion 
of nondisabled people’s resistance to disabled people’s sexuality and the ways in which a 
disability-inflected, disability-authored sexual culture contributes to the positive transforma-
tion of bodies and sexuality more generally; see also McRuer and Mollow.
 7. Rodas, e-mail message to the author, June 10, 2010. Thanks to Rodas for suggesting 
this useful term as a way to describe Jane and Rochester’s relational dynamics.
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between a blind man and a sighted woman, and the implication (by almost 
entirely erasing that part of the book) that desire for an amputated Roches-
ter is queerly outside the limits of what filmmakers expect their audiences to 
imagine.
rochester on horseback
The plethora of screen versions that have encountered the challenge of rep-
resenting Rochester as concurrently “ugly,” disabled, and desirable cre-
ate an opportunity to reflect on the larger place of desire, difference, and 
embodiment in text and culture, through four key scenes that construct his 
disabled self, approaching bodily difference by a combination of the con-
ventional, the innovative, and the divergent. Thus, in the pages to come, 
I examine the way film adaptations approach the following scenes: Jane’s 
first meeting with Rochester when he falls from his horse; her first encoun-
ter with him in Thornfield Hall; her first sight of Thornfield—and then 
Rochester—after the fire that has damaged both; and finally, the scene that 
reestablishes Jane and Rochester’s relationship as lovers. Against this fairly 
consistent ground, the films often enact choices noticeably at odds with the 
novel and/or with each other in ways that illuminate the cultural construc-
tion of disability.
 Jane’s first meeting with Rochester characterizes him in terms of his 
embodiment, both its athleticism and its vulnerability. The scene also estab-
lishes the physical nature of Jane’s attraction to Rochester. She focuses first 
on his body (as he sits on a stile, in pain) and next on his face:
His figure was enveloped in a riding cloak, fur collared and steel clasped; 
its details were not apparent, but I traced the general points of middle 
height and considerable breadth of chest. He had a dark face, with stern 
features and a heavy brow; his eyes and gathered eyebrows looked ireful 
and thwarted just now; he was past youth, but had not reached middle-age; 
perhaps he might be thirty-five. (134; ch. 12)
While distinctly distancing herself from any interest beyond “being useful, 
or at least officious,” Jane authorizes her somewhat bold and familiar scru-
tiny with the statement that “[h]ad he been a handsome, heroic-looking 
young gentleman, I should not have dared to thus stand questioning him 
against his will, and offering my services unasked” (134; ch. 12). Here, 
the novel forges an important theme of Jane’s sexuality; it is Rochester’s 
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“roughness” and misalignment with gendered ideals of beauty—his embod-
ied “difference”—that generates the sense of ease and familiarity that spurs 
her attraction.
 The scene, then, establishes an important instance of Jane and Roches-
ter’s sexual aesthetic, including an appreciation of their shared divergence 
from standard beauty and comportment. Antagonism, often based on their 
awareness of their class and power differences and their willingness to test 
the implied boundaries, is also established as a part of their dynamic. In 
this one scene, as Rochester transitions from high on horseback to low on 
the ground and his horse falls on top of him, a host of ideological implica-
tions are suggested by the fact that the powerful, muscular master is depen-
dent upon the small servant for help.8 Filmmakers have made much of this 
power shift and of the physical and class contrasts between two characters 
who are briefly connected by temporary disability. Stevenson’s production 
creates a template for many later films with a scene that has the emotional 
muscularity of a Delacroix and, despite divergences, is relatively faithful to 
the novel.9 In this version, director of photography George Barnes renders 
the suddenness of Rochester’s arrival on horseback by working dramati-
cally with camera angles (as will all later versions): high-angle shots make 
the horse and man loom even larger, while low-angle shots of Jane from 
the back make her a small silhouette in cloak and bonnet. After Rochester 
falls, the two characters’ dramatic divergence in levels is erased. This scene 
includes a series of same-level close-ups suggesting parity between Jane and 
the man she does not know is her employer and toward whom, according 
to the novel, she feels “no fear [ . . . ] and but little shyness” (134; ch. 12).10 
Shot/reverse-shot editing, which lets us see each face from the other charac-
ter’s perspective, adds to this sense of mutuality.
 Cinematography is often defined as writing with light and motion, and 
lighting and camera distance used together are crucial to the visual grammar 
of Jane and Rochester’s relationship in all film versions. A distinctive feature 
of Stevenson’s film is its use of lighting to present characters as emotionally 
open or impenetrable and to chart their power dynamics accordingly. This 
 8. Rodas, e-mail message to author, June 10, 2010. As Rodas has reminded me, there is 
some degree of fetishization of class and power differences, with Jane’s insistence on calling 
Rochester “master” despite his explicit refusal to treat her as an inferior.
 9. See Sconce for a fascinating history of the adaptation.
 10. This stands in contrast to Welles’s expressivist aesthetic in which compositional ele-
ments (i.e., mise-en-scène: characters, props, the set, lighting, and camera orientation) rather 
than close-ups articulate his or her situation and psychology. See Campbell for a discussion 
of Welles’s instrumentality in the film despite not being the director of record. A subtler 
expressivism characterizes Fukunaga’s version as well.
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is particularly the case in the close-ups of Jane and Rochester’s faces in this 
first encounter, where complementary lighting, with Rochester’s face lit on 
the right side and Jane’s on the left, makes the viewer’s eye connect the two 
characters, building an affinity between them. Facial orientation and eye 
contact enhance this effect. A face filmed straight on performs openness and 
potential vulnerability or engagement, contributing to the illusion of eye 
contact—or its sense of possibility. Just as in an encounter with an actual 
person, a viewer or character’s encounter with a film face is an event in 
which relationships are instantly established, even between strangers such as 
Jane and Rochester.
 Later productions reiterate this moment and its literal and figurative 
levels of power. They also include something Stevenson’s film does not—a 
shot of Rochester using Jane to limp to his horse—a device which further 
dramatizes both their difference in height (and class status) and their unex-
pected relationship, as well as foreshadowing his later disablement and her 
role as his prosthesis (ch. 38). Zeffirelli’s Jane Eyre gives an even stron-
ger dynamic of differences marked and later muted, by providing not only 
shot/reverse-shot sequences that view Rochester from a high angle and Jane 
from a low one (sometimes over his shoulder) but also shots incorporating 
both characters (i.e., a “two-shot”), making them equals in the same cin-
ematic frame.
 Levels are an important issue for the representation of dis/ability, par-
ticularly those disabilities whose distinctive qualities include situating a per-
son above or below the mainstream level for standing or walking. While a 
concern for representing disability and desire is probably not the catalyst, 
an emphasis on low and high in the aesthetic of representing Rochester and 
Jane distinguishes all film versions and lends itself to the representation of 
not only class and gender but also disability. This same aesthetic becomes 
much more complex in cinematic renderings of the first formal meeting 
between the two characters.
rochester’s chaIr
Jane’s first formal introduction to Rochester occurs at the end of the same 
day as their surprise encounter. This encounter takes place within the physi-
cal and social constraints of Thornfield Hall, in the drawing room, where he 
lies “half-reclined on a couch,” his “foot supported by the cushion” (141; 
ch. 8). Jane’s description of Rochester is even more detailed than that in the 
horseback scene, expressly creating him as an object of her gaze. Starting 
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with his face, her words (and eyes) move down her employer’s body, leading 
the reader through a sustained moment of increasing intimacy:
I knew my traveller with his broad and jetty eyebrows; his square forehead, 
made squarer by the horizontal sweep of his black hair. I recognised his 
decisive nose, more remarkable for character than beauty; his full nostrils, 
denoting, I thought, choler; his grim mouth, chin, and jaw—yes, all three 
were very grim, and no mistake. His shape, now divested of cloak, I per-
ceived harmonised in squareness with his physiognomy: I suppose it was 
a good figure in the athletic sense of the term—broad-chested and thin-
flanked, though neither tall nor graceful. (141; ch. 8)
Relentlessly evaluative and comparative, Jane completes a blazon of his 
appearance and judges Mr. Rochester’s body “good,” as she will later judge 
herself “bad” in comparison to Blanche Ingram.
 Significantly, the novel’s attention to visuality and looking works on 
both dramatic and metanarrative levels. Jane looks at Rochester, and Roch-
ester notices her looking: “You examine me, Miss Eyre,” said he: “do you 
think me handsome?” (154; ch. 14). Through their mutual looking (or star-
ing) and a series of conversations in which Rochester interrogates Jane, the 
two characters reiterate the negotiation of gender, power, and embodiment 
that occurs in the horse scene, further developing what is still an ambiguous 
relationship.
 Screen versions of Jane Eyre, as we might expect, retain an emphasis 
on the physical aspects of this negotiation. All seem to recognize that this 
meeting—indoors, amid class formalities and the visible signs of Rochester’s 
power, and following closely on the heels of a meeting outdoors in circum-
stances that released them from all such constraints—is crucial to estab-
lishing Jane and Rochester’s power dynamics and sexual attraction, which 
are overdetermined by the resonances of class, gender, and (in this case, 
temporary) disability. Successive screen productions inflect this dynamic 
differently, establishing the characters’ conversational and body language 
through acting and mise-en-scène (i.e., the compositional elements of char-
acters, props, set, lighting, and camera orientation). As an aesthetic of Jane 
Eyre films as well as a broader ideology of the body, these scenes offer fas-
cinating messages about geographies of power and disability as negotiated 
through such elements as looking/staring and levels.
 I call these scenes “chair scenes” because only Amyes’s interpretation 
preserves Brontë’s presentation of Rochester in a chaise longue at this meet-
ing; the others situate Jane and Rochester in chairs opposite each other, 
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convenient for the shot/reverse-shot sequences used (rather than the earlier 
two-shots binding them to one another) for their conversations. A highly 
charged dynamic, not only of talking but also looking, is thus created. The 
chair scenes illustrate the dynamics through which looking establishes rela-
tionships and hierarchies, a particularly loaded issue for films that represent 
blindness.11 In Stevenson’s production, acting, camera angles, and lighting 
make this looking unidirectional, a fact that has inspired debate among film 
critics.12 The camera’s function as an observer is evident in the cinematog-
raphy. If Jane is not exactly stared at, the camera is certainly looking at her 
closely. The orientation of her face leaves a sense of the possibility of the 
viewer “catching her eye” as Rochester interrogates her or as she reacts to 
his harshness: we see her reactions. Further, as indicated through point-of-
view shots and eyeline matches (i.e., shots edited together to connect one 
person’s look with the object s/he regards), Stevenson’s chair scene has Jane 
looking at Rochester (as she does in the novel).
 Rochester, in contrast, is always looking to the side, away, or down; 
he directs questions at Jane or commands her, continually deflecting the 
viewer’s attempts to understand his character. Chiaroscuro lighting, which 
leaves Jane’s face fully lit and Rochester’s dramatically shadowed, enhances 
his inaccessibility. In several screen versions, shots of Rochester place him in 
such deep profile within the back of the chair that neither Jane nor the audi-
ence has access to him. Acting and lighting thus reiterate Rochester as a man 
with many secrets, in opposition to Jane, a poor, plain, woman who lacks 
the ability to forestall the interrogative gaze of her employer.
 Later film versions break Rochester’s impenetrability to varying degrees. 
Lighting in the chair scenes still favors chiaroscuro,13 with Jane frequently 
etherealized by backlighting. In terms of eye contact, however, Zeffirelli’s 
and White’s versions create particularly open Rochesters in Hurt’s and Ste-
phen’s facial and eye orientations, using shot/countershot editing of charac-
ter close-ups to produce a convincing sense of the dynamic interactions that 
build Jane and Rochester’s attraction.
 11. See Garland-Thomson for a useful discussion of the dynamics of eye contact (Staring, 
40–41). Her scholarship on staring is particularly well attuned to film analysis, a discipline 
concerned with point of view, the gaze, and other aspects of visuality that inflect and are 
inflected by forms of embodied “difference,” particularly gender difference. As I discuss later, 
Kleege and Cheu offer important discussions of eye contact, blindness, and “passing.”
 12. In brief, while Ellis and Kaplan argue that Jane’s recurrent positioning as observer 
in the second part of the film makes her passive, Campbell and Soyoung Lee criticize this 
conclusion as reductive and insufficiently nuanced in terms of film elements such as mise-en-
scène.
 13. The use of chiaroscuro is especially noticeable in the Zeffirelli interpretation because 
of the contrast it forms to the egalitarian, day-lit scene that precedes it.
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 Screen versions of this scene are particularly fascinating for the con-
sistency with which they approach the central prop of the chair, and the 
fact that the scene often goes against conventions of frame composition 
and power. Rochester is established as an authority by sitting in his chair 
with others moving around him, or directing Jane to move her chair near 
to him; but he also places Jane in his chair at several points, which, given 
his identification with it, produces a sense of intimacy. By repeatedly shoot-
ing Rochester in his chair, cinematographers and directors collaborate to 
create a visual message that Rochester’s chair defines him, suggesting that 
he is overshadowed by it, literally and figuratively. The shots may also sug-
gest, metonymically, a wheelchair, implying the antiquated but nevertheless 
familiar notion of the chair user as “wheelchair-bound” or “confined” to a 
wheelchair. In their respective portrayals of Rochester, for instance, Ciáran 
Hinds (Young’s version) and Toby Stephens (White’s production) are dis-
tinctively slumped into and contained by their chairs in ways that suggest—
along with the oblique framing of Rochester in these chair shots—a sense 
of Byronic mystery blended with stereotyped “angry-cripple” alienation, a 
foreshadowing not only of Rochester’s later disability but also of the poten-
tial for his attractive brusqueness to slip into an available narrative of dis-
ability and masculinity.
 At the same time, there is never any suggestion that Rochester’s being in 
a chair and at a lower level than Jane places him in a position of dependency, 
supplication, or vulnerability. While conventions of film interpretation indi-
cate that the upper two thirds of the frame are the locus of power and that 
actions tend to originate on the left side of the frame and be received by 
the right side, these conventions of visual design are always inflected in any 
scene by dialogue, plotting, acting, lighting, and other elements of cinema 
that are inextricably part of mise-en-scène.14 Rochester is by definition on a 
lower plane than Jane in this scene; thus, conventionally, he has less visual 
power within the frame. Other than having Jane kneel before him—which 
she does in the Stevenson version, to pour hot water into a basin for Roch-
ester’s foot after he snaps his fingers toward the kettle—there is no way to 
inscribe their power differential via levels alone. While slight camera angles 
in shot/reverse-shots do suggest Rochester’s dominant position in some ver-
sions, most films work instead with body language/orientation/framing, 
lighting, and acting to present his interrogation of Jane. Regardless of the 
approach, Rochester is always presented as the more powerful figure in this 
 14. Just as Third Cinema theory has forced film scholars to reconsider the conventions 
of Western film in terms of its unexamined limits, one wishes for a Crip Cinema theory that 
would investigate ways of overturning assumptions about levels, perspective, etc.
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scene, despite being seated and disabled. White’s version emphasizes this by 
shooting at the level of Rochester’s chair, so that, rather than looking down 
at him and sharing Jane’s point of view, we look from his orientation up at 
her. His position in the chair determines the norm for the conversation, just 
as his questions dictate the topics for discussion. A key visual message, then, 
is that being at a lower level, as in a chair of any kind, does not inherently 
situate a body as powerless.
rochester dIsabled
While nineteenth-century novels can be notably ambiguous about some 
conditions of the body—not only pregnancy but also illness and disability—
Brontë’s description of Rochester after the fire that destroys Thornfield Hall 
is frank and direct: “one eye was knocked out, and one hand so crushed 
that Mr. Carter, the surgeon, had to amputate it directly” (494; ch. 36). 
Brontë is also very clear about each character’s uncertainty as they approach 
the delicate negotiation of their new relationship. In this reunion scene, after 
observing Rochester unnoticed, Jane takes the place of a servant, replaying 
in miniature his cruelty to her during her governess days by not identifying 
herself to him immediately. The masquerade ends in Rochester’s exclama-
tion and a passionate embrace:
He groped; I arrested his wandering hand, and prisoned it in both mine.
 [ . . . ] The muscular hand broke from my custody; my arm was seized, 
my shoulder, neck, waist—I was entwined and gathered to him. (500; ch. 
37)15
When Jane kisses Rochester, the encounter becomes more complex: “I 
pressed my lips to his once brilliant and now rayless eyes—I swept his hair 
from his brow, and kissed that too. He suddenly seemed to arouse himself: 
the conviction of the reality of all this seized him” (501; ch. 37). Rochester 
becomes anxious about the nature of Jane’s interest in him: “But as you are 
rich, Jane, you have now, no doubt, friends who will look after you, and 
not suffer you to devote yourself to a blind lameter like me?” (501; ch. 37). 
 15. See Bolt for an analysis of this moment’s participation of “the motif of the groping 
blindman” and associations with lecherousness (272–73). The Young production improb-
ably shifts Rochester’s groping to the water glass. In several versions, Jane needs to guide the 
water to his lips despite the fact that he has clearly learned mobility techniques and would 
be unlikely to require so much assistance with an activity as daily as drinking from a glass.
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For her part, Jane, even empowered by her gains in status, is also hesitant to 
assume that he wants her: “I suddenly remembered that I might have been 
all wrong, and was perhaps playing the fool unwittingly; and I began gently 
to withdraw myself from his arms” (502; ch. 37). While the pair does not 
completely settle their situation in this scene, they have found a level of com-
fort with each other’s feelings that permits a frank and loving discussion of 
Rochester’s changed body:
“On this arm, I have neither hand nor nails,” he said, drawing the muti-
lated limb from his breast, and showing it to me. “It is a mere stump—a 
ghastly sight! Don’t you think so, Jane?”
 “It is a pity to see it; and a pity to see your eyes—and the scar of fire on 
your forehead: and the worst of it is, one is in danger of loving you too well 
for all this; and making too much of you.”
 “I thought you would be revolted, Jane, when you saw my arm, and 
my cicatrised visage.” (503; ch. 37)
In this startling scene of physical revelation, Brontë does little to develop the 
details of what the stump or scar look like; the reader is given no basis on 
which to evaluate whether s/he might find it a ghastly or revolting sight, and 
Jane’s quick answer offers no suggestions of her reactions beyond the state-
ment that “it is a pity” (which is not the same as saying that she pities him). 
Rochester’s simply described action of “drawing the mutilated limb from his 
breast and showing it” is similarly undramatic, particularly in terms of the 
melodramatic conventions that in Brontë’s time, and ours, tend to dominate 
cultural scripts of disability, particularly first revelations of disablement. As 
familiar as we may be with the ending of Jane Eyre, we may overlook—as 
many critics have—this progressive conversation about a changed body and 
about a relationship that is partly changed as well, but for the better.
 Viewed symbolically, Rochester’s disabilities have posed a continuing 
challenge for feminist critics. Helene Moglen sees his injuries as the nec-
essary complement to Jane’s independence, “the terrible condition of a 
relationship of equality” (142). Gilbert and Gubar argue for a symbolic 
interpretation beyond that of castration: “Apparently mutilated, he is para-
doxically stronger [ . . . ]. [N]ow, being equals, he and Jane can afford to 
depend upon each other with no fear of one exploiting the other” (368–9). 
What is problematic about this emphasis is that it reads disability as purely 
symbolic, a critical gesture that simply tries to recuperate castration into the 
creation of metaphysical sight and strength. David Bolt’s “The Blindman in 
the Classic: Feminisms, Ocularcentrism, and Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre” 
v i s i o n s  o F  R o c h e s T e R  163
C
h
a
p
ter 8
is a welcome exception to mainstream critical reading of Rochester’s dis-
abilities. But, arguing from a disability studies perspective, Bolt nevertheless 
believes that the resolution between Jane and Rochester reinforces blindness 
as deficiency and loss, as an emptiness that fills out the desires of the sighted 
Jane. One implication seems to be that the marriage that ensues is not about 
the body or sexuality; according to these interpretations, Jane and Rochester 
have found their egalitarian union away from society but also away from 
the embodiment that is central to the novel.16
 At the same time, we can also read Rochester as resistant to Jane’s 
encompassing narrative of his blindness: he shows her his stump, after all, 
and he tells her, “I want a wife” (512; ch. 37). He does not go gently into 
the good night of being a blind projection. In fact, Rodas suggests that we 
might read this moment as defiantly phallic: “What if [ . . . ] Rochester’s 
disability is a beautiful thing within the Jane-Rochester sexual aesthetic, 
his stump manifestly, unapologetically erect, phallic, masculine?” (e-mail 
message to author, June 10, 2010). Rodas’s reading suggests that we might 
consider this scene, and particularly the revelation of the stump, in terms of 
Robert McRuer’s concept of “a critically queer and disabled” perspective, 
in which the gap between normative and queer sexualities—and norma-
tive and disabled bodies—is mobilized to reimagine and reshape “the lim-
ited forms of embodiment and desire proffered by the systems that would 
contain us all” (96). In other words, in this moment in the novel, Brontë 
powerfully enacts a disabled character refusing both normalization and 
marginalization: the “staree” (Garland-Thomson’s term) wrests control of 
the scene of looking.
 As with Rochester’s fall from his horse and the various chair scenes, 
screen productions likewise continue to interpret and critique this reunion 
of the lovers in which one character is a blind amputee. Informed by the 
relentless emphasis on conventional beauty and a superficial and artificial 
sense of wholeness that characterizes the narratives of popular media, cul-
tural ambivalence regarding disability is nowhere more evident than in the 
ways that filmmakers render the close of Brontë’s novel. More changes seem 
to occur in screen interpretations of Jane’s return to Rochester than in any 
other part of the novel. While these scenes, like the earlier ones, share touch-
 16. Gilbert’s later essay on “furious lovemaking” in Jane Eyre corrects that suggestion, 
noting Jane’s return to the observations about his body that mark her first meeting with him 
and expressed desire to kiss not simply his brow but also his lips. “There can be no question, 
then, that what Jane calls the ‘pleasure in my services’ both she and Rochester experience in 
their utopian woodland is a pleasure in physical as well as spiritual intimacy, erotic as well 
as intellectual communion” (368).
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points, there is substantially more variation in added dialogue (and added 
affect), as well as in the ways in which disability is represented as a physical, 
psychological, and social experience.
 Jane’s return to Rochester is fraught with increasingly mixed feelings as 
she apprehends the ruin of Thornfield Hall and the situation of her former 
master and fiancé. The return is also complex for the film audience, which 
has had many opportunities to become closely identified or sutured with 
Jane but not with Rochester. In Stevenson’s rendition, by the time we enter 
the ruin (where this film relocates the reunion), we have looked at Jane and 
looked with Jane at Rochester, but we have been to a large extent prevented 
by the cinematography from ever seeing into him—having the illusion of 
access to his actual thoughts or feelings—because of Welles’s acting, the 
mise-en-scène that takes the place of close-ups, and the chiaroscuro lighting 
that leaves him enigmatically in the dark and Jane in the light, vulnerable to 
view.
 As with the chair scenes, certain filmic conventions have evolved for this 
moment of “seeing blindness,” based loosely on the end of the novel.17 Some 
versions develop this “seeing” gradually. Both Aymes and White render the 
first sight of Rochester outside Ferndean with some illuminating differences. 
Amyes’s Rochester, for example, not only gropes his way out and back into 
the house but is also guided by a servant who holds him by the arm. White’s 
Rochester, in contrast, has a cane he uses to navigate his own way outside 
and back into the house. This initial scene, in which Jane does not speak to 
Rochester, is followed by a second one in which she enters the room in the 
place of a servant, bringing him water. As we enter the room, sutured to 
Jane’s point of view, we are guided by shot sequences to look at Rochester’s 
blindness (and to look at Jane looking at blindness).
 Young’s version is particularly dramatic in its rendering of numerous 
close-ups of Rochester’s face and in the special effects makeup that repre-
sents his blindness. Here the cinematic language of the earlier parts of the 
productions provides meaning through repetition with a difference: whereas 
in earlier scenes Rochester was guarded, three-quarter-turned, or in shadow, 
the post-disablement scenes offer up Rochester’s face and body in full light 
to shots from Jane’s point of view. Where before he looked at Jane but was 
inaccessible himself, the post-blinding shots make him vulnerable to our 
scrutiny and, following the conventions of cinematic representations of 
 17. The moment in which blindness or another disability is “seen” or materialized by an-
other person (often the beloved) recurs in many narrative forms, as does the scene of vision’s 
return in “cure” narratives. For an excellent study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
scenes of returning vision in historical context, see Paulson.
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blindness, unaware of our voyeuristic invasion. Some shots are even identi-
cal in framing to earlier ones. Jane’s reaction shots establish her ability to 
look directly at him in a way that controls the gaze, unlike the earlier scenes 
in which she was in essence a face on display to his interrogation.
 A return to disability studies theories of blindness and looking is help-
ful as we engage this scene. In particular, a recent essay by Johnson Cheu 
might be repurposed to examine cinema’s use of blindness. Drawing on the 
work of Georgina Kleege, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, and other disabil-
ity studies scholars, Cheu’s “Seeing Blindness on Screen” focuses on “the 
blind female gaze,” exploring “blindness” and a distinctive “blind gaze” 
as an element filmmakers co-opt to shore up the power of the “norma-
tive” (male) gaze. Cheu points out that feminist film theory, though it has 
observed this feature, has not yet fully interrogated its meaning.18 In this 
essay, Cheu indirectly reaffirms the possibility of reading Jane’s reunion 
with Rochester as a scene in which she retrospectively establishes her own 
sense of equity in her relationship with him. Put another way, the scenario 
Cheu analyzes—that of sighted characters and moviegoers looking at the 
blind gaze of female characters—is significantly complicated by Jane Eyre 
and by this scene (see figure 1) of a sighted female character regarding a 
male character’s “blind gaze.”
 Jane has repeatedly narrated her lack of object-status because she is 
plain, poor, and small; her descriptions of Rochester have objectified him, 
making her a surprisingly confident looking subject, if not one confident in 
her authority to desire a man who is her class superior. Later, however, she 
must acknowledge that she is, for him, an object of desire, as much as he is 
an object for her evaluation—a situation that enables her power of refusal. 
Finally, when she returns a rich woman and encounters Rochester after his 
disablement, we see Rochester as an object of interest, concern, and longing 
before he himself is aware of the gaze we share with Jane. Once alerted to 
her presence, Rochester again sees himself as an object for her evaluation, 
but with the additional concern of disability as a complication. Further, he is 
no longer a man with secrets he can—and believes he must—withhold from 
her. The cinematography of this scene reinforces Jane’s new ownership of 
the look and the concurrent shift in power.
 As before, levels are central to the figurative and literal dynamic between 
Jane and Rochester. The change in elevation (raising Jane up and bringing 
Rochester low) that so many critics observe in the novel is literal here. Jane 
 18. See Mulvey, DeLauretis, and Doane for key theoretical works on gender and the 
filmic gaze.
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enters a room in which Rochester is slumped in a chair, reminiscent of her 
first “official” meeting with him at Thornfield in which he is temporarily 
disabled. However, this is repetition with a difference: rather than a sprained 
ankle, he is blind and otherwise disabled (the “otherwise” indicated by a 
cane, a general appearance of fatigue, burn/cicatrix makeup, or, very rarely, 
signs of amputation). If in the earlier scene Rochester ignores Jane’s entry 
because she is a governess and beneath his notice until he finds her interest-
ing, in this one he doesn’t notice her because he is incapable of noticing (the 
film would have us imagine that his blindness is an all-encompassing lack of 
awareness), and even when he is aware that someone is there, he does not 
know who it is until she speaks. Further, as Jane and Rochester interact, the 
literal changes in their levels break out of the repetitive framing; there are a 
number of shots (in several screen interpretations) that truncate Rochester 
to privilege the audience’s view of Jane. Acting and directing exacerbate the 
message of disability as dependency in Young’s version, while increasing the 
voyeuristic sense of staring at blindness; although the audience will later see 
Rochester grope Jane, in this scene Rochester gropes and fumbles for his 
water glass while the camera watches.
 The visual economy of film thus reiterates Brontë’s explicit visual 
empowerment of Jane, whose problematic aspects Bolt analyzes so effec-
tively. In fact, the frequent repetition of earlier visual motifs, done with no 
apparent critical distance, reiterates what Bolt points out as one of the dis-
appointing aspects of the novel, the message that “the misery of the blind-
man is integral to the happiness of not only the sighted woman, but also the 
sighted man whom Rochester becomes” (285).
 Scripts for screen narratives of Jane Eyre suggest that misery alone is 
insufficient, and that twentieth- and twenty-first century interpretations of 
the novel must carry the freight of contemporary fixations about disabled 
masculinity: they must engage angrily with the assumption of pity. In Ste-
venson’s very compressed version of the ending of Brontë’s novel, Jane sees 
Rochester walking in the ruined part of Thornfield with the dog Pilot and a 
cane. Where Pilot, earlier in the plot, works as an extension of Rochester’s 
masculinity and class power, here the dog is repurposed as a different kind 
of prosthesis. The dog and cane read as two assistive devices that over-
determine, as visual metonyms, the message of his disablement, without 
transcribing Bronte’s descriptions of Rochester’s amputation and blindness. 
Welles performs blindness with one eye opened to reveal more white than 
the other, and with the “zombielike stare” Kleege notes as a convention of 
cinematic representations of blindness (45). Jane works no deception in this 
production; Rochester simply detects Jane’s presence and shouts at her; she 
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identifies herself; he touches her; and they resolve their situation in a brief 
conversation and an embrace. But as brief as the scene is, it has time for this 
conversation:
“Jane—all you can feel now is mere pity. I don’t want your pity.”
 “Edward.”
 “You can’t spend your life with a mere wreckage of a man. You’re 
young and fresh. You ought to get married.”
 “Don’t send me away. Please don’t send me away!”
 “Do you think I want to let you go?”
A passionate clinch closes the scene, followed by a summary ending and the 
closing credits. Compression is the principle guiding the production, but 
curiously, in compressing the much longer scenes in the novel, screenwriters 
tend to use “pity” as shorthand for the much more complicated emotional 
dynamic offered by Brontë.
 Moreover, Stevenson’s early cinematic adaptation is not especially dated 
in its popular representation of blind masculinity. Nearly forty years later, 
Amyes’s production, “faithful” in other ways, includes an angry Roches-
ter who retorts that as a rich woman, Jane has “friends enough who will 
not suffer you to devote yourself to a lame blind wreck. This is pity, not 
love. Leave me!” Young’s interpretation makes a very similar move within 
a much more elaborate development of Jane and Rochester’s reunion. The 
words companion and nurse trigger the following, a clear departure from 
Brontë’s text: “I don’t want a companion! Neither do I want a nurse.” He 
continues, “I might have known—so you have come back to take pity on a 
poor blind man. Is that it? Who told you?” Similarly, where Brontë includes 
a discussion of Rochester’s “hideousness” as a moment in which he feels out 
Jane’s attitude towards him and she responds with a humor that indicates 
she is unwilling to simply soothe his anxiety, the Young production’s script 
generates an angrily bitter Rochester who snarls, “Take a good look. It was 
a narrow escape. You could have been married to this hideous blind wreck,” 
and responds to Jane’s assurances of love with, “How can you love me like 
this? Do not speak these words out of pity.” Several screen interpretations 
of the meeting between Jane and Rochester, then, find it necessary to supple-
ment the novel with scripts that depict him as resolutely angry and focused 
on pity and shame.
 The Zeffirelli and White versions stand out for actively working to ren-
der the closing scenes in ways that invite viewers to think beyond these 
received cultural assumptions that disability is the occasion for anger and 
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pity but not sexuality. Zeffirelli’s version exemplifies the power of mise-
en-scène to convey relationships far more effectively than added dialogue 
(particularly when the dialogue delivers a complex interaction in reduc-
tive terms). The resolution is compressed, like most things in this produc-
tion: The two reencounter each other; Jane avows that she will never leave 
Rochester; they kiss; he laments his “ruined” state; she denies it; and they 
embrace again. The next scene provides an excerpt from the novel’s epi-
logue. Jane and Rochester’s development of a new configuration for their 
relationship, however, is something lighting and camera work communi-
cate in significant and effective ways. She finds him in a room with low 
vaulted ceilings where shafts of sunlight from arched, churchlike windows 
counteract the room’s central darkness and cryptlike tone. Chiaroscuro 
externalizes Rochester’s emotional liminality, but the sunlight combined 
with the low ceilings presents the space more as attic than crypt, suggesting 
that he is now contained by Thornfield, as Bertha was before. A series of 
two-shots position the pair together but alternate whose face is at eye-level 
(whether sitting or standing) and, indeed, who sits or kneels or stands. Zef-
firelli follows the convention of Rochester standing up as he voices con-
cerns about Jane’s plan to be his companion and nurse (the word nurse 
usually generates the movement), but his rise to his feet does not seem to 
signal anger about pity but rather a sadness for his changed self that is 
quickly dispelled by Jane’s rebuttals about vigor. The scene closes with a 
tableau of them embracing under the curve of the vaulted ceiling. If other 
aspects of the film have been accused of muting Brontë’s gender-egalitarian 
vision, its cinematography of bodies and relationships conveys a strong 
message of equal potential for self-determination, regardless of gender or 
dis/ability.
 The visual eloquence of the scene is undisturbed by Whitemore and Zef-
firelli’s script. When Jane avows that she will never leave Rochester again, 
he says, “So you will stay with me. How?” This is neither reproach nor sus-
picion, but a crucial question that both need to answer. The quickness with 
which it is resolved may not be fully plausible, but it is much less troubling 
than the compulsion to add in pity and anger.
 White’s version handles the reunion in a much more extended form, 
separating Jane’s first view of ruined Thornfield from her encounter with 
Rochester, as the novel does, and giving her an opportunity to learn of the 
fire (but not Rochester’s disabilities) before seeking him out at Ferndean. 
It thus honors the novel’s extended reestablishment of Jane and Roches-
ter’s relationship and the issue of “how” they will relate with their changed 
circumstances. While it shares with other films some visual conventions of 
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blindness as incapacity, this version is striking for its overturning of the mes-
sage that disabled people are not sexual subjects.
 We enter the room in which Rochester is engulfed, through chiaroscuro, 
in darkness, his white shirt and the white bandages that wrap one hand 
standing out from his figure slumped in a chair. Jane actually pours the 
drink into his mouth; as in Young’s version, White dramatizes blindness as 
groping not simply for Jane’s body but for everything—despite Rochester’s 
effective use of the cane in the outdoor shot. Following this moment, how-
ever, there are no angry outbursts or discussions of pity. Jane and Roches-
ter embrace; he weeps, and then “feels her up”—but rather than leave this 
single anchor to the “groping” language of the novel, Sandy Welch’s screen-
play normalizes the groping by following it with other moments of sexual 
mutuality in the film’s closing scenes, mirroring those before the failed wed-
ding. Jane not only sits in his lap (an action she takes, and takes time to jus-
tify, in the novel) but lies on top of him on a riverbank. While the propriety 
of the nineteenth-century novel, already strained by Brontë, would draw the 
line at such representations, their inclusion in film interpretations creates a 
powerful statement that is arguably in the novel as well: Rochester blinded 
and amputated is no less sexual a being than he was before the fire, and 
Jane is no less desiring of him. The film ends with a horizontal two-shot and 
a horizontal pan that moves across their intertwining feet (cinematic short-
hand for sexual intercourse) as Jane lies on top of Rochester.
 A distinctive feature of screen versions is how they work with Brontë’s 
very clearly articulated directions about Rochester’s amputation. In almost 
every version, Rochester’s blindness and the scarring on his face are sug-
gested somehow through props and special-effects makeup. While Orson 
Welles seems simply to widen one eye, Ciáran Hinds wears an opaque con-
tact lens; Stephens seems simply to have burn makeup, and the burn makeup 
worn by Timothy Dalton’s and William Hurt’s Rochesters suggests that the 
left eyelid in each instance has fused over the eye socket to the left cheek. 
In almost every version, however, both of Rochester’s hands are completely 
or virtually intact. In Young’s production, Hinds’s left hand has some burn 
makeup; in White’s interpretation, Stephens’s left hand is bandaged; but 
only in Amyes’s version is Rochester actually given a visible amputation, 
albeit virtually indistinguishable from the cuff of his shirt.
 In this context, it is striking not so much that some versions ignore major 
plot elements—after all, adaptation is usually a craft of compression—but 
that some of the most “faithful” versions have moments in which they com-
pletely depart from the novel, suggesting that while Brontë had no difficulty 
imagining Jane desiring Rochester just as much (or more) with an amputa-
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tion, twentieth- and twenty-first century film is less convinced of the market-
ability of such a narrative. This is particularly interesting in terms of White’s 
BBC interpretation, which otherwise may provide the most normalizing 
approach to disability and desire by making Jane and Rochester’s relation-
ship at the end as sexualized as it is in the middle. All the same, whether it’s 
because an amputation is a deal-breaker and blindness isn’t—or because an 
amputation presents more involved “cure” sequences than regained sight—
White’s sexual Rochester is still only a blinded Rochester.
 Taken in the aggregate, popular film versions of Jane Eyre consistently 
articulate—as does Brontë’s novel—desire in the context of blindness. At the 
same time, however, anger and pity are almost always presented as oblig-
atory gatekeepers to the happy ending, which is not the case in Brontë’s 
novel. Further, films rarely visually represent Rochester’s amputation, sug-
gesting that a blind Rochester can be desiring and desirable, but that a blind 
amputee as desirable is more than filmmakers currently expect of their audi-
ences. Whether it is the queerness of the amputation—itself a potentially 
hyperphallic symbol—that makes it alarming, or the extra layer of perceived 
“dependence” it may imply, a handless Rochester remains absent from Jane 
Eyre films.19
 These concerns notwithstanding, film has much to contribute to our 
visually oriented concept of interpersonal relations, where eye contact domi-
nates. In the scenes of Jane’s reunion with Rochester, proxemics and shot 
length are almost as important as eye contact to establish point of view and, 
furthermore, to suggest that point of view is not restricted to being able to 
view things with the eyes. In Zeffirelli’s Jane Eyre, for example, the camera 
lingers at the level of the seated, blinded Rochester, establishing his orienta-
tion to the world as the norm. The work done by the earlier “chair scenes,” 
which counter conventions of mise-en-scène and power, persists in these 
more explicitly disability-focused scenes and prevent us from assuming that 
the seated person is automatically diminished and dependent. Jane is out of 
the frame when they embrace but is not “looked up to” as some distant and 
longed-for ideal. Indeed, Rochester does not look up at Jane at all but rather 
is present and close to the viewer, with intimacy created not simply through 
faciality but also through embodiment. While some productions (Young’s, 
in particular) pause on the standing embrace between the two, lingering on 
Jane’s face and reactions as central to the shot, in Zeffirelli’s film, Rochester 
 19. The dearth of film stills that show Rochester visibly disabled is significant. While 
film versions rarely picture his disabilities in any detail, the archives of publicity stills seem 
to enact a further erasure of meaningful renderings of disability from the public and popular 
narrative of Jane Eyre.
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and Jane alternate being present in the frame as a body and being present as 
a face. Soyoung Lee’s description of the scene is apt:
The depiction of Rochester and Jane’s emerging [sic] into each other is not 
effected through a seamless fusion, but a montage of images, differently 
framed and from different angles, signifying their multiple positions and 
[the] complex dynamics which are involved in their negotiating of the[m] 
selves in marriage. (302)
This visual medium, then, actually argues for the value of tactility, instruct-
ing sighted audiences that you don’t have to see to have a presence or a 
perspective, or to have your point of view central to an important human 
moment.20
 Key feminist readings of Jane Eyre films criticize productions which 
remove Jane’s opportunities for individuation by softening the domineering 
 20. This visual focus on embodiment and tactility distinguishes the Jane-Rochester re-
union embrace in Cary Fukanaga’s 2011 film as well. Fukunaga’s Jane Eyre, perhaps more 
than any other popular screen version, shows us how film and poetry function similarly. Its 
muted palette and meticulously detailed sets evoke a nearly visceral progression of moods 
that respect the blend of depression and passion that distinguishes much of Bronte’s fic-
tion. The socially insightful mise-en-scène (recurrent point-of-view shots that show Jane’s 
ambiguous position of governess enmeshed in, but not truly part of, the upper-class society 
she serves) combined with painterly lighting that recalls the Baroque paintings of Georges de 
laTour (and, in that mode, Cocteau’s La Belle et La Bête) generate this distinctive tone. With 
emotional landscape its priority, it makes sense that Fukunaga takes the necessary compres-
sion of the novel to an extreme: a combination of compression and discontinuity—in which 
various connectives are stripped away—make the film function much as a poem does, mov-
ing from resonant image to resonant image without explanation. For example, instead of a 
gradual approach to the ruins of Thornfield Hall—a device other versions use as a transition 
to Rochester’s disablement—Fukunaga heightens the impact of Jane’s first view. In this film, 
Rochester’s disability is signaled by his immobility (an echo of the chair scene) and a close-up 
on his face that reveals alteration and lack of focus in his eyes, probably a combination of 
special effects contact lenses and acting. In addition, his hair is particularly long and shaggy; 
as my colleague Ann Fox commented, “he looks like a war veteran.” In fact, Rochester 
echoes, for those of us old enough to remember this important contribution to disability 
consciousness and culture, Jon Voight in Coming Home. The hair is also a nod to Jane’s ob-
servations in the novel about his “thick and uncut locks” and need for rehumanizing: “your 
hair reminds me of eagles’ feathers; whether your nails are grown like birds’ claws or not, 
I have not yet noticed” (ch. 37). While in the novel, however, Jane’s comment provides the 
opening for Rochester to reveal his amputation, the 2011 film, like most of the others, leaves 
both of his hands intact. What is particularly lost in the Fukunaga film’s resolution—and 
perhaps most distinctive about it—is any negotiation between Rochester and Jane about the 
meaning of his changed bodily state for their relationship. It is even briefer in its resolution 
than the Orson Welles version. One might argue that in Fukunaga’s vision of Rochester and 
Jane’s relationship, the conversation about disability and marriage—will Jane be a nurse or 
a wife?—is vestigial, an unnecessary and outdated obstacle to the superseding “moment of 
being” of their union. This viewer, however, missed it.
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aspects of Rochester that spur her development, and/or by actually cutting 
the scenes in which Jane individuates in her time away from Thornfield.21 
These readings also evaluate the rendering of disability as a key element 
in Brontë’s argument about female individuation and egalitarian marriage, 
building on literary criticism that looks at Rochester’s disabilities as judg-
ments—if not punishments—Brontë enacts (along with Jane’s inheritance) 
to resolve Jane and Rochester’s power disparities. For many critics, disabil-
ity as total dependency sums up its function in the novel. Patsy Stoneman’s 
summary of several feminist critics’ objections to a perceived “dilution of 
Jane’s rebellious spirit” (Ellis and Kaplan, 192) in most film versions reaf-
firms that critics see Rochester’s disability as inversely related to Jane’s inde-
pendence: “Rochester is not sufficiently injured to need Jane’s assistance 
[ . . . ]. In the fire, Rochester is not scarred and does not lose a hand, which 
means that the promise of restored sight brings him back to his original 
strength” (23; emphasis added). Sumiko Higashi’s essay on the way film ver-
sions of Jane Eyre capitulate to the market forces of the Hollywood romance 
argues that the representation of disability in Jane Eyre films fails to render 
convincingly what she sees as the novel’s message, that Rochester is “totally 
dependent” on Jane (22). Higashi appears to criticize Welles’s Rochester for 
being either not disabled enough or too sexual to be disabled; for example, 
“he claims her with a passionate kiss placed squarely on the mouth. Rather 
good aim for a blind man” (23). Similarly, Soyoung Lee’s nuanced discus-
sion of three film versions of Jane Eyre and their use of cinematic techniques 
to portray gendered power dynamics, nevertheless criticizes Stevenson’s film 
because it represents the disabled Rochester as high-functioning and sexual: 
“The ruins are an obvious symbolism of Rochester’s state, however, his pos-
ture is still as vigorous as before: his right hand is intact and although blind, 
he does not falter a bit,” “his masculinity [is] intact” (287–88). What is 
striking about most such criticism is not only that it tends to fault films that 
reduce Rochester’s disablement but also that the theory emerging from this 
stance requires us to understand disability as an icon of dependency and 
asexuality.
 Rochester’s undiminished and unchastened disablement in Stevenson’s 
film is a primary criticism of Kate Ellis and E. Ann Kaplan’s much-cited 
feminist analysis. Orson Welles’s nondisabled Rochester “always dom-
inates whatever scene he is in,” and the camera repeatedly situates Jane 
as an observer of Rochester, a position they posit as being passive (196). 
Specifically, Ellis and Kaplan criticize the ending’s failure to demonstrate 
 21. See Ellis and Kaplan; Higashi.
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that Rochester has received his comeuppance through disablement: “Welles 
limps through the ruins but is hardly the mellowed, chastened Rochester 
(could Welles ever appear chastened?) of Brontë’s closing chapters. Their 
coming together simply represents the typical lovers’ reunion, with male 
and female traditionally placed” (198). In other words, Rochester is nei-
ther dependent nor diminished enough to resolve the imbalance between 
him and Jane, though disability was apparently supposed to enact these 
changes. 
 In short, those film analyses of Jane Eyre that address disability extend 
and reinforce what the films themselves often tell us about common assump-
tions regarding disability. These constructions of disability are focused 
entirely on dependency, without consideration of other functions, and they 
seem to assume, along with Helene Moglen, that disability means the end of 
sexuality: “Jane’s development [can] be maintained only at the cost of Roch-
ester’s romantic self-image. [ . . . ] It is not a lover he requires, but a mother 
[ . . . ]. And it is this function which Jane will gratefully assume” (142–43).22
 Along with these shortcomings, film critics’ interpretations of Roches-
ter’s disabilities tend to focus on a limited vocabulary of film effects, and 
thus to read reductively. Indeed, most film criticism, regardless of subject, 
does not consider disability as a key element in plot, characterization, dia-
logue, mise-en-scène, or other important elements of cinematic meaning. As 
such, critics are prone to elide what is most worth discussing in film versions 
of Jane Eyre: the way each thinks through longstanding cultural narratives 
of disability and sexuality. Communicating in a primarily visual medium, 
these films ultimately invite us to reconsider desire, as well as human pres-
ence and identity, within a broader aesthetic than that defined by conven-
tional faces, ordinary vision, and upright posture.
 22. Moglen, like many other critics, looks at the ending of Jane Eyre as parallel to the 
role Brontë assumed in relation to her father, Patrick Brontë, who had cataracts.
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